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My dissertation is composed of three corporate finance studies, documenting the effects
of firm policies with deep regulatory implications. In particular, I examine corporate
actions taken in contexts of distress, such as defaults on syndicated bank loans, or taken
in contexts of very asymmetrical information, such as private equity investment and
corporate diversification.
In syndicated loans, violations of financial covenants lead to the transfer of firm con-
trol rights from shareholders to creditors. I find that that firms increase disinvestment
following covenant violations, both through asset sales and spin-off equity deals. Divest-
ing firms can anticipate their exit from a default status, through one-off adjustments
of their accounting variables. In diversified firms, multiple business centres exist in
different divisions. We show that the addition of dedicated financial divisions to non-
financial conglomerates is shown to have a positive impact in the efficiency of capital
allocation within firms, by playing the role of redistributor and common provider of
external financing. In private equity, managers and investors are bound by pre-set
compensation contracts and governance rules, since the fund’s inception. I study the
relationship between compensation, investment strategies and performance in this par-
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In the first chapter, I study the impact of covenant violations on firm disinvestment. I
find that firms increase disinvestment following financial covenant violations in credit
agreements, both through asset sales and spin-off equity deals. Firms in violation
status increase their asset sales by 10 to 15% in the following 3 months. Using a
regression discontinuity design, I find that firms are 81% more likely to sell assets when
a covenant is marginally breached, while the probability of spinning off increases from
0.1 to 3.8 percentage points. Divesting firms adjust covenant variables discretely, thus
anticipating their exit from violation status. My findings highlight how long-term firm
policies can be quickly reshaped by contingent control rights.
In the second chapter, my co-authors and I study non-financial conglomerates that
have a dedicated financial division. We hypothesize that financial divisions improve
the operation of internal capital markets. We develop a simple model based on this
idea, which predicts that financial divisions are more valuable for larger firms, for
firms with more diverse segments, and also for firms with more segments. We show
empirical evidence that financial divisions run more efficient internal capital markets
in conglomerates. Conglomerates with a financial division appear to command a value
premium when compared to otherwise similar firms.
1
In the third chapter, I examine that deal-by-deal compensation rules in Private Equity
Under deal-by-deal rules, bonus payments to General Partners are a function of each
deal within the fund, resembling a portfolio of call options. Using a novel dataset of
fees and investor cash flows, I study the relationship between compensation, investment
strategies and performance in deal-by-deal funds. I find that higher bonus payments
decrease net-of-fee performance. A stronger effect is observed in deal-by-deal funds
with heterogeneous firm portfolios.
2
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Covenant violations and disinvestment
1.1 Introduction
Covenant violations are known to enhance creditors’ bargaining power. Credible threats
of accelerating loan payments or terminating credit agreements can empower lenders
decisively. This empowerment is most relevant for creditors who seek to intervene in
the firm’s management for their own protection. However, managers can anticipate
creditors’ empowerment. They may try to limit the transfer of control through quick
disinvestment actions that yield liquidity and meet due payments. Disinvestment can
both be materialized through pure asset transactions, such as fixed asset sales; or by
equity deals, such as spin-offs or carve-outs.
In this paper, I show that covenant violations trigger disinvestment actions. Firms can
target different outcomes as they implement new policies. In addition to flow variables
(such as investment and financing needs), defaulting firms often act upon stock vari-
ables in their balance sheet, through large reductions of fixed assets. Asset reductions
3
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have immediate effects in firms’ operations and human resources. By prompting the
dismantlement of firm’s operations, or a change in its scope, covenant violations can
have irreversible effects on firm policies which last for many years.
My main finding is that firms tend to carry out asset sales and spin-offs following
implied covenant violations, relinquishing illiquid assets. Effects of technical defaults
are sizeable in my baseline specification. Firms increase their asset sales by 10 to 15%
in the three months after a fiscal quarter in violation. In that period, the propensity of
spin-offs and the share of spun-off assets both increase by more than 50%. The total
effect of a violation can be significantly larger, as firms tend to remain in a violation
state for several consecutive quarters.
I employ a regression discontinuity design to estimate the marginal effect of violating a
covenant. Firms are 81% likelier to sell assets at the mean, as the probability of selling
asset increases by 13.9 percentage points.1 Marginal violations increase the probability
of spinning off assets from 0.1 to 3.8 percentage points and the share of spun-off assets
by 1.1 standard deviations (4.7% of total assets).
This study documents how covenant violations lead firms to disinvest. Following previ-
ous empirical work on the impact of covenant violations2, this paper investigates settings
in which the timely implementation of firm policies can be critical for the protection of
both shareholders’ and creditors’ interests. This paper’s focus on disinvestment through
asset sales and equity deals, whose effects are studied in separate. According to prior
studies, equity deals can have deeper implications on the pledgeability of firm’s as-
sets, thus on default risk.3In this context, they may signal an attempt by management
1The positive effect in the share of assets sold attains 6.7% of total assets (92% of the mean).
2Throughout the paper, I refer to several papers that explored the impact of violations in different
financial variables, following the first studies by Chava and Roberts (2008) and Roberts and Sufi
(2009).
3The literature on spin-offs (Maxwell and Rao (2003)) has supported the idea that creditors of
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and/or other stakeholders to bend the restructuring process in their favour.
Theoretical literature in Finance has pointed to constrained disinvestment actions un-
der financial distress (Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Caballero and Simsek (2013)), in
particular upon technical default events (e.g. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005)). In
practice, constrained disinvestment could be achieved both as part of a renegotiation
(under the threat of loan termination) or later, upon the legal acknowledgement of
covenant violations. Managers and creditors have incentives to accelerate restructur-
ing events, in stages of the process where their control rights are enhanced. Attempts
to anticipate or circumvent reorganization outcomes can be expected from managers
(and shareholders) before violations are legally recognized and creditors receive any
court protection. Such attempts can also be expected from creditors, either at loan
termination stages or if they can threaten managers with imminent insolvency.4
I give empirical support to the prediction that quick interventions are undertaken by
firm stakeholders. For every type of disinvestment (asset sales, spin-offs, carve-outs),
outcome variables are both written with a binary structure (whether there was an event
of that type in that quarter) and as a ratio of the total value disinvested per quarter (in
that type of events), over total assets. I lag explanatory variables by one, two or three
quarters. Both asset sales and disinvestment overall are most frequent one quarter
from a violation. In specifications with longer lags, distinct disinvestment patterns
are revealed, as I exclude the most immediate disinvestment actions at the start of
violation periods. Equity deals are more prevalent, suggesting that more complex and
restructuring transactions occur after six or nine months.
largest resulting entities become less guaranteed than under the spun-off firm. Not least, this prediction
has strong grounding in investment banking guidelines and practises.
4Yet strategies facing the counterpart with irreversible accomplishments are not always feasible,
between creditors and debtors, in insolvency settings.
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Covenant violations can be well predicted for a large proportion of firms, in horizons
of several quarters. A clear counterfactual cannot be established for firms with no real
possibilities of either entering or exiting a violation state. These concerns can only be
alleviated with the inclusion of fixed effects and a wide set of control variables. Hence,
in a refinement of baseline specifications, I restrict my analysis to a narrow sample of
firms close to covenant thresholds.
As noted by Chava and Roberts (2008), covenant violations identify a specific mechan-
ism, the transfer of control rights, revealing conflicts of interest between stakeholders.
Covenants define discrete and verifiable conditions allowing creditors to claim addi-
tional control rights in the court system. The potential for exogenous identification
comes from the random assignment of firms around covenant thresholds, according to
minor variations in their accounting variables. I make use of a regression discontinuity
design to address the concern that disinvestment actions, the availability and liquidity
of firm assets, covenant variables (e.g. net worth) and covenant thresholds (e.g. a bind-
ing minimum net worth) may be jointly determined. The source of exogenous variation
is the minimum distance between covenant variables and covenant thresholds, in each
firm-quarter observation. When this distance is non-negative, a firm is in a violation
state.
The existing literature documents the impact of covenant violations on investment (e.g.,
Chava and Roberts (2008), Falato and Liang (2016)), capital structure (e.g. Roberts
and Sufi (2009), Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009,0)), payout and compensation policies
(e.g. Ferreira, Ferreira, and Mariano (2018)). This paper complements these findings
by highlighting one-off changes in firms’ assets. Such sharp adjustments are consistent
with deep governance changes depicted in Ferreira et al. (2018). In their paper, they
document longer-term changes in firm policies that are preceded and driven by gov-
6
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ernance changes5 and examine permanent one-off changes to a firm’s asset portfolio.
Changes in firm boundaries constrain long-term firm policies by changing the reach
of management bodies (the agency relationship), rather than the membership of those
bodies (the agent).
Covenant violations are a precise mechanism found in the literature to identify sudden
control transfers from shareholders to creditors. Creditors can immediately threaten
managers with a court procedure of loan termination, when certain accounting variables
reach their pre-defined threshold levels.
In practice, creditors rarely need to obtain court recognition of technical (non-cash) de-
faults; most breaches in debt contracts lead to contract renegotiations (Roberts (2015)).
Renegotiations are often launched when creditors’ cash flow projections forecast default-
ing financials in the near future. This paper defines covenant breaches as implied cov-
enant violations, where a formal violation may not have occurred. Hence, some of these
violations have resulted in covenant waivers obtained through renegotiations. Because
disinvestment actions are one of the quickest ways to rebalance a firm, they are likely
to be taken as part of renegotiations, namely in implied covenant violations. These
observations are crucial for addressing the research question and should be retained.
I propose that large divestitures can be motivated by the prospect of a one-off movement
that restores the firm’s non-violation status. As managers achieve a return to compli-
ance, they strengthen their bargaining power in renegotiations with creditors. Creditors
can always threaten managers with loan termination upon one past violation, in most
contracts. Yet the recognition process of violations is long and lengthy. Managers can
commit to behave in a creditor-friendly way only if bankruptcy is avoided. As the firm




return to regular financials, the cost of settling a legal covenant violation becomes high.
Violations result from a key trait of syndicated loans: a traditional covenant structure.6
This covenant structure is not often found in other types of credit arrangements. Under
financial covenants, firms can be flagged much sooner as defaulting or in financial
distress, often at times when bankruptcy can still be avoided.
Concerns with appropriate early warnings gain relevance in a context of emergence of
covenant-lite financing instruments (Becker and Ivashina (2016)), a current matter of
priority for North-American and European policymakers. Under similar circumstances,
covenant-lite mechanisms have the potential to conceal financial distress situations from
external stakeholders until much later stages.7 In this paper, I aim at documenting how
decision-making under “covenant-full” loans can shape a firm’s restructuring through
constrained disinvestment. Resulting policy implications may then be considered for
the potential disbandment of this loan category, as it is replaced by non-bank channels
for corporate financing.
Across non-bank agents, it cannot be ruled out that key decisions such as investment
screening and exposure management may be taken away from established practises in
banking deals. Markets refrain from loans which are simultaneously low in collateral-
ization and covenant-setting standards. Under these loan packages, clearly insolvent
firms could not be tagged as defaulting for long time and help compound uncertainty
in loan markets. Creditors would not be entitled to intervene before any default event
occurred.
6This structure may be binding in key circumstances, where some anticipation of outright insolv-
ency can be attained.
7For the last years, capitalization and solvency concerns have bound bank lending to corporates
for the last years. Non-bank channels for corporate financing benefited from a constrained supply of
traditional corporate loans. Within the so-called “shadow banking system”, direct lending by private




It has been argued that bankruptcy risk can be reduced by mechanisms for early creditor
intervention. However, there is insufficient evidence that such interventions may be
timely in anticipating and reversing management’s own initiative to shape the firm’s
future outlay. This paper intends to shed light on this issue.
My paper makes several contributions to the literature. My results add to the literature
on the effect of loan covenant violations in firm outcomes (Chava and Roberts (2008),
Roberts and Sufi (2009), Ferreira et al. (2018) and others). Asset sales and equity deals
impact covenant variables in a more discrete and irregular way than previously studied
mechanisms. Disinvestment can transform firms in a structural way, through a single
event, with immediate effects and long-lasting implications.
My findings assert the empirical relevance of models associating asset sales to financial
constraints (Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Caballero and Simsek (2013), Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2005)) in settings of enhanced creditor control. Under the threat of loan
termination, evidence of disinvestment actions is consistent with predatory trading and
fire sale models. My evidence on covenant violations thus generalizes effects of strict
trading or regulatory constraints in financial markets. I show that the breach of contract
rules can also prompt large scale transactions in non-financial firms, whose assets tend
to be less liquid.
I do not just provide additional evidence to the literature on the effects of covenant
violations. Importantly, I provide a new plausible motivation for large disinvestment
transactions, such as large asset sales, spin-offs and equity carve-outs. I document
that firms divest large scale assets in specific default circumstances: when they need to
return to compliance with financial covenants.
I contribute to the literature on asset sales, by proposing that financial constraints can
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play an important role in defining a firm’s target scale. In the abscence of M&A deals,
asset purchases and sales are the lead mechanism (Warusawitharana (2008)) through
which firms revise their scale and scope. My findings point out to quick adjustments
to firms’ sizes, through asset sales, driven by a transfer of control to creditors. Hence, I
propose that conflicts of interest in the firm’s governance can supersede strategic factors
in determining firms’ boundaries.
I also contribute to the literature on spin-offs and carve-outs. Prior empirical studies
have addressed both types of equity deals from the vantage point of investors, identiying
positive market reactions (Hite and Owers (1983), Cusatis et al. (1993)). This paper
measures one critical determinant of these managerial decisions. I point out to instances
where equity deals follow disruptions in competing sources of financing - internal funds
and debt, as admitted by the managerial discretion hypothesis and predicted by the
pecking order theory (Maxwell and Rao (2003), Allen and McConnell (1998)). My res-
ults document firms’ preference for equity deals under financial constraints and provide
details on their chosen deal structures.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature
related to the paper. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology used. Section
4 presents the main empirical findings. Section 5 describes the discontinuity analysis,
discusses identification strategies and the robustness of results. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Literature review
My work is related to a number of studies that focus on the impact of credit agreements
on firm policies. Chava and Roberts (2008) are the first to document empirical evidence
for a mechanism of transfer of control rights through the channel of debt covenants.
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As expected, this mechanism plays a crucial role in financing and investment decisions.
They find that capital expenditures decline in response to a covenant violation by
approximately 1% of capital per quarter—a 13% decline relative to investment prior to
the violation.
In Chava and Roberts (2008), investment reductions are presented as an easily imple-
mentable policy to boost short term cash flows, so that firms can cope with debt service.
The authors suggest that Capex reductions can be used to thwart inefficient investment
or to punish management’s misbehaviour, according to the agency theory of covenants
(Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977). Bradley and Roberts (2015)).8 Investment
is presented as the main channel for financial rebalancing policies, as opposed to labour
policy, inventory management and Research and Development.
In their paper, Chava and Roberts (2008) address identification issues through an
innovative application of RDD and quasi-RDD techniques, targeting the objectivity
of violation events in continuous covenant variables. This method provides both a
between-firm (vs. a non-violator) and a within-firm counterfactual (vs. the same firm
before violation) from a quasi-random assignment of firms around the threshold. Evid-
ence of investment reductions is robust to the inclusion of a host of control variables
in the regression specification, including firm and year-quarter fixed effects, proxies of
investment opportunities, financial health, debt overhang and other contractual fea-
tures. Several smooth functions of the distance to the covenant threshold were used to
determine bandwidths: linear, quadratic and higher order polynomials.
Based on a 15-year sample, between 1994 and 20089, Ferreira, Ferreira, and Mariano
8Chava and Roberts (2008) was the first of several papers documenting firm rebalacing policies
taken upon covenant violations. Evidence of such actions confirms the hypothesis that covenants
enable creditors to mitigate conflicts of interest with shareholders, by enhacing their control rights in
states of the world where (payments) default risk is higher.
9The authors add data for the 2009-2014 period for robustness purposes.
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(2018) show that the number of new independent directors is around 25% higher for
firms having breached a covenant or entered into an implied violation of it. These
new directors are often shared with other creditor firms of the same lenders. Firms
appointing directors following a violation are likelier to cut payout, reduce investment
and operational risk (in ROA). Highly levered firms and those with the most established
lending relationships are the likeliest to appoint new board members. These appoint-
ments are not a replacement for executive directors. Covenant violations are defined
as implied, by an accounting criterion. Results show a stochastic structure of two-year
lagged effects of covenant violations in the appointment of directors. Effects are stronger
for more repeated bank relationships and for less tight covenants at origination.
Additional evidence in Ferreira et al. (2018) links incentive conflicts (between firms and
creditors) to corporate debt policy. Net debt issuing activity experiences a sharp and
persistent decline following debt covenant violations. Creditors use their acceleration
and termination rights to increase interest rates and reduce the availability of credit.
The effect of creditor actions on debt policy is strongest when the borrower’s alternative
sources of financing are costly. In addition, despite the less favourable terms offered by
existing creditors, borrowers rarely switch lenders following a violation.
Roberts and Sufi (2009) use novel data set that includes the universe of financial coven-
ant violations reported on firms’ annual and quarterly securities and exchange commis-
sion (SEC) filings between 1996 and 2005. Their analysis considers a legal definition
of covenant violation. Hence the paper complements other studies that include all cov-
enant violations foreshadowed by accounting data. The authors test to the degree of
permission in “implied violation” criteria, which intend to remove potential biases of
omission of non-registered defaults.
Roberts and Sufi (2009) use a sample of violators comprising 3,603 private credit agree-
12
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ments entered into by 1,894 of the firms. Almost 97% of these credit agreements contain
at least one financial covenant. Two main types of covenants are found, according to
their underlying ratios: debt to cash flow (58% of total) and debt to balance sheet.
Among the population of publicly listed firms in the United States, more than one
quarter are found to violate a financial covenant at some point during their sample
horizon. The high incidence in the general population implies that covenant violations
are relevant for a large number of public firms.
On average, financial policy exhibits a sharp change following a covenant violation.
Specifically, net debt issuing activity experiences a large and persistent drop immedi-
ately after the violation. In the four quarters before a violation, borrowers have an
average net debt issuance scaled by lagged assets of 80 basis points per quarter. In just
two quarters after the violation, net debt issuance falls to 25 basis points. Firms move
from increasing net debt issuance by 0.8% of assets per quarter to reducing net debt
issuance in just two quarters. This decline is persistent, lasting for over 2 years after
the violation, and leads to a corresponding decline in leverage of over 3%.
Additional results in Roberts and Sufi (2009) reveal cross-sectional features that in-
crease the likelihood of violations. Firms with and without a corporate credit rating
violate covenants at approximately similar rates. However, smaller firms violate finan-
cial covenants more frequently than larger firms. For instance, firms with total assets
less than $100 million are almost 20 percentage points more likely to violate a financial
covenant than firms with total assets over $5 billion. Firms rated “A” or better have
a 1-year probability of violating a covenant of 1%, while firms rated BB have a 7%
probability. Probabilities of a covenant violation are significantly larger in every rat-
ing category except firms rated “CCC” or worse, which includes some firms that have
already defaulted on a payment.
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In another strand of the literature, a number of studies has developed comprehensive
hypotheses for endogenous disinvestment actions. Warusawitharana (2008) proposes a
model in which firms are expected target under-performing assets in asset sales. Firms
should divest when their performance is lower and their capital employed is higher.
Consistently, in empirical tests, operating performance (ROA) and size are shown to
be the main predictors of asset purchases and sales. These findings indicate that asset
sales are consistent with efficient investment decisions.
Several studies have hypothesized the signalling effects of different types of disinvest-
ment. For equity carve-outs, a prominent signalling theory has been depicted in the
literature. The managerial description hypothesis states that a partial relinquishment
of control of assets of a subsidiary can signal an attempt to cash out the firm: redu-
cing its net cash position, increasing its debt. This the case when cash is paid out for
repurchases or dividends as a result of the carve-out. (Allen and McConnell (1998))
Alternatively, under the managerial description hypothesis, managers could use the
proceeds of a carve-out to reinvest in other projects. From a manager or dominant
shareholder point of view, a carve-out requires a much larger relinquishment of control
than debt or internal financing. It is then signalled in a quite clear way that if rein-
vestment is done through (the proceeds of) a carve-out, then managers must have been
pushed towards that choice for other reasons. Possibly, managers can not access debt
financing, do not want to disclose as much information, or can not be convincing to
external market agents.
The managerial description hypothesis sees equity carve-outs as directly linked to the
pecking order theory. Managers may find hard to present their investment prospects as
opportunities with net present value, not driven by private benefits or empire-building
goals. If external stakeholders of the firm can not be attracted, carve-outs can be seen
14
Chapter 1
as last-resort option, yet preferred to issuing equity.
Another special case of disinvestment is that implied by splitting parts of the firm under
autonomous legal and operating units, in what is usually known as a spin-off. Spin-offs
that have no effect on debt-to-equity ratios send very distinct signals from equity carve-
outs. We can see this as a subtle transfer of value from debtholders to equity holders, in
the sense that these imply reductions of critical mitigators of default risk. Fixed assets
and collateral value that can be pledged by each creditor tend to be reduced. Moreover,
spun-off firm structures lose diversification benefits from the uncorrelatedness of firm
segments’ performances. (Maxwell and Rao (2003)). 10
1.3 Data and methodology
1.3.1 Data
I construct my sample from the non-financial firms in the SDC database, from which
I obtain panel data on asset sales, spin-offs and carve-outs. I obtain accounting and
segment data from Compustat, stock returns from CRSP and data on syndicated loans
from the DealScan database. I restrict the sample to loans with information on the
spread over Libor, on maturity and origination dates, and I eliminate firms with loans
without any covenant information or that do not include a covenant on the net worth,
tangible net worth, debt-to-EBITDA, book leverage, interest coverage and current ra-
tios.
My main sample uses accounting data from 1990 to 2018 (fiscal years) and SDC data
from 1991 to 2018. Specifications with lagged variables eliminate data for the 1990
10A remarkable exception to creditors’ harm is when spin-offs suit the interest of creditors, by
detaching them from more uncertain, upside-generating firm operations. These deals can be mutually
advantageous if they somehow improve somehow the relative position of shareholders.
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fiscal year (first quarter of 1991). SDC data is available starting with 1991 (fiscal year):
this determines the beginning of the sample period. Matching of accounting data to
calendar events (e.g. spin-offs, carve-outs, etc.) is such that every event in SDC data is
matched to the most recently finished fiscal quarter of accounting data. Hence, counts
and total values of events per fiscal quarter refer to at most three months subsequent
to the end of that quarter. Implied covenant violations occur precisely at end of the
quarter they are assigned to.
My final (baseline) sample covers 4255 firms and 109,773 firm-quarter observations. For
this sample, I find that 45.9% of the firms have at least one covenant violation during
the sample period (1951 firms), and 11.5% of the firm-quarter observations include a
violation (12,571 firm-quarter observations).
Ferreira et al. (2018) use a yearly structure in their accounting data, thus having firm-
year observations and tagging covenant violations per year. While their proportion of
firms ever violating a covenant is close to this study, the proportion of firm-year obser-
vations with a technical default in their paper (60%) is mechanically higher than the
corresponding share of firm-quarter observations in my study. This paper’s proportion
of defaulting observations is comparable to those of other studies using quarterly data,
such as Chava and Roberts (2008), who report a figure of 15%.
For each loan, I first obtain covenant thresholds on the net worth and the tangible net
worth balances, as well as on the book leverage, debt-to-EBITDA, interest coverage and
current ratios. The first five of this list (net worth, tangible net worth, book leverage,
debt-to-EBITDA, interest coverage) are the five most frequent covenant variables in my
sample. The sixth is the current ratio covenant, which is by far the most frequent one
measuring liquidity, as opposed to solvency. The use of the current ratio covenant is
common in previous research papers (Chava and Roberts (2008), Ferreira et al. (2018)).
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Within the list of six covenants, I consider violations of the three most frequent cov-
enants (net worth, tangible net worth, Debt-to-EBITDA) in my baseline models. In
additional tests, all covenants in the list are included. When considering the full list
of six covenants, the share of observations in violations increases to 19.17% and the
number of observations increases to 118,099.
The choice of three covenants narrows the analysis to one of the dimensions of technical
default: insolvency. Given the extended impact of disinvestment actions in a firm’s
balance sheet, their use as a rebalancing policy is more plausible when an imbalance in
firm’s stock variables is to be addressed.
I assume that covenants are binding every quarter until the maturity of the loan. Quar-
ters during which loans mature are then fully comprised. Since a firm might have more
than one active loan in a given quarter, I use most binding threshold for each covenant
across all active loans in a given quarter. This is the minimum threshold for coven-
ant variables with a maximum cap (debt-to-EBITDA ratio, book leverage ratio) and
a maximum threshold for those with a minimum level (current ratio, interest coverage
ratio, net worth and tangible net worth).
As previously mentioned, I use Compustat data at a quarterly frequency to compute
the accounting variables. From here onward, I will refer to distances to threshold as
positive when not in violation, and negative when in violation, regardless of the sign of
breaches. Hence, negative distances to threshold are associated with financial distress.
Thus the minimum distance to threshold across all covenants shall determine how close
a covenant is to be breached or to return to conformity.
The relevant accounting variables have different units of measurement (dollar values
versus ratios). Thus I measure the distance to the covenant threshold as a proportion
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of the threshold. If the accounting variable with a minimum (maximum) level covenant
is below (above) or equal to the threshold, there is an implied covenant violation. In
the exceptional case where the binding threshold is exactly zero, this measure is void.
I call the minimum distance to the threshold across the list of covenants the binding
distance, which is defined as follows:
1.3.1.0.1 Dijt = min(D̃itjk), with
D̃itjk = minz(Citjk − Titjk)/Titjkz
1.3.1.0.2 An implied covenant violation event is a firm-quarter observation in
which the firm breaches at least one covenant threshold.
As in Chava and Roberts (2008) and Ferreira et al. (2018)), I acknowledge implied
violations from loan and accounting data. The number of violations may be understated
due to under-coverage of threshold renegotiations in the Dealscan database. Roberts
(2015) shows that credit agreements are renegotiated on average every nine months,
often outside violation events. Denis and Wang (2014) show that covenant thresholds
are often renegotiated when firms are close to the threshold, such that many more firm
would be in default if original thresholds had been kept until maturity.
The number of actual violations may be misstated also because banks may waive cov-
enants and because the accounting numbers, such as earnings-based measures and net
worth, used in credit agreements may differ from those reported on financial statements.
In sum, there are a number of possible sources of measurement errors. However, I find
no a priori reason to suspect that such errors would bias the results toward finding a





I estimate the average effect of an implied covenant violation on disinvestment ac-
tions, conditional on firms having loans with restrictive covenants. The main empirical
challenge is to isolate the pure effect of a violation in disinvestment from the effect
of financial performance, past investment decisions and other confounding factors. I
measure the effect of violations in one-off events (disinvestment actions), with potential
continued effects in the future. In all periods after the event, the effect of the violation
event needs to be disentangled from both contemporaneous and lagged predictors of
affected variables. Lagged predictors can potentially be variables measured before the
violation.
Should negotiations not succeed after a violation, creditors typically have the right to
terminate the credit agreement and request the full repayment of the loan. Before
loan termination is recognized, no coercion exists in creditors’ actions. Controlling
for financial performance and other factors, a violation can affect firm outcomes only
because creditors are able to make threats that were not possible before the violation.
This does not mean that creditors actually use their enhanced control rights to obtain
concessions from the firm. Management or large shareholders could promote changes
in policies in response to increased creditor control rights, even absent any indication
that creditors favour a particular policy.
As discussed in the introduction, an analysis of disinvestment types may give indications
on the likelihood that creditors’ influence has been directly exerted. However, these two
channels are not clearly detachable.
I show that an increase in creditor control rights caused by covenant violations leads
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to disinvestment actions. To reduce firm heterogeneity around covenant thresholds,
I focus primarily on results obtained in discontinuity subsamples constructed using
narrow windows around the threshold. However, this approach is arguably not sufficient
to address identification problems in this particular application. A standard regression
discontinuity design is presented with critical challenges when applied to this problem.
Following the literature on this topic (Ferreira et al. (2018)), I briefly summarize them:
First, the probability of firms exiting or entering a sample around the threshold may
be correlated with the existence of disposable assets or the feasibility of restructuring
through equity deals.
Second, violations may directly affect the distance to threshold. After violations, if
a firm takes actions that improve the underlying accounting variables, the firm may
rapidly exit the violation sample, creating an unbalanced distribution of observations
on either side of the threshold. For the subsample of violators taking disinvestment
actions, the likelihood of a rapid exit from the violation sample could even be higher,
given the scale of some disinvestment deals.
Third, the use of ratios as “running" variables could affect the sample’s symmetry
around the threshold. To understand this problem, consider, for example, the interest
coverage variable. Much of the variation in this variable comes from its denominator,
because debt is often refinanced under different terms and the debt stock typically have
either a reduction or a projected growth path, concentrating interest expense in certain
periods. Because interest coverage is a convex function of interest expenses, for a given
amount of variation in interest expenses, this ratio will vary more when it is initially
low (i.e. low EBIT) than when it is initially high. Thus, observations in violation of
this covenant are likely to be farther from the threshold than observations that are not
in violation. Any narrow window that is symmetric around the threshold is more likely
20
Chapter 1
to include observations that are not in violation than observations in violation.
Fourth, covenant thresholds differ across firms. Although I normalize all covenant
thresholds to make them comparable across firms, the underlying thresholds are dif-
ferent. Thus, the effects of violating a covenant might differ across firms because the
breach of a tight covenant might have different implications from the breach of one that
is not as tight.
Furthermore, covenant thresholds are endogenously chosen (Garleanu and Zwiebel
(2008) and Demiroglu and James (2010)), in such ways that firms may self-select them-
selves into a group with certain restructuring mechanisms. This self-selection could be
based on prior default expectations for identical firms, or more broadly on peer group
practises and market conditions. Consequently, any managerial effect identified for
covenant violations can reveal, at least qualitatively, contingent events that could be
expected when loan contracts were once signed. To some extent, investors and man-
agers may be motivated to include covenants in loan contracts by such future events
they expect and account for, with some probability.
To address these concerns, I proceed as follows. First, I use industry or firm fixed
effects, targeting time-invariant omitted variables. Second, I control for a long list of





My two baseline specifications are given by:
1.3.2.2.1 1yit = βv(t−a) + γit + θi + δt;
yit
atit
= βv(t−a) + γit + θi + δt
1.3.2.2.2 yit denotes the outcome variable chosen, for a given firm and quarter.
The coefficient of interest is β, while v is a binary variable denoting any covenant
violation in a given quarter. a is a non-negative number of quarters, varying between
1 and 4, according to specifications, to which we lag violations from current quarter t,
denoting v(t−a). γit is a set of firm-quarter control variables. θi and δt are fixed effects
at firm and quarter levels, respectively.
For different types of disinvestment actions (sales, spin-offs, carve-outs) and for their
combinations, outcome variables are both written with a binary structure (whether
there was an event of that type in that quarter) and as a ratio of the total value
disinvested per quarter over total assets. My approach allows to capture quantitative
effects of covenant violations in each disinvestment action (values of assets disinvested).
It also measures qualitative effects of covenant violations (whether any disinvestment
action of that type was taken, whichever its scale). I avoid the use of count variables,
considering that those can be imprecise when occasional events such as disinvestment
actions. Count variables would raise concerns related to outliers, which could possibly
group several related or small-sized transactions.11
I lag explanatory variables by one, two or three quarters. There are reasons to ex-
pect a lag. First, the date of a covenant violation (actual or implied) may indicate
11With spin-offs and carve-outs, this problem could be even more material, since the distribution
of count dependent variables would be strongly bi-modal, between the values zero and one.
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the start of negotiations between the firm and its lenders. Some disinvestment actions
are expectedly taken as a result of either an imminent or an accomplished agreement.
Second, some disinvestment actions are restructuring actions, which may take longer to
implement, both for their contractual complexity and for the operating strain they can
impose. For example, the lag between an initial covenant violation and the implement-
ation of a spin-off or a carve-out can be substantial. It is not then unexpected that the
spin-off actions may be recorded with a delay of at least 2 quarters.
As my baseline specifications depend on lead periods from firms’ last recorded viol-
ations, they can be affected by test observations without a clear counterfactual. In
particular, firms in recent violation states may yet be breaching covenant variables by
large margins. Such firms have no credible prospects of reversing implied violations,
under the same contract terms. Hence, their counterfactual is not appropriately defined
by non-violator firms, namely by those at risk of breaching a covenant.
Large short-term variations in covenant variables, in any direction, imply concurrent
firm adjustments that may not be fully captured by control variables. For this reason,
the counterfactual of large (however recent) violations is neither well specified by quar-
ters where the same firm does not default on its covenants.12
In a refinement of baseline specifications, I restrict my analysis to a narrow sample of
firms close to covenant thresholds. As is typical in regression discontinuity designs, this
subsample includes only those observations for which the absolute value of the binding
distance is less than h (the bandwidth). I do not use a theoretically derived band-
width (for example, Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)) because some of the necessary
assumptions are unlikely to hold in my application. I choose instead an ad hoc narrow
12Firms in non-violation could resemble firms in recent violation states in several dimensions. If a
firm’s violation state is not plausibly reversible, though, control transfers (to creditors) are likely occur
by other channels than the enforcement of debt covenants.
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bandwidth (h = 0.20) as the baseline, which generates a sample that includes 8866
observations (8.1% of the full sample). The standard deviation of the binding distance
(in the [-10; 10] interval) is 2.53; thus, one unit of binding distance is equivalent to
0.395 of a standard deviation. Therefore, the h = 0.20 bandwidth is roughly equivalent
to 0.08 of a standard deviation.
Narrower bandwidths improve sample balance but reduce sample size. Since there are
strong flaws in the validity of estimates from small subsamples, I choose to focus on
sample defined by h = 1:5 and check the robustness of the results to larger and smaller
bandwidth choices. In particular, I repeat my complete analysis with a bandwidth of
h = 0.40, following Ferreira et al. (2018).
The combination of fixed effects and the use of observations near the threshold mitigates
concerns about omitted variables. With fixed effects, my key identification assumption
is that the suitability of assets for quick disinvestment and the effectiveness of disin-
vestment in transferring control do not make firms less likely to manipulate accounting
earnings, so as to narrowly avoid violations.
In my baseline specifications, industry and quarter fixed effects are included, while I
employ fixed effects at the firm level in additional OLS models and for all RDD tests.
Firm fixed effects imply the loss of some external validity, as cross-sectional variations in
disinvestment across firms are not measured. Firms without covenant violations do not
contribute to the estimation of the violation coefficient. Only cross-sectional models
include all non-violator firms in the counterfactual group, in baseline specifications.
Nonetheless, firm fixed effects are key in ensuring an improved identification of results,
which is developed in section 4 of this paper. Following prior applications (e.g. Roberts
and Sufi (2009), Nini et al. (2012)), my identification tests perform extensive pre-
treatment of observations, through saturated models.
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My approach in discontinuity tests is close to Ferreira et al. (2018)). I estimate the
following equation:





it−1 + αt + fi + x
′
it−1 + εit, (1.1)
where yit is either an indicator denoting the occurence of a disinvestment action, or the
ratio of disinvested Assets to total assets, like in my baseline specifications. vit is an
indicator variable that takes the value of one if firm i breaches a covenant threshold in
quarter t−1 (Dit ≤ 0);
∑P
p=1 [γp0 + γp1vit]D
2
it is a polynomial of order 2 of the distance
to threshold, where coefficients γp0 and γp1 can differ across negative (vit = 0) and
positive (vit = 1) binding distances ; αt is a quarter fixed effect; fi is a firm fixed effect;
and xit−1 is a vector of control variables, lagged by one quarter. Standard errors are
estimated through a nearest-neighbour algorithm (minimum order of 3), within firm
clusters.
Some of the model’s variables require methodological assumptions. Disinvestment
events from the SDC dataset are split in three categories: two identified as such in
the database (spin-offs, carve-outs) and a residual one (sale of assets). The residual
category comprises all reductions of assets with an offsetting cash inflow that are not
associated with events in the remaining two categories. Total debt is defined as long-
term debt plus debt in current liabilities. I measure EBITDA as net income minus





In table 1, disinvestment actions are described, both in terms of event indicator variables
(per quarter) and in terms of value disinvested, per quarter and disinvestment type.
While asset sales are much more common than restructuring disinvestment, through
spin-offs or carve-outs, each sale amounts to much lower value than the average spin-
off or carve-out transaction. Spin-offs and carve-outs tend to concern a very high
proportion of the firm, whether in terms of total assets, turnover or profits. While in
asset sales, it is value, rather than the event indicator, to exhibit a clearer univariate
increase in violating firms, in spin-offs and carve-outs, very large relative effects are
both found in transaction quantities and values.
In Table 2, I report statistics that could help ascertain whether firms in violation differ
from their compliant counterparts in any unexpected dimension that would not be
associated to lower solvency or liquidity. While size, both measured in assets and sales,
does not differ considerably, leverage is clearly higher for firms in violation. Investment
and dividend payments are clearly lower for those firms, as predicted by Chava and
Roberts (2008) and Roberts (2015).13 The subsample of firms in violation has lower
credit ratings and worse profitability, which is also expected.
For control variables, mean differences are all significant, even when economically mod-
est. The univariate test applied to (contemporary) outcome variables reveals positive
significant differences in asset sales and spin-offs for violator firms. Asset sales measures
increase in a larger absolute scale, but the relative effect in spin-offs is much higher.
Increased spin-off measures are likely to reflect the large size exceptional accent of spin-
offs in any firm. Carve-out deals occur in a lower share of firms in violation and in
13Subsample statistics are reported for both variables, although capital expenditures and dividend
payments are not included in the set of control variables.
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lower transaction values, although this difference is not significant for the value metric.
Table A1 in the appendix presents summary statistics for the discontinuity sample (h
= 0.2). Compared to the full-sample statistics in Table I, firms in the discontinuity
sample are smaller (average value of assets $2.7 billion) and more levered (31%). They
are also more likely to violate covenants (32%). These differences are not surprising:
by definition, the discontinuity sample contains only observations that are close to the
violation threshold. All other variables in Table IA.VI appear similar to those in the
full sample.
In Table A2, panel A gives detail on sub-sample distributions of both outcome and
control variables. In panels B and C, critical variables are, respectively, measured
in their original scales and as absolute distances to covenant thresholds. All main
covenants chosen have an expected univariate behaviour for their critical variables,
being lower in violating firms for minimum value covenants and higher in violating
firms when covenants are an upper cap to the critical variable.
1.4 Empirical findings
1.4.1 Disinvestment through the sale of assets
Within the set of disinvestment actions, the most prevalent effect of covenant violations
is the sale of assets. As discussed in previous sections, this action implies the least
interference in the firm’s legal organization and control structure. However, it may
have immediate and drastic effects over operations, if the firm is to be deprived of




In Table 3, I look at the effect of covenant violations in asset sales. Equations (2) and
(6) contrast the main specifications for the number of transactions and for the number
of transaction values, respectively. In the same table, I show regression equations for
the same outcome variables, but without the effect of covenant violations (equations
(1) and (5)). The main explanatory variable is the contemporary covenant violation
dummy. The baseline specification is changed by including a 2 quarter lag in covenant
violations (equations (3) and (7)) and by including a 3 quarter lag in that variable
(equations (4) and (8)).
In baseline specifications, the marginal effect of covenant violations on asset sales can
be measured as a 1.65% increase in the chance of selling assets (equation (2)) or as an
increment of 0.676 percentage points in the share of divested assets (equation (3)). To
better illustrate these magnitudes, I evaluate them at the subsample average for non-
violator firms. Both effects are similar, in relative terms: 10.1% and 9.3%, respectively.
Predicted revenues per firm-quarter are just slightly lower for firms in violation. Across
the sample, the average transaction size of violator firms is also marginally lower (19.5%
of total assets vs. 21.9% of total assets).
By including 2 and 3-quarter lagged violations in equations (3) and (4), the effect of
violations in the binary variables is qualitatively similar and significant, while for the
share of asset sales I find insignificant coefficients with a similar magnitude in equations
(7) and (8). Both effects show some persistence, but decline as observations in the first
and second quarters of violation are excluded from the treatment group.
Total assets (positive), debt-to-assets (positive), Tobin’s q (negative), the EBIT-to-
assets ratio (negative) and the investment in Property, Plant and Equipment are the
main predictors of asset sales, in the absence of violations as explanatory variable.
These effects all remain significant at 1% when included along the variable of interest,
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even though their magnitude decreases for leverage, mostly in equations (2) and (6).
Asset sales are regular events from an economical point of view, such that many occur
at times with no financial distress. However, the effect of violations is sizeable as a
quarterly measure. Firms that remain in violation state for several quarters will be
more propense to disinvest throughout all that period.
1.4.2 Disinvestment through equity deals: spin-offs
A different class of actions could be taken under financial distress: those that directly
restructure the firm’s control structure. Equity deals transform the main contractual
relationships commanding firm’s assets and daily operations, by assigning control rights
to different agents.
We would expect that such transactions are less frequent, given how complex it is
to set them up. Moreover, one spin-off or one carve-out per firm are the maximum
frequency found in almost all time periods. Not only are their average values much
higher, but we would also expect their long-term impact to be potentially larger. Given
their complexity, they could take longer to implement, as discussed in section 3.
Spin-offs can be characterized, in a context of financial distress, as a way to potentially
split a cohesive, well-functioning and solvent segment of the firm. This is achieved
by detaching its assets (to some extent) from the pledge of credit relationships of the
incumbent larger firm. In essence, the size of the spun-off component could vary. This
size should mostly depend upon operating divisions or collateralization constraints (in
particular, if some fixed assets are shared across segments.
In Table 4, I look at the effect of covenant violations in spin-offs. Equations (3) and
(7) exhibit the main specifications for number of transactions and transaction values,
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respectively. I also present regression equations for the same variables, without the
effect of covenant violations (equations (1) and (5). The main explanatory variable
is the covenant violation dummy. The baseline specification is changed by including
the first lag covenant violations (equations (2) and (6)) or by lagging those by 2 or 3
quarters (equations (3), (4), (7) and (8)).
In baseline specifications, the marginal effect of covenant violations in spin-offs can be
measured as an increase of 0.18 percentage points in the likelihood of spinning off, or
as an increase of 0.18 to 0.19 percentage points in the share of total assets. In the
baseline group of non-violator firms, 0.33% of firm assets are spun-off in average; hence
the effect of violations increases this number by 54.4% in the first quarter and by 55.3%
in the second. By contrast, the share of spun-off assets exceeds in 81.5% the average of
non-violator firms.
The magnitudes of both effects imply that spin-offs by violator firms increase in relative
size (16.70% in average). The scale of the effect is yet short of the univariate mean
difference in transaction sizes (79.2% vs. 65.5% of the book value of assets).14 By
including 1-quarter and 2-quarter lagged violations in equations (4) and (8), effects do
not suffer but minor changes, if anything being reinforced in lag 1.
In contrast with asset sale estimates, effects over spin-offs show high persistence in the
first three quarters after violations. Effects seem to be best estimated when the first
(or the second) quarter of violation is excluded from the treatment and I include the
first (or the second) quarter where a firm returns to a non-violation state. This finding
supports the hypothesis that spin-offs have longer implementation periods than asset
sales, due to their greater complexity. To be captured by the first lag, a transaction




must occur within a maximum period of three to five months after the accounting date
when a violation is acknowledged (according to fiscal calendars). Plausibly, extending
this period to a maximum of six to eight, or nine to eleven months can best target this
effect.
Spin-offs are much less predicted by firm covariates than asset sales. However, there is
a significant (negative) association with leverage. The complex re-assignment of debt
claims and pledgeable assets implied by a spin-off may often not be feasible in highly
levered firms. This mechanism seems to be kept when I include violations as regressors.
For highly levered firms, this result provides some evidence against the use of spin-offs
to shape, or precondition future restructuring processes. In particular, it can not be
excluded that spin-offs are deterred by increased creditor control rights when firms are
more levered.
1.4.3 Other equity deals
1.4.3.1 Carve-outs
Equity deals can be carried out in different ways than the rigid structure of a spin-off,
involving a total relinquishment of control over some unit(s), while control over the
remaining ones is totally kept. Carve-outs allow for a partial transfer of control of
one (or more) sub-units of the firm. These sub-units gain full legal length, as separate
firms, upon the carve-out. Critically, carve-outs may break some creditor relationships
towards carved-out assets. At the same time, they allow the parent firm to realize cash
without removing any business or asset from the corporate group.
Carve-outs imply that new equity is issued and placed, usually through an initial pub-
lic offer or a private placement. Equity offerings are lengthy and heavily regulated
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processes, whose success depends on market reactions. Although carve-outs can be
attractive options to generate cash for debt repayment, their practical requirements
may limit their undertaking in technical default situations. Firms in financial diffi-
culties could find more opportunities to carve-out assets while not having yet entered
a violation state.
In Table 5, I investigate the effect of covenant violations in carve-outs. Equations
(3) and (7) present the main specifications for number of transactions and transaction
values, respectively. In the same table, I exhibit regression equations for the same
variables, without the effect of covenant violations (equations (1) and (5)). The main
explanatory variable is the covenant violation dummy, lagged by one quarter. The
baseline specification is changed by including 1-quarter lagged violations (equations (3)
and (7)) or by lagging those by 2 quarters (equations (4) and (8)).
The marginal effect of covenant violations in carve-outs is not significantly different from
zero. It can be measured as a reduction of 0.005 percentage points in the likelihood of
carving out, or decreased 0.006% of carved out assets, in baseline specifications for a
1-quarter lag. By including 2-quarter lagged violations in equations (3) and (6), this
effect remains insignificant, but with a positive estimate. Overall, no evidence is found
of a greater prevalence of carve-outs upon covenant violations.
Carve-outs are well predicted by some control variables, mostly by firm size (positive)
and the Tobin’s q (negative). Two other predictors (profitability and industry diversi-
fication) are significant at 10%. Industry diversification can be interpreted as a proxy
for the suitability of a firm to split its control structure across distinct business units.




1.4.3.2 Choice between disinvestment types
In Table 6, I report regression results for both OLS and Probit models where only
firms undertaking disinvestment actions are considered. In this test, I document the
effect of violations over the choice between two alternative types of disinvestment: asset
sales and equity deals. Equity deals comprise spin-offs and carve-outs. The dependent
variable is an indicator of the occurrence of an equity deal, which can either be a spin-
off or a carve-out. Hence, the outcome variable takes the value of zero when a firm has
not undertaken equity deals in a given quarter, but at least one asset sale transaction
has occurred.
In equations (1), (3) and (5), OLS linear probability models are estimated for the
violation indicator lagged by one, two or three quarters. Some evidence is found of
an increased preference for equity deals over asset sales, following covenant violations.
Coefficients for the three lags of violations are significant at a minimum level of 10%.
The third lag has a significant coefficient at 5%. It is also the largest coefficient in
magnitude, yet measuring the effect of violations over equity at less than 1 basis point
(0.009), within the subsample of divesting firms. Since in the control group of non-
violator firms, 4.69% of observations where disinvestment occurs contain an equity
deal, marginal effects define an increase of this share between 14.9% (first lag) and
19.2% (third lag)
Equations (2), (4) and (6) estimate Probit models for the same sets of variables. Coef-
ficients measuring the effect of covenant violations over equity deals are materially
smaller, with average marginal effects totalling 0.55, 0.62 and 0.51 percentage points,
for the three lags. Only the 3-quarter lagged effect is significant at 10%.
Overall, results point out to an increased or non-decreased preference for equity deals,
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following covenant violations. Equity deals, which define more restructuring trans-
actions, are chosen over asset sales, which preserve the firm’s control structure (see
Introduction). The shift in preferences for equity deals is not drastic, yet it denotes
that restructuring properties of equity deals are attractive to defaulting firms.
1.5 Identification strategy
1.5.1 Within-firm analysis
As discussed in section 2, potential identification problems are raised in studying the
effects of covenant-related events. Covenants are a persistent firm covariate, despite
the occurrence of renegotiations in particular periods of the corporate lifecycle. Not
only do they have strong explanatory power in firms’ time-invariant characteristics,
but they are also potentially determined by other explanatory variables at the time
of origination of loan facilities (both invariant and time-dependent). At that moment,
covenants are specified for usually long periods to maturity. Arguably it is the result
of both a bargaining mechanism and a self-selection decision taken by the borrower.
In baseline models of previous sections, invariant characteristics of business industries
and time trends are captured through industry and quarter fixed effects. I allow for
some cross-sectional variation between firms to be captured by estimated effects of
covenant violations.
In this section, all results reported refer to models with firm fixed effects. Additional
tests include replications of Tables 4, 5 and 6 with firm fixed effects and RDD models.
At the cost of some external validity, these tests alleviate validity concerns related to
firms’ invariant characteristics. Moreover, RDD models address time-variant sources of
endogeneity in binding distances to threshold, by exploring small exogenous variations
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around the threshold. 15
In Table 7, I report regression results for asset sales, in models with firm fixed effects.
Equations (2) and (6) present the main specifications for number of transactions and
transaction values, respectively, with regression equations for the same variables without
the effect of covenant violations (equations (1) and (5)). The main explanatory variable
is the contemporary covenant violation dummy. The baseline specification is changed
by including a 2-quarter lag in covenant violations (equations (3) and (7)) and by
including a 3-quarter lag in that variable (equations (4) and (8)).
The marginal effect of covenant violations in asset sales can be measured as a 2.34%
increase in the chance of selling assets, or additional 1.136% of total assets, in baseline
specifications. Again I illustrate these magnitudes by evaluating them at the subsample
average for non-violator firms. Both effects are close, in relative terms: 14.3% and
15.6%, respectively. Predicted revenues per firm-quarter are slightly higher for firms in
violation than for those in compliance. Unlike the within-firm effect, both the average
transaction size of asset sales and its cross-sectional estimate are comparatively lower
for violator firms (section 3).
By including 2 and 3-quarter lagged violations in equations (3) and (4), the effect
of violations in the binary variables is qualitatively similar, but steadily declining in
magnitude, while for the share of asset sales I find an insignificant coefficient in the
third lag.
Results from fixed effect models show that the sign and the magnitude of effects in
asset sales coincide with those estimated in cross-sectional models. For the first two
lags, effects are economically larger and statistically more significant. For the share of
15A within-firm RDD specification excludes most firms that are either unlikely to ever breach
covenants or unlikely to ever exit violation states without covenant waivers.
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assets sold, the baseline coefficient becomes significant at the 1% level.
A within-firm analysis of asset sales provides strong evidence that transactions in vi-
olator firms are clustered in the first violation quarters and have comparatively larger
values than counterfactual transactions in non-violation quarters.
I have estimated similar fixed effect models for spin-off and carve-out measures (Tables
A7 and A8). Positive insignificant coefficients were found for spin-offs in both variables
and all the three lags. For carve-outs, I found significant coefficients at the 10% level for
the second and third lags of the binary measure and the third lag of the share of carved-
out assets. These estimates define marginal effects of 8.1 to 8.8 percentage points in the
propensity to undertake carve-outs and of additional 6.5% of the book value of assets.
Given their low frequency, equity deals appear unsuitable for a within-firm analysis, in
particular since firms tend to make no more than one deal of this class in their lives.
However, the clustering of these few observations around violation thresholds provides
the opportunity to upgrade this analysis (see subsection 5.2).
One key identification assumption is that the expectation of divesting assets upon coven-
ant violations does not deter firms from preventing default events, namely by (narrowly)
manipulating earnings. It is plausible that disinvestment does not act as an ensuring
mechanism, reducing managers’ perceived cost of violations ex ante. Relinquishing the
control of firm assets bears direct welfare costs to managers. Further, disinvestment
induces changes that arguably increase the risk of manager replacement.
I address some potential self-selection patterns related to choices of specific covenants,
by varying the set of covenants included in my analysis, through my definition of vi-




More generally, both self-selection and other firm-specific forms of endogeneity are tar-
geted by my identification strategy. This strategy can be defined as a “quasi-regression
discontinuity design”, since it employs two-dimensional fixed effects: firm and quarter.
Conditional independence of the treatment through covenant violations is reinforced
with the use of the same set control variables in baseline models.
1.5.2 Discontinuity sample
Figures 1 to 6 illustrate the distribution of disinvestment variables and model residuals
within the discontinuity sample. Each figure refers to one outcome variable. The first
two charts in each figure are scatters plot that illustrate the distribution of the outcome
variable across different values of binding distance to threshold, computed for the three
main covenants in this paper. Linear and quadratic polynomials are fit for each of
two branches of the function domain: negative binding distances (not violation any
covenant) and positive binding distances (in violation).
Quarterly asset sales are much concentrated around median transaction sizes, in the
[0, 0.1] interval 16. In Figures A1 to A6, identical charts are presented for a wider dis-
continuity sample, with a bandwidth of h = 0.4. A broader perspective highlights the
presence of more extreme transaction values across the whole spectrum, with greater
prevalance in the boundaries of the wider sample. Both the linear and the quadratic fit-
ted functions define quasi-concave graphs across both segments, where a naïve estimate
of the discontinuity would clearly be positive.
Spin-offs and carve-outs are almost absent from the baseline discontinuity sample in its
negative branch. This stylized fact is in contrast with the wider bandwidth version. By
16With an average number of transactions close to 1.45 per quarter in the discontinuity sample, the
median share of asset sales for divesting firms is 47.2%
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comparing both universes, it is clear that large equity deals are clustered in the [-0.4,
0.25] region (carve-outs being the largest). Without the use of econometric or modelling
techniques, it becomes apparent that firms do not typically resort to these transactions
when they are close to violating covenants, in a sheer contrast with periods in which
they default on covenants, but are close to comply. In this sense, discontinuity estimate
reflects both the high concentration of deals in the positive segment (in particular, for
spin-offs, in the interval [0.1, 0.15]) and the unlikelihood of deals in the left neighbouring
region.
The remaining two charts illustrate the distribution of the residual of a regression
discontinuity model, using the baseline RDD specification for each variable, with a
bandwidth of 0.2 for the kernel function. This distribution is computed within bins of 5
percentage points of binding distance, measured as a percentage of its threshold. Means
and 95% confidence intervals are portrayed. Polynomials of the binding distance are fit
into the bin-level average points, for each sign of the binding distance: a quadratic one
in the third chart and a forth-degree one in the fourth.
For asset sales variables, differences between both polynomials are mild, with an ex-
ception for the largest negative bin of the binding distance. Negative and positive bins
are, without exception, distributed with non-overlapping counterdomains. It is appar-
ent that higher-degree polynomials could artificially increase the discontinuity estimate.
This graphical inferrence provided support for the choice of quadratic functional forms.
With spin-offs, the discontinuity seems to be the result of extremely high frequencies in
the first positive bin for each variable. The fourth-degree function is further detached
from bin averages and the quadratic polynomial, placing the discontinuity upper bound
at outlier values in the distribution of the first positive bins. For the asset share measure,
the first positive bin is very steeply detached neighbouring parts of the domain, but
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mainly from the distributions in the first negative bins. This would be expected to
drive RDD estimate results, equalling them across different bandwidth choices.
In both carve-out variables, the most positive residuals are found in the second and
fourth positive bins. The discontinuity estimate is positive, but small, while wide
confidence intervals in positive bins are expected reduce estimation power. A wider
sample window (figure 12) produces a more concave and continuous functional shape,
with a steep positive slope to the right of the cutoff and a non-negligible negative slope
to its left. Graphical evidence of a discontinuity is therefore weak.
In Table 9, I apply the identification strategy described in section 4. In this table, each
equation corresponds to a single main specification tested for a different dependent
variable. In equations (1) and (4), asset sales variables are tested against last-quarter
violations. In equations (2) and (5), I apply this test to spin-offs and, in equations (3)
and (6), to carve-outs.
RDD specifications are not as sensitive to the persistence of dependent variables to-
wards close future lags (second or third) as baseline models. Firms remain in the
discontinuity subsample for several consecutive quarters, particularly once they violate
covenants. The total 9478 observations in this subsample correspond to 1371 firms (6.91
observations per firm). In violation states, 959 firms are treated for an average number
of 4.17 quarters (3994 observations). Hence, the increased flexibility of RDD models
in quarterly data creates an opportunity to measure total effects over disinvestment,
irrespective of their exact timing.
For that reason, effects of larger magnitude than in baseline models are not unexpected.
The discontinuity estimate for asset sales can be measured as a 13.95% increase in the
chance of selling assets, or additional 6.73% of total assets, in baseline specifications. I
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evaluate these magnitudes at the (full-)sample average, for non-violator firms. Although
both coefficients are close, in relative terms, the value effect is dominant: 92.1% vs.
85.6%. Predicted revenues per firm-quarter are again higher for firms in violation, as
in other firm fixed effects models.
For spin-offs, the discontinuity estimate defines a 3.58% increase in the chance of selling
assets, or as additional 4.70% of total assets spun-off, in baseline specifications. In
relative terms, the binary measure is nearly multiplied by six (+ 463.7% or 5.63x).
This corresponds to no more than 0.62 standard deviations, given the rare frequency of
spin-offs. With the asset share variable, a 19.41x relative effect represents an increase
of 1.02 standard deviations.
Carve-outs do not allow for the estimation of a significant discontinuity effect for the
propensity measure. However, the share of carved-out assets is shown to increase follow-
ing covenant violations. Though modest from an economic point of view, its coefficient
is significant at the 5% level. Additional 0.77% of total assets amount to 0.23 standard
deviations and increase the control subsample mean by 9.47x. Although effects over
carve-outs can not be identified in the cross-section, high value carve-outs, evaluated at
stock market prices, contribute to positive within-firm effects based on a low number
of observations, concentrated in the cutoff neighbourhood. The low number of observa-
tions is a likely deterrent of findings concerning the propensity to undertake an equity
carve-out.
Polynomial estimates define more concave non-linearities (in the binding distance) for
the negative segments of asset sale and carve-out shares of total assets, as well as for the
positive segments of the ratio of spun-off assets. Functional forms are here consistent
with stylized facts observed in the graphical analysis.
40
Chapter 1
In Table A9, I replicate the six baseline regression discontinuity models in a wider
discontinuity sample with a bandwidth of h = 0.4.
1.5.3 Effects of disinvestment over covenant variables
An important conclusion to an analysis of disinvestment in the neighbourhood of cov-
enant thresholds is the subsequent feedback effect it has in covenant variables. From
a theoretical point of view, assessing the effectiveness of disinvestment is key to the
understanding of its underlying mechanisms.
In Table 10, I test for effects of disinvestment actions in the binding distance to
threshold. For this purpose, I estimate first difference models, measuring disinvest-
ment in two alternative ways: with the asset sales binary measure or with a binary
measure comprising any of three types of disinvestment: asset sales, spin-offs or carve-
outs. The dependent variable is a contemporary first difference of the binding distance
to threshold, scaled by one, two or three quarters. Disinvestment variables are respect-
ively lagged to the second (t-1 ), third (t-2 ) or fourth (t-3 ) quarters from the end of
the variation period in the dependent variable. Violations are further lagged by one
quarter. Control variables are set at the beginning of the difference period (fourth last
quarter).
With these tests, I turn to the interaction of disinvestment variables and covenant
violations (Asset sale × violation, Any disinvestment × violation). This interaction
provides the estimation of a distinct effect of disinvestment in violation states, assessing
whether it is as effective in adjusting covenant variables as in normal. From a theoretical
standpoint, this is a largely open question. While it could be argued that disinvestment
should be more targeted at the binding covenant variables, upon covenant violations,




Equations (1) and (5) isolate the total effects of disinvestment variables, specified along
quarter fixed effects and the vector of control variables defined in baseline models for
asset sales. All the three specified lags are pooled. For both variables, I find insigni-
ficant coefficients, negative for the first two lags. The second one has a clearly higher
magnitude (third and fourth last quarter).
In equations (2), (3) and (4), covenant violations are added, for each of three lags
considered, along with the main parameter of interest: the interaction term (Asset
sales in violation. Negative significant effects are found for the three lags, comprised
between -1.63 (t-4, t-5 ) and -4.20 (t-2, t-3 ) percentage points of the threshold. For
the second quarter in the difference, the coefficient (-1.82) is significant at the 1% level.
Disinvestment effects in non-violation are not totally subsumed, being significant at the
10% level for the first two lags, with magnitudes between 0.9 and 2 percentage points.
Under that assumption, for violator firms, the total effect of asset sales could attain 2.7
(t-1 ) or 5.2 (t-2, t-3 ) percentage points.
Equations (6), (7) and (8) repeat the same analysis for Any disinvestment, again with
a violation indicator and an interaction term (Disinvestment post violation) for each
of the three lags. All interactions have negative coefficients. The first two coefficients
are significant at the 5% level. For both the second (-1.56) and the third and fourth
quarters (-3.93), the size of effects is close to the magnitude of asset sales estimates.
Similarly, baseline effects of disinvestment are slightly lower than for the asset sales
measure.
Given the high concentration of divesting firms in the region of narrow violations, by
less than one decimal point of binding distance (10% of the threshold), the size of
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these effects is economically significant and plausible to have strong influence in debt
renegotiations. In most covenant-full contracts, exits from violation states are not
automatically accomplished when covenant variables return to compliance, since loan
termination provisions can be enacted through the registry of covenant violations. For
these provisions to be waived by creditors or not to be requested beforehand, negotiated
outcomes are required.
1.5.4 Robustness
I run several robustness tests, both to my baseline models and to my findings in the
discontinuity sample.
In Tables A2 to A5, I retake all my main tests in Tables 3, 4 and 5 with a wider sample
based on violations of the 6 most frequent covenants. No qualitative changes are found
in results, with asset sales and spin-offs still revealing significant positive effects of
covenant violations. The economic significance of these effects is similar, while only
contemporary effects in the binary measure of spin-offs are sizeably less significant than
under the baseline list of three covenants. Through these tests, I argue that the initial
choice of covenants was sufficiently general to provide a relevant degree of external
validity, at least in the context of syndicated loans. Covenant variables included in this
wider list are those described in Table 1.1.
In Tables A11 and A12, I examine some cross-sectional variations in effects over dis-
investment, based on other policies firms may implement upon covenant violations.
While other policies could contribute to improvements in the their financial situation,
it is a priori unclear whether other measures would be adopted as replacement or a
complement to disinvestment actions. I refer to two of the most documented effects
of covenant violations, investment reductions and reductions in leverage. I study their
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effects in disinvestment actions, two quarters later, I also study interactions of covenant
violations with the effects of investment and leverage reductions in disinvestment.
Some evidence is found that investment and leverage reductions, on a year-on-year
measure, correlate positively with subsequent asset sales, although the economic signi-
ficance of differences is small, denoting that disinvestment effects do not truly overlap or
subsume other. The effect of leverage reductions is smaller, but it is strongly identified
in the interaction with covenant violations. Past de-leverage is specifically associated
to disinvestment, for violator firms, but the magnitude of this effect is small: rounding
1 percentage point for a 10% leverage reduction. For spin-offs, no significant effects are
estimated, either for level or interaction variables.
In Tables A13 and A14, I test for the simultaneous implementations of investment
reduction and leverage reduction policies. For this purpose, I restrict my sample to
firms selling assets in the most recent calendar quarter and redefine the violation binary
variable to the two last fiscal quarters before the disinvestment period.
A first test involves yearly first differences of investment and leverage. Investment
reductions follow the predictions of Chava and Roberts (2008). Reducing investment
is consistent with level reductions of a firm’s capital stock, through disinvestment and
no evidence of a contemporaneous trade-off is found. The same does not occur with
leverage. A negative insignificant coefficient is found, such that leverage can possibly be
more effectively reduced by firms that disinvest in non-violation states. In a second test,
I run firm fixed effects models for the investment and leverage (integrated) variables.
Effects have larger magnitudes, being benchmarked by firm means, rather than by the
dependent variable fourth lag. Results are consistent and significant at the 1% level.
Some of the robustness tests cover key aspects of the regression discontinuity design.
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In Tables A15 and A16, I report estimates of the discontinuity coefficient for binary
measures of asset sales and spin-offs, with several ad hoc choices of bandwidth, at every
decimal point from 0.1 to 0.4. For the bandwidth h = 0.4, I provide extra detail on
the polynomial model in Table A9. As discussed in subsection 4.2, binary variables are
the most affected by bandwidth choice in this sample, given irregular their frequencies.
High average volumes (as a share of assets) in these few observations partially offset
reduced estimation power in the value measures of disinvestment.
Although the number of sampled observations ranges from roughly one half of to approx-
imately twice its size, estimates are close. For asset sales, there is almost no variation
in the [0.2, 0.4] interval. For spin-offs, the coefficient changes by less than one third.
At h = 0.1, both coefficients remain significant. For asset sales, the effect’s magnitude
decreases by 28%; for spin-offs. Both remain significant at the 5% level.
Finally, I search for spurious correlations that could jump discontinuously close to the
covenant thresholds, but not exactly at it. Should the discontinuity result from the
effect of omitted variables, I would expect to find similar results, in magnitude and
significance, at other points within the discontinuity sample. I perform placebo tests
using “placebo” of “fake” thresholds in the interval [-0.2, 0.2] of binding distance, using
six cutoff points: -0.2, -0.1, -0.05, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2. Following Ferreira et al. (2018), I
interpret these tests as discontinuity-based exogeneity tests. Bandwidth and polynomial
order are the same than in my main specification. For each placebo threshold, I redefine
the binding distance variable such that it becomes centred at the new threshold and
choose the discontinuity sample accordingly.
Results are reported in Tables A17 and A18 for the asset share measures of asset sales
and spin-offs. As it was shown in subsection 4.2, value measures are the most propense
to non-linearities in the binding distance. For both variables, coefficient signs flip more
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than once, namely around the threshold c = -0.10. Effect magnitudes are small in
comparison the true coefficients (6.401, 2.654). Only one coefficient is significant at the
10% level, for spin-offs: it is negative and has a small magnitude (c = -0.1). The null




I find that violations of financial covenants significantly increase the likelihood of dis-
investment actions. This effect is best observed for firms narrowly defaulting on their
covenants, regardless of the exact time period elapsed since their first violation. Once
disinvestment plans are implemented, violator firms experience fast reductions in the
binding distance to their nearest covenant threshold: in the next six months to one
year.
My results show that violations trigger large one-off disinvestment transactions, with
effects on financial stock variables. This is consistent with managers preventing large
transfers of control to creditors, through preemptive actions that reduce leverage and
increase liquidity. Quick disinvestment actions can help unblock creditor agreements
that waive covenants. These may also facilitate reductions in debt service through
renegotiated debt terms and early repayments.
In violator firms, most of disinvestment occurs through asset sales, taking place at
varying stages of violation states. Their increased likelihood of selling assets is not
associated with larger transaction sizes. In contrast, equity deals are rarer, larger and
implemented in longer time horizons of more than six months. Their transaction sizes
are comparatively larger in violator firms.
The occurrence of spin-offs is well predicted by covenant violations, whereas a higher
propensity to undertake carve-outs is not observed.
The choice of spin-offs is consistent with constraints in accessing equity markets upon
violations, while it still depends on legal permissions and on shareholder support. It is
also consistent with the view that disinvestment is used to increase managers’ bargaining
power and to influence future reorganization outcomes in bankruptcy procedures.
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While disinvestment decisions may sometimes contribute to cooperative negotiation
outcomes in restructurings, they are likely to imply the loss of fundamental value,
through a fire sale effect. Covenant structures can have a strict effect of discipline,
when firms disinvest, but also imply overshooting firm reactions and even hamper more
efficient restructuring outcomes that creditors could promote.
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Figures
Figure 1.1: Scatter plots and fitted polynomials: asset sales The following six
figures comprise four charts each, referring to each of the six dependent variables of this
paper. These are as defined in Table 1, but scaled here between 0 and 1. The first chart
in each figure is a scatter plot that illustrates the distribution of the outcome variable
across different values of binding distance to threshold, computed for the three main
covenants considered in table 8 (Net Worth, Tangible Net Worth, Debt-to-EBITDA). A
linear polynomial of the binding distance is fit to the scatter, for each of two branches
of the function domain: negative binding distances (not violation any covenant) and
positive binding distances (in violation). The second chart reproduces the same scatter
plot as in the first. Differently, a quadratic polynomial of the binding distance is
fitted to the data. The third chart illustrates the distribution of the residual of a
regression discontinuity model, using as covariates the same control variables and fixed
effects as in table 8. The equations estimated are identical to those in table 9, with
a bandwidth of 0.2 for the kernel function. This distribution is computed within bins
of 5 percentage points of binding distance, measured as a percentage of its threshold.
A quadratic polynomial of the binding distance is fit into the bin-level average points
for each sign of the binding distance. The fourth chart illustrates the residuals of
the same model than the third chart, distributed across the same bins. It differs in
that fourth-degree polynomials are fitted to bin-level averages, for either negative or
positive binding distances. This figure reports results for the binary variable denoting
the occurrence of asset sales in a given quarter.
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Figure 1.2: Scatter plots and fitted polynomials: spin-offs This figure presents
an identical set of charts to those in figure 1, for the binary variable denoting the
occurrence of spin-offs in a given quarter.
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Figure 1.3: Scatter plots and fitted polynomials: carve-outs This figure presents
an identical set of charts to those in figure 1, for the binary variable denoting the
occurrence of carve-outs in a given quarter.
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Figure 1.4: Scatter plots and fitted polynomials: asset sales This figure presents
an identical set of charts to those in figure 1, for the binary variable denoting the
occurrence of asset sales in a given quarter.
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Figure 1.5: Scatter plots and fitted polynomials: spin-offs This figure presents
an identical set of charts to those in figure 1, for the ratio of the value of spin-offs to
total assets in a given quarter.
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Figure 1.6: Scatter plots and fitted polynomials: carve-outs This figure presents
an identical set of charts to those in figure 1, for the ratio between carved-out assets
and total assets in a given quarter.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Summary stats - all firms reporting covenants
This table shows summary statistics for the full sample of firms reporting financial covenants.
Statistics are reported for all baseline disinvestment variables. Asset sales – binary is a binary variable
denoting the existence of any asset sale in the next full calendar quarter. Asset sales / Total assets is
the ratio between the value of sold assets and the value of total assets, for the same period. Similarly,
Spin-offs – binary is a binary variable denoting the existence of any spin off and Spin-offs / Total
assets is a relative measure of the value of spun off assets, in the next full calendar quarter. Carve-outs
– binary is a binary variable denoting any occurrences of carve-outs and Carve-outs / Total assets is
the ratio between the asset value divested in carve-outs and the total value of assets, in the next full
calendar quarter. I also report statistics for several firm control variables: Log(assets) is the logarithm
of the book value of total assets, from which goodwill is deducted. Investment is the ratio of annual
capital expenditures to the book value total assets in the end of that year. Leverage is the book ratio
of total debt to total assets. Panel B displays several disinvestment variables. Tobin’s q is the ratio
between the market value of assets and the book value of assets. Cash-to-assets is the quarterly ratio
of cash holdings to the book value of assets. Sales growth is the growth rate of total sales revenue, for
the last four quarters. PPE growth is the growth rate of Property Plant and Equipment for the last
four quarter. PPE/Assets is the ratio between Property Plant and Equipment and the book value
of total assets. Industry diversification is a binary variable that takes the value of one when a firm
reports at least two different business segments in a given quarter, and zero otherwise.
All firms reporting financial covenants
Financial variables Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max Number of obs.
Asset sales – binary 16.60% 0 37.2% 0 1 109773
Asset sales / Total assets 7.48% 0% 23.0% 0% 110.2% 109 773
Spin-offs - binary 0.338% 0 5.8% 0 1 109773
Spin-offs / Total assets 0.242% 0% 4.6% 0% 118.5% 109 773
Carve-outs - binary 0.118% 0 3.4% 0 1 109773
Carve-outs / Total assets 0.081% 0% 2.4% 0% 95.7% 109 773
Log (assets) 6.92 6.89 1.79 2.68 11.07 109773
Leverage 28.86% 27% 21.4% 0% 100.9% 109773
Tobin’s q 2.00 1.62 1.24 0.66 7.47 109773
Cash-to-assets 10.01% 5.1% 12.6% -0.7% 110.4% 109773
EBIT-to-assets 1.90% 2.0% 2.8% -11% 9.9% 109773
PPE growth 1.91% 0.5% -90.0% -26.0% 60.3% 109773
Sales growth 3.55% 1.8% -79.1% -52.2% 104.3% 109773
PPE / Assets 29.93% 21.9% 24.7% 0.0% 91.7% 109773
Industry diversification 14.66% 0.0% 35.4% 0.0% 100.0% 109773
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Table 1.2: Summary stats - decomposition by violation status
This table shows summary statistics for two subsamples: No violation is composed of firms
that do not violate any of the three most frequent covenants in a given quarter and Violation is
composed of firms that violate at least one of these. The three covenant variables are tangible net
worth, net worth and debt-to-EBITDA. Investment is the ratio of annual capital expenditures to the
book value total assets in the end of that year. Dividend is a binary variable, taking the value of
1 when a firm has paid dividends in the last fiscal quarter. All other variables are as described in
Table 1. The t-statistics presented correspond to an hypotheses tests on mean differences. For each
variable, the null hypothesis states that both subsample means are equal.
Summary stats - decomposition by violation status
Financial variables No violation - mean Number of obs. Violation - mean N t-Statistic
Asset sales – binary 16.29% 88 850 19.01% 20 923 9.60
Asset sales / Total assets 7.30% 88 850 8.93% 20 923 9.36
Spin-offs - binary 0.331% 88 850 0.390% 20 923 1.33
Spin-offs / Total assets 0.233% 88 850 0.314% 20 923 2.34
Carve-outs - binary 0.128% 88 850 0.048% 20 923 -2.92
Carve-outs / Total assets 0.087% 88 850 0.036% 20 923 -2.72
Log (assets) 6.99 88 850 6.01 20 923 -67.67
Leverage 26.51% 88 850 40.30% 20 923 73.40
Tobin’s q 2.01 88 850 1.81 20 923 -21.40
Cash-to-assets 10.13% 88 850 9.38% 20 923 -7.69
EBIT-to-assets 2.10% 88 850 0.51% 20 923 -57.54
PPE growth 2.29% 88 850 0.99 20 923 -44.14
Sales growth 3.78% 88 850 2.10% 20 923 -9.65
PPE / Assets 30.01% 88 850 29.52% 20 923 -2.67
Industry diversification 15.35% 88 850 12.42% 20 923 -11.39
Investment 3.43% 88 850 2.89% 20 923 -1.58
Dividend 45.80% 88 848 32.17% 20 922 -37.48
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Table 1.3: Disinvestment - asset sales
This table reports the results of LPM and OLS regressions for Asset sales – binary, a binary
variable denoting the existence of any asset sale and Asset sales / Total assets, a relative measure of
the value of sold assets, in a given calendar quarter. Violation of most frequent covenants t-1 is a
binary variable that takes the value of 1, when a violation of one of the three most frequent covenants
in the sample occurred in the last quarter before the initial calendar quarter. The three covenant
variables are tangible net worth, net worth and debt-to-EBITDA. t-2 denotes lagging to the second
before the disinvestment period. t-3 denotes the lagging of the violation binary variable to the third
last quarter before the disinvestment period. Industry fixed-effects are included at the SIC 3 level of
the standard industry classification, alongside quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level. The values in parenthesis represent t-statistics. The standard error for each star is
mentioned below the table. All other control variables are as described in Table 1.
Asset sales - binary t Asset sales / Total Assets t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Violation of three main covenants t−1 1.645∗∗∗ 0.639∗
(2.611) (1.761)
Violation of three main covenants t−2 1.597∗∗ 0.537
(2.508) (1.476)
Violation of three main covenants t−3 1.410∗∗ 0.426
(2.249) (1.193)
Log (Book value of assets) 4.942∗∗∗ 4.987∗∗∗ 4.986∗∗∗ 4.983∗∗∗ 1.359∗∗∗ 1.376∗∗∗ 1.374∗∗∗ 1.372∗∗∗
(22.509) (22.553) (22.545) (22.524) (11.759) (11.864) (11.845) (11.819)
Leverage ratio t−1 6.060∗∗∗ 5.275∗∗∗ 5.280∗∗∗ 5.402∗∗∗ 4.419∗∗∗ 4.114∗∗∗ 4.156∗∗∗ 4.220∗∗∗
(4.484) (3.789) (3.779) (3.881) (5.455) (4.980) (5.012) (5.108)
Tobin’s q t−1 -0.927∗∗∗ -0.940∗∗∗ -0.944∗∗∗ -0.941∗∗∗ -0.502∗∗∗ -0.508∗∗∗ -0.508∗∗∗ -0.507∗∗∗
(-4.690) (-4.760) (-4.778) (-4.762) (-4.252) (-4.295) (-4.300) (-4.288)
Cash-to-assets ratio t−1 -4.787∗∗ -4.761∗∗ -4.761∗∗ -4.784∗∗ -1.943 -1.933 -1.935 -1.943
(-2.167) (-2.158) (-2.158) (-2.168) (-1.512) (-1.505) (-1.506) (-1.512)
EBIT-to-assets ratio t−1 -65.348∗∗∗ -62.701∗∗∗ -63.053∗∗∗ -64.042∗∗∗ -20.015∗∗∗ -18.988∗∗∗ -19.244∗∗∗ -19.621∗∗∗
(-8.545) (-8.231) (-8.285) (-8.428) (-4.170) (-3.946) (-4.005) (-4.096)
PPE growth t−1 -5.299∗∗∗ -5.006∗∗∗ -5.031∗∗∗ -5.007∗∗∗ -1.774∗∗ -1.660∗∗ -1.684∗∗ -1.686∗∗
(-4.047) (-3.835) (-3.855) (-3.832) (-2.101) (-1.971) (-2.000) (-2.000)
Sales growth t−1 -0.844∗ -0.907∗ -0.917∗∗ -0.914∗∗ -1.102∗∗∗ -1.126∗∗∗ -1.126∗∗∗ -1.123∗∗∗
(-1.822) (-1.955) (-1.977) (-1.971) (-3.643) (-3.718) (-3.716) (-3.707)
Constant -15.630∗∗∗ -16.054∗∗∗ -16.030∗∗∗ -15.996∗∗∗ -1.539∗ -1.704∗∗ -1.674∗∗ -1.650∗∗
(-10.595) (-10.798) (-10.788) (-10.761) (-1.879) (-2.068) (-2.034) (-2.003)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 109770 109770 109770 109770 109770 109770 109770 109770
R-squared 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060
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Table 1.4: Spinoffs - baseline
This table reports the results of LPM and OLS regressions for Spin-offs – binary : a binary
variable denoting the existence of any spin off and Spin-offs / Total assets: a relative measure of the
value of spun off assets, in a given calendar quarter. Violation of most frequent covenants is a binary
variable that takes the value of 1, when a violation of one of the three most frequent covenants in the
sample occurred in the last quarter before the initial calendar date. The three covenant variables are
tangible net worth, net worth and debt-to-EBITDA. Violation of three main covenants t−1 is a binary
variable that takes the value of 1, when a violation of one of the three most frequent covenants in the
sample occurred in the last quarter before the initial calendar quarter. The three covenant variables
are tangible net worth, net worth and debt-to-EBITDA. t-2 denotes lagging to the second before the
disinvestment period. t-3 denotes the lagging of the violation binary variable to the third last quarter
before the disinvestment period. Industry and quarter fixed effects are included. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. All other control variables are as described in Table 1.
Spin-offs - binary t Spin-offs / Total Assets t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Violation of three main covenants t−1 0.180∗∗ 0.190∗∗
(1.990) (2.563)
Violation of three main covenants t−2 0.183∗∗ 0.190∗∗
(2.026) (2.539)
Violation of three main covenants t−3 0.178∗∗ 0.179∗∗
(1.963) (2.415)
Log (Book value of assets) 0.180∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(6.293) (6.367) (6.368) (6.365) (5.756) (5.845) (5.839) (5.826)
Leverage ratio t−1 -0.376∗∗∗ -0.462∗∗∗ -0.466∗∗∗ -0.459∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗ -0.315∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗
(-2.988) (-3.527) (-3.531) (-3.498) (-2.248) (-2.904) (-2.901) (-2.844)
Tobin’s q t−1 -0.021 -0.022 -0.023 -0.023 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(-0.841) (-0.889) (-0.909) (-0.900) (-0.272) (-0.337) (-0.363) (-0.349)
Cash-to-assets ratio t−1 -0.082 -0.078 -0.078 -0.080 0.039 0.043 0.043 0.041
(-0.277) (-0.261) (-0.261) (-0.269) (0.197) (0.222) (0.222) (0.208)
EBIT-to-assets ratio t−1 -1.455 -1.167 -1.192 -1.291 -0.301 0.005 -0.027 -0.135
(-1.587) (-1.255) (-1.285) (-1.403) (-0.569) (0.009) (-0.053) (-0.261)
PPE growth t−1 -0.237 -0.205 -0.206 -0.200 -0.126 -0.093 -0.095 -0.089
(-1.645) (-1.402) (-1.412) (-1.366) (-1.126) (-0.810) (-0.827) (-0.778)
Sales growth t−1 -0.104 -0.110∗ -0.112∗ -0.112∗ -0.113∗∗ -0.120∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(-1.624) (-1.708) (-1.729) (-1.736) (-2.441) (-2.570) (-2.599) (-2.604)
PPE-to-assets ratio t−1 -0.265 -0.257 -0.256 -0.255 -0.247 -0.237 -0.237 -0.237
(-1.031) (-0.999) (-0.994) (-0.991) (-1.257) (-1.211) (-1.205) (-1.203)
Industry diversification t−1 -0.013 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 0.040 0.044 0.043 0.043
(-0.123) (-0.088) (-0.093) (-0.096) (0.456) (0.503) (0.495) (0.490)
Constant -0.631∗∗∗ -0.681∗∗∗ -0.681∗∗∗ -0.681∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗∗ -0.503∗∗∗ -0.502∗∗∗ -0.501∗∗∗
(-3.044) (-3.243) (-3.230) (-3.220) (-2.841) (-3.106) (-3.087) (-3.061)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 109770 109770 109770 109770 109770 109770 109770 109770
R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
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Table 1.5: Carve-outs - baseline
This table reports the results of LPM and OLS regressions for Carve-outs – binary, a binary
variable denoting any occurrences of carve-outs in a given calendar quarter and Carve-outs / Total
assets: a relative measure of the asset value divested in those occurrences, as a share of total assets,
in that calendar quarter. Violation of three main covenants t−1 is a binary variable that takes the
value of 1, when a violation of one of the three most frequent covenants in the sample occurred in the
last quarter before the disinvestment period. The three covenant variables are tangible net worth,
net worth and debt-to-EBITDA. The three covenant variables are tangible net worth, net worth and
debt-to-EBITDA. t-2 denotes lagging to the second before the disinvestment period. t-3 denotes
the lagging of the violation binary variable to the third last quarter before the disinvestment period.
Industry and quarter fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All
other control variables are as described in Table 1.
Carve-outs - binary t Carve-outs / Total Assets t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Violation of three main covenants t−1 -0.005 -0.006
(-0.102) (-0.163)
Violation of three main covenants t−2 0.002 -0.001
(0.045) (-0.028)
Violation of three main covenants t−3 0.009 0.006
(0.180) (0.178)
Log (Book value of assets) 0.086∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(4.650) (4.642) (4.639) (4.643) (4.744) (4.736) (4.737) (4.739)
Leverage ratio t−1 0.200 0.202 0.198 0.195 0.150 0.153 0.151 0.148
(1.403) (1.331) (1.311) (1.311) (1.643) (1.545) (1.532) (1.535)
Tobin’s q t−1 -0.031∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.018∗∗
(-2.341) (-2.331) (-2.331) (-2.337) (-2.041) (-2.024) (-2.022) (-2.032)
Cash-to-assets ratio t−1 0.539 0.539 0.539 0.540 0.319 0.319 0.319 0.319
(1.267) (1.267) (1.267) (1.267) (1.428) (1.428) (1.428) (1.428)
EBIT-to-assets ratio t−1 -0.844∗ -0.852∗ -0.841∗ -0.836∗ -0.571∗ -0.581∗ -0.573∗ -0.566∗
(-1.850) (-1.832) (-1.817) (-1.825) (-1.770) (-1.750) (-1.737) (-1.739)
PPE growth t−1 -0.054 -0.055 -0.054 -0.052 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.015
(-0.526) (-0.524) (-0.513) (-0.496) (-0.226) (-0.236) (-0.225) (-0.203)
Sales growth t−1 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
(-0.316) (-0.309) (-0.315) (-0.323) (-0.218) (-0.209) (-0.214) (-0.226)
PPE-to-assets ratio t−1 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.141 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.110
(0.988) (0.988) (0.991) (0.994) (1.111) (1.112) (1.115) (1.119)
Industry diversification t−1 0.148∗ 0.148∗ 0.148∗ 0.148∗ 0.118∗ 0.118∗ 0.118∗ 0.118∗
(1.646) (1.646) (1.647) (1.647) (1.731) (1.732) (1.733) (1.732)
Constant -0.570∗∗∗ -0.569∗∗∗ -0.571∗∗∗ -0.573∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗ -0.374∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗ -0.378∗∗∗
(-3.352) (-3.380) (-3.379) (-3.379) (-3.616) (-3.665) (-3.664) (-3.658)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 109770 109770 109770 109770 109770 109770 109770 109770
R-squared 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
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Table 1.6: Asset sales vs. equity deals - LPM and probit models
This table reports the results of regressions for a binary variable denoting the existence of an
equity deal in a given calendar quarter (Asset sales vs. Equity deals). For firms not undertaking any
equity deal, but disinvesting through asset sales in that period, it takes the value of zero. Violation of
most frequent covenants t−1 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1, when a violation of one of
the three most frequent covenants in the sample occurred in the last quarter before the disinvestment
period. Those three covenant variables correspond to the three most frequent covenant types included
in tables 3, 4 and 5. t-2 and t-3 denote lagging to the second and the third quarter before the
disinvestment period. Industry and quarter fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level. All other control variables are as described in Table 1.
Asset sales vs. Equity deals t
OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Violation of three main covenants t−1 0.007∗ 0.201
(1.789) (1.503)
Violation of three main covenants t−2 0.008∗ 0.221
(1.910) (1.613)
Violation of three main covenants t−3 0.009∗∗ 0.227∗
(2.047) (1.663)
Log (Book value of assets) 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(5.278) (5.286) (5.305) (6.267) (6.279) (6.328)
Leverage ratio t−1 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.588∗ -0.596∗ -0.595∗
(-1.488) (-1.546) (-1.566) (-1.834) (-1.838) (-1.835)
Tobin’s q t−1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014
(-1.489) (-1.517) (-1.505) (-0.276) (-0.301) (-0.294)
Cash-to-assets ratio t−1 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.322 0.315 0.311
(0.497) (0.499) (0.486) (0.514) (0.501) (0.494)
EBIT-to-assets ratio t−1 -0.009 -0.009 -0.013 1.889 1.946 1.832
(-0.295) (-0.281) (-0.408) (0.923) (0.947) (0.888)
PPE growth t−1 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.159 -0.157 -0.130
Continued on next page
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Table 1.6 continued from previous page
(-0.936) (-0.914) (-0.837) (-0.447) (-0.438) (-0.362)
Sales growth t−1 -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗ -0.321∗∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗
(-2.142) (-2.177) (-2.197) (-2.622) (-2.634) (-2.634)
PPE-to-assets ratio t−1 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.053 0.050 0.046
(0.562) (0.569) (0.568) (0.194) (0.182) (0.169)
Industry diversification t−1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.110 0.112 0.112
(-0.360) (-0.354) (-0.351) (0.738) (0.750) (0.752)
Constant -0.028∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -4.069∗∗∗ -4.071∗∗∗ -4.072∗∗∗
(-2.975) (-2.985) (-3.001) (-12.260) (-12.270) (-12.324)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Observations 18215 18215 18215 18220 18220 18220
R-squared 0.039 0.039 0.039
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Table 1.7: Asset sales with Firm FE
This table reports the results of regressions for Asset sales – binary, a binary variable denot-
ing the existence of any asset sale, and Asset sales / Total assets: a relative measure of the value
of sold assets, in a given calendar quarter. Violation of most frequent covenants t−1 is a binary
variable that takes the value of 1, when a violation of one of the three most frequent covenants in the
sample occurred in the last quarter before the disinvestment period. Those three covenant variables
correspond to the three most frequent covenant types included in tables 3, 4 and 5. t-2 denotes
lagging to the second before the disinvestment period. t-3 denotes the lagging of the violation binary
variable to the third last quarter before the disinvestment period. Firm and quarter fixed-effects
are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The values in parenthesis represent
t-statistics. The standard error for each star is mentioned below the table. All other control variables
are as described in Table 1.
Asset sales - binary t Asset sales / Total Assets t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Violation of three main covenants t−1 2.336∗∗∗ 1.136∗∗∗
(3.253) (2.669)
Violation of three main covenants t−2 2.087∗∗∗ 0.786∗
(2.823) (1.812)
Violation of three main covenants t−3 1.531∗∗ 0.408
(2.093) (0.963)
Log (Book value of assets) 6.897∗∗∗ 7.091∗∗∗ 7.087∗∗∗ 7.044∗∗∗ 2.750∗∗∗ 2.844∗∗∗ 2.821∗∗∗ 2.789∗∗∗
(11.443) (11.694) (11.680) (11.611) (7.325) (7.509) (7.451) (7.378)
Leverage ratio t−1 5.363∗∗∗ 4.061∗∗ 4.091∗∗ 4.516∗∗ 3.235∗∗∗ 2.602∗∗ 2.756∗∗ 3.009∗∗
(2.833) (2.117) (2.115) (2.355) (2.773) (2.187) (2.289) (2.518)
Tobin’s q t−1 -0.902∗∗∗ -0.899∗∗∗ -0.909∗∗∗ -0.904∗∗∗ -0.243 -0.242 -0.246∗ -0.243
(-3.564) (-3.559) (-3.597) (-3.573) (-1.638) (-1.628) (-1.656) (-1.641)
Cash-to-assets ratio t−1 -14.590∗∗∗ -14.476∗∗∗ -14.463∗∗∗ -14.511∗∗∗ -8.707∗∗∗ -8.651∗∗∗ -8.659∗∗∗ -8.686∗∗∗
(-5.672) (-5.637) (-5.627) (-5.644) (-5.342) (-5.319) (-5.320) (-5.333)
EBIT-to-assets ratio t−1 -27.251∗∗∗ -25.280∗∗∗ -25.816∗∗∗ -27.218∗∗∗ -4.910 -3.952 -4.370 -4.902
(-3.548) (-3.306) (-3.372) (-3.548) (-1.017) (-0.817) (-0.904) (-1.015)
PPE growth t−1 -1.938 -1.788 -1.818 -1.776 -0.636 -0.564 -0.591 -0.593
(-1.577) (-1.459) (-1.483) (-1.446) (-0.821) (-0.728) (-0.764) (-0.765)
Sales growth t−1 -1.464∗∗∗ -1.533∗∗∗ -1.540∗∗∗ -1.514∗∗∗ -1.269∗∗∗ -1.303∗∗∗ -1.298∗∗∗ -1.283∗∗∗
(-3.369) (-3.539) (-3.551) (-3.492) (-4.337) (-4.450) (-4.429) (-4.382)
Constant -28.806∗∗∗ -30.268∗∗∗ -30.174∗∗∗ -29.881∗∗∗ -10.981∗∗∗ -11.692∗∗∗ -11.496∗∗∗ -11.267∗∗∗
(-6.706) (-7.003) (-6.978) (-6.905) (-4.115) (-4.343) (-4.274) (-4.194)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 109610 109610 109610 109610 109610 109610 109610 109610
R-squared 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.239 0.239 0.239 0.239
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Table 1.8: Large asset sales, firms with no asset sale covenants
This table reports the results of regressions for Asset sales – binary, a binary variable denot-
ing the existence of any large asset sale, and Asset sales / Total assets: a relative measure of the value
of assets sold in large asset sales transactions, in a given calendar quarter. The sample is composed by
firms with no covenants restricting asset sales, such as (total or partial) asset sale sweeps. Violation
of most frequent covenants t−1 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1, when a violation of one of
the three most frequent covenants in the sample occurred in the last quarter before the disinvestment
period. Those three covenant variables correspond to the three most frequent covenant types included
in tables 3, 4 and 5. t-2 denotes lagging to the second before the disinvestment period. t-3 denotes
the lagging of the violation binary variable to the third last quarter before the disinvestment period.
Firm and quarter fixed-effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The
values in parenthesis represent t-statistics. The standard error for each star is mentioned below the
table. All other control variables are as described in Table 1.
Asset sales - binary t Asset sales / Total Assets t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Violation of three main covenants t-1 5.912∗∗∗ 3.634∗∗∗
(3.879) (3.404)
Violation of three main covenants t-2 6.034∗∗∗ 3.728∗∗∗
(3.755) (3.306)
Violation of three main covenants t-3 5.610∗∗∗ 3.421∗∗∗
(3.494) (3.061)
Log (Book value of assets) 3.732∗∗∗ 4.109∗∗∗ 4.185∗∗∗ 4.135∗∗∗ 2.063∗∗∗ 2.295∗∗∗ 2.365∗∗∗ 2.336∗∗∗
(7.428) (7.958) (7.871) (7.583) (5.912) (6.390) (6.381) (6.095)
Leverage ratio 6.410∗∗ 2.510 2.153 2.359 5.350∗∗ 2.953 2.565 2.564
(2.093) (0.753) (0.627) (0.680) (2.338) (1.191) (1.010) (0.998)
Tobin’s q -1.160∗∗ -1.388∗∗∗ -1.421∗∗∗ -1.435∗∗∗ -0.755∗∗ -0.895∗∗ -0.927∗∗ -0.909∗∗
(-2.308) (-2.747) (-2.775) (-2.894) (-2.076) (-2.446) (-2.503) (-2.467)
PPE growth t−1 -10.238∗∗ -9.891∗∗ -9.575∗∗ -9.267∗∗ -5.787∗∗ -5.574∗∗ -5.297∗ -5.148∗
(-2.531) (-2.498) (-2.360) (-2.228) (-2.023) (-1.980) (-1.830) (-1.732)
Constant -8.488∗∗ -10.899∗∗∗ -11.727∗∗∗ -11.677∗∗∗ -3.625 -5.106∗∗ -5.778∗∗ -5.771∗∗
(-2.526) (-3.218) (-3.389) (-3.312) (-1.525) (-2.122) (-2.340) (-2.271)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22202 22202 21079 20235 22202 22202 21079 20235
R-squared 0.117 0.119 0.124 0.128 0.105 0.106 0.112 0.118
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Table 1.9: Regression discontinuity design
This table reports the results of regression discontinuity design models. These models are applied to measures
of three different types of disinvestment: asset sales, spin-offs and carve-outs. Covenant violation is the coefficient for
a regression discontinuity in a distance-to-threshold running variable. This running variable is the minimum distance
to threshold in one of three covenants (Tangible Net Worth, Net Worth, Debt-to-EBITDA). For a better illustration of
results, I report proportional effects at the subsample mean of violator firms. I also report marginal effects measured
as a ratio of sample standard deviations. I consider the last quarter before the disinvestment event year. I report the
second degree polynomial estimates, both for negative and positive binding distances, fixed effects and estimates for
control variables. Models employ a non-parametrical kernel function of the Epanechnikov type. A total fraction of
8.6% of observations is included in the RDD sample (9478). The size of the subsample bandwidth is 0.2, measured in
the running variable, as a fraction of the threshold. Fixed effects are included at the firm and quarter levels. Standard
errors are clustered by firm according to the nearest neighbour method. Binding distance (negative) denotes the
distance to the nearest covenant, for observations that are not in violation state, measured in percentage points of the
covenant threshold. Binding distance (positive) is the same binding distance for observations violating one of the three
covenants. Squared binding distance(negative) denotes the quadratic term of the second degree polynomial of binding
distances, for Binding distance (negative), rescaled in percentage points of the covenant threshold. Squared binding
distance(positive) denotes the equivalent quadratic term for Binding distance (positive). All other control variables are













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 13.948∗∗∗ 6.737∗∗∗ 3.579∗∗∗ 4.699∗∗∗ 0.428 0.767∗∗
(4.139) (3.172) (3.766) (5.104) (1.031) (2.246)
Proportional effects (at violation subsample mean) 0.461 0.480 0.823 0.951 0.770 0.904
Marginal effects (standard deviations) 0.375 0.617 0.223 1.216 1.167 1.209
Second order polynomial
Binding distance (negative, × 100) 0.680∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.065 0.014 0.084 0.019
(2.198) (2.577) (0.981) (0.330) (1.094) (0.578)
Squared binding distance (negative, × 100) 3.153∗∗ 2.559∗∗∗ 0.340 0.088 0.425 0.103
(2.133) (2.738) (1.073) (0.432) (1.159) (0.643)
Constant (negative) 11.681∗∗∗ 6.818∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗ 0.897∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗ 0.068
(5.836) (5.388) (2.115) (3.250) (2.270) (0.313)
Binding distance (positive, × 100) 0.693∗ 0.077 -0.025 -0.128∗∗∗ -0.049 0.026
(1.958) (0.346) (-0.326) (-2.626) (-0.553) (0.688)
Squared binding distance (positive, × 100) -1.436 0.801 -0.016 0.649∗∗∗ 0.158 0.015
(-0.827) (0.729) (-0.043) (2.709) (0.367) (0.080)
Firm-level controls
Log (Book value of assets) t−1 8.223∗∗∗ 4.632∗∗∗ -1.079∗∗∗ 0.206 -0.827∗∗ 0.109
(6.076) (5.412) (-3.708) (1.101) (-2.458) (0.741)
Tobin’s q t−1 -0.010 -0.351 -0.099 -0.259∗∗∗ -0.123 -0.105
(-0.014) (-0.783) (-0.652) (-2.641) (-0.696) (-1.366)
Cash-to-assets ratio t−1 -1.599 -2.687 -1.890 -1.397 -1.926 -1.251∗
(-0.235) (-0.624) (-1.275) (-1.463) (-1.123) (-1.672)
EBIT-to-assets ratio t−1 -42.370∗∗ 3.014 5.573 1.468 7.741 3.077
(-2.035) (0.229) (1.250) (0.511) (1.501) (1.368)
Sales growth t−1 -2.098 -2.333∗∗ -0.502 -0.462∗ -0.664 -0.328
(-1.126) (-1.980) (-1.258) (-1.796) (-1.439) (-1.629)
PPE-to-assets ratio t−1 1.559 1.313 1.644 0.244
(1.118) (1.462) (1.019) (0.347)
Industry diversification t−1 0.159 0.277 0.475 0.224
(0.444) (1.202) (1.148) (1.240)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9478 9478 9478 9478 9478 9478
R-squared 0.640 0.633 0.273 0.265 0.240 0.310
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Table 1.10: Variation in the binding distance to threshold
This table reports regression results for first differences of the binding distance of the most
stringent of 3 covenants (Binding Distance), for periods of two (t, t-1), three (t, t-2) or four (t, t-3)
quarters. These covenants are net worth, tangible new worth and Debt-to-EBITDA. Asset sale ×
violation is a binary variable taking the value of 1 when a firm sells assets in the next year following
a covenant violation (starting in violation state. Any disinvestment × violation is a binary variable
taking the value of 1 when a firm sells assets or disinvests through an equity deal (any type of
disinvestment) in the next quarter after a violation. Disinvestment variables are lagged to the second
(t-1 ), third (t-2 ) and fourth (t-3 ) quarters from the end of the variation period in the dependent
variable. Disinvestment occurs in the first quarter of that variation period. Quarter fixed effects are
included. All control variables are described in Table 1.
Binding Distance: variation (as a fraction of the threshold)
Asset sale - binary Disinvestment - binary
(t, t-1) (t, t-1) (t, t-2) (t, t-3) (t, t-1) (t, t-1) (t, t-2) (t, t-3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Asset sale in violation, t-1 -0.112∗∗
(-2.036)
Asset sale in violation, t-2 -0.155∗
(-1.823)
Asset sale in violation, t-3 -0.107
(-0.983)
Disinvestment post violation, t-1 -0.094∗
(-1.797)
Disinvestment post violation, t-2 -0.099
(-1.052)
Disinvestment post violation, t-3 0.001
(0.009)
Asset sale, t-1 0.013∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗
(6.268) (-2.438)
Asset sale, t-2 -0.162∗∗∗
(-3.128)
Asset sale, t-3 -0.233∗∗∗
(-3.277)
Any disinvestment, t-1 0.013∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗
(6.553) (-2.436)
Any disinvestment, t-2 -0.144∗∗∗
(-2.953)
Any disinvestment, t-3 -0.202∗∗∗
(-2.990)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 76507 103961 99168 94708 76507 103961 99168 94708
R-squared 0.044 0.010 0.019 0.024 0.044 0.010 0.019 0.023
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Appendix tables
Table A1. Panel A: Summary statistics - discontinuity sample This table reports
summary statistics for the baseline discontinuity sample, composed of observations with
a binding distance within 20% of the corresponding threshold, for the same covenant
variable. All financial variables are as defined in table 1. Binding distance is the
distance of the most stringent covenant variable to its threshold, from the set of three
main covenants defined in tables 3 to 10. Summary statistics are reported for both the
negative and the positive intervals of the domain of this variable.









Asset sales - binary 20.9% 0 40.6% 0 1 9478
Asset sales / Total assets 9.89% 0% 25.1% 0% 110.2% 9478
Spin-offs - binary 0.45% 0 6.7% 0 1 9478
Spin-offs / Total assets 0.24% 0% 4.3% 0% 90.4% 9478
Carve-outs - binary 0.18% 0 4.2% 0 1 9478
Carve-outs / Total assets 0.13% 0% 3.1% 0% 95.6% 9478
Log (assets) 6.63 6.62 1.84 2.68 11.07 9478
Leverage 32.50% 31% 20.5% 0% 100.9% 9478
Tobin’s q 1.78 1.44 1.12 0.66 7.47 9478
Cash-to-assets 7.9% 3.9% 10.2% 0.0% 85.3% 9478
EBIT-to-assets 1.47% 1.7% 2.5% -11% 9.9% 9478
PPE growth 0.83% -0.2% 9.0% -26% 60.3% 9478
Sales growth 2.6% 1.3% 19.5% -52.2% 104.3% 9478
PPE / Assets 31.3% 25.2% 24.2% 0.0% 91.7% 9478














[-0.2, 0]: Mean = -0.104 -0.182 -0.155 -0.107 -0.055 -0.023 5491
[ 0, 0.2]: Mean = 0.095 0.016 0.044 0.091 0.145 0.176 3987
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Table A1. Panel B: Summary stats - discontinuity sample, by violation status
This table shows summary statistics for the baseline discontinuity sample, composed
of observations with a binding distance within 20% of the corresponding threshold, for
the same covenant variable. Statistcs are reported for two subsamples: No violation is
composed of observations where Binding distance is negative. Violation is composed of
observations with positive values Binding distance. All other variables are as described
in Table 1. The t-statistics presented correspond to an hypotheses tests on mean
differences. For each variable, the null hypothesis states that both subsample means
are equal.








Asset sales - binary 11.87% 5 491 33.30% 3987 24.78
Asset sales / Total assets 5.54% 5 491 15.92% 3987 19.10
Spin-offs - binary 0.073% 5 491 1.052% 3987 6.11
Spin-offs / Total assets 0.028% 5 491 0.549% 3987 5.07
Carve-outs - binary 0.018% 5 491 0.426% 3987 4.00
Carve-outs / Total assets 0.017% 5 491 0.305% 3987 3.93
Log (assets) 6.58 5 491 6.71 3987 3.21
Leverage 31.06% 5 491 34.48% 3987 7.96
Tobin’s q 1.79 5 491 1.77 3987 -0.80
Cash-to-assets 7.92% 5 491 7.88% 3987 -0.18
EBIT-to-assets 1.63% 5 491 1.25% 3987 -7.15
PPE growth 0.49% 5 491 1.07% 3987 3.09
Sales growth 2.69% 5 491 2.69% 3987 0.00
PPE / Assets 31.56% 5 491 31.17% 3987 -0.77
Industry diversification 13.60% 5 491 13.10% 3987 -0.71
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Table A3: Correlation matrix
This table reports correlations for all combinations of predictor variables in baseline specifica-


















Violation - 3 covenants 1
Log (Book value of assets) -0.0828 1
Leverage ratio 0.2263 0.1196 1
Tobin’s q -0.0149 0.0155 -0.0967 1
Cash-to-assets ratio -0.0201 -0.1159 -0.3148 0.2476 1
EBIT-to-assets ratio -0.1489 0.1454 -0.0621 0.3565 -0.0167 1
PPE, growth rate -0.079 0.0248 -0.0356 0.1072 0.0056 0.1368 1
Sales, growth rate -0.0227 -0.0064 0.0002 0.0358 -0.0005 0.2464 0.1754 1
PPE/Assets -0.0065 0.1234 0.2345 -0.2707 -0.2939 -0.0701 0.0183 0.0028 1
Industry diversification -0.0401 0.0003 0.0042 -0.0778 -0.0751 0.0162 0.0062 0.0053 0.0335 1
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Table A4: Asset sales - six covenants
This table reports the results of regressions for a binary variable denoting the existence of any
asset sale and a relative measure of the value of sold assets, in a given calendar quarter. Violation of
most frequent covenants, t-1 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1, when a violation of one of
the six most frequent covenants in the sample occurred in the last quarter before the initial calendar
date. The six covenant variables are tangible net worth, net worth, debt-to-EBITDA, interest
coverage, leverage and current ratio. t-2 denotes lagging to the second before the disinvestment
period. t-3 denotes the lagging of the violation binary variable to the third last quarter before the
disinvestment period. Industry and quarter fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level. All other control variables are as described in Table 1.
Asset sales - binary t Asset sales / Total Assets t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Violation of six most frequent covenants t−1 1.602∗∗∗ 0.647∗
(2.609) (1.817)
Violation of six most frequent covenants t−2 1.597∗∗ 0.537
(2.508) (1.476)
Violation of six most frequent covenants t−3 1.410∗∗ 0.426
(2.249) (1.193)
Log (Book value of assets) 4.942∗∗∗ 4.985∗∗∗ 4.986∗∗∗ 4.983∗∗∗ 1.359∗∗∗ 1.377∗∗∗ 1.374∗∗∗ 1.372∗∗∗
(22.509) (22.581) (22.545) (22.524) (11.759) (11.883) (11.845) (11.819)
Leverage ratio 6.060∗∗∗ 5.220∗∗∗ 5.280∗∗∗ 5.402∗∗∗ 4.419∗∗∗ 4.079∗∗∗ 4.156∗∗∗ 4.220∗∗∗
(4.484) (3.734) (3.779) (3.881) (5.455) (4.920) (5.012) (5.108)
Tobin’s q -0.927∗∗∗ -0.938∗∗∗ -0.944∗∗∗ -0.941∗∗∗ -0.502∗∗∗ -0.507∗∗∗ -0.508∗∗∗ -0.507∗∗∗
(-4.690) (-4.749) (-4.778) (-4.762) (-4.252) (-4.290) (-4.300) (-4.288)
Cash-to-assets ratio t−1 -4.787∗∗ -4.780∗∗ -4.761∗∗ -4.784∗∗ -1.943 -1.941 -1.935 -1.943
(-2.167) (-2.167) (-2.158) (-2.168) (-1.512) (-1.511) (-1.506) (-1.512)
EBIT-to-assets ratio -65.348∗∗∗ -62.113∗∗∗ -63.053∗∗∗ -64.042∗∗∗ -20.015∗∗∗ -18.708∗∗∗ -19.244∗∗∗ -19.621∗∗∗
(-8.545) (-8.144) (-8.285) (-8.428) (-4.170) (-3.883) (-4.005) (-4.096)
PPE growth t−1 -5.299∗∗∗ -4.987∗∗∗ -5.031∗∗∗ -5.007∗∗∗ -1.774∗∗ -1.648∗ -1.684∗∗ -1.686∗∗
(-4.047) (-3.816) (-3.855) (-3.832) (-2.101) (-1.953) (-2.000) (-2.000)
Sales growth t−1 -0.844∗ -0.932∗∗ -0.917∗∗ -0.914∗∗ -1.102∗∗∗ -1.137∗∗∗ -1.126∗∗∗ -1.123∗∗∗
(-1.822) (-2.007) (-1.977) (-1.971) (-3.643) (-3.752) (-3.716) (-3.707)
Constant -15.630∗∗∗ -16.060∗∗∗ -16.030∗∗∗ -15.996∗∗∗ -1.539∗ -1.713∗∗ -1.674∗∗ -1.650∗∗
(-10.595) (-10.812) (-10.788) (-10.761) (-1.879) (-2.082) (-2.034) (-2.003)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 118099 118099 118099 118099 118099 118099 118099 118099
R-squared 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060
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Table A5: Spin-offs - six covenants
This table reports the results of regressions for a binary variable denoting the existence of any
spin off and a relative measure of the value of spun off assets, in a given calendar quarter. Violation
of most frequent covenants, t−1 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1, when a violation of
one of the six most frequent covenants in the sample occurred in the last quarter before the initial
calendar date. The six covenant variables are tangible net worth, net worth, debt-to-EBITDA, interest
coverage, leverage and current ratio. t-2 denotes lagging to the second before the disinvestment
period. t-3 denotes the lagging of the violation binary variable to the third last quarter before the
disinvestment period. Industry and quarter fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level. All other control variables are as described in Table 1.
Spin-offs - binary t Spin-offs / Total Assets t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Violation of six most frequent covenants t−1 0.148∗ 0.169∗∗
(1.681) (2.330)
Violation of six most frequent covenants t−2 0.183∗∗ 0.190∗∗
(2.026) (2.539)
Violation of six most frequent covenants t−3 0.178∗∗ 0.179∗∗
(1.963) (2.415)
Log (Book value of assets) 0.180∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(6.293) (6.350) (6.368) (6.365) (5.756) (5.832) (5.839) (5.826)
Leverage ratio -0.376∗∗∗ -0.454∗∗∗ -0.466∗∗∗ -0.459∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗ -0.313∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗
(-2.988) (-3.458) (-3.531) (-3.498) (-2.248) (-2.863) (-2.901) (-2.844)
Tobin’s q -0.021 -0.022 -0.023 -0.023 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(-0.841) (-0.874) (-0.909) (-0.900) (-0.272) (-0.321) (-0.363) (-0.349)
Cash-to-assets ratio t−1 -0.082 -0.081 -0.078 -0.080 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.041
(-0.277) (-0.271) (-0.261) (-0.269) (0.197) (0.208) (0.222) (0.208)
EBIT-to-assets ratio -1.455 -1.156 -1.192 -1.291 -0.301 0.040 -0.027 -0.135
(-1.587) (-1.231) (-1.285) (-1.403) (-0.569) (0.076) (-0.053) (-0.261)
PPE growth t−1 -0.237 -0.208 -0.206 -0.200 -0.126 -0.094 -0.095 -0.089
(-1.645) (-1.419) (-1.412) (-1.366) (-1.126) (-0.816) (-0.827) (-0.778)
Sales growth t−1 -0.104 -0.112∗ -0.112∗ -0.112∗ -0.113∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(-1.624) (-1.719) (-1.729) (-1.736) (-2.441) (-2.603) (-2.599) (-2.604)
PPE-to-assets ratio t−1 -0.265 -0.260 -0.256 -0.255 -0.247 -0.240 -0.237 -0.237
(-1.031) (-1.011) (-0.994) (-0.991) (-1.257) (-1.225) (-1.205) (-1.203)
Industry diversification t−1 -0.013 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 0.040 0.043 0.043 0.043
(-0.123) (-0.095) (-0.093) (-0.096) (0.456) (0.496) (0.495) (0.490)
Constant -0.631∗∗∗ -0.673∗∗∗ -0.681∗∗∗ -0.681∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗ -0.502∗∗∗ -0.501∗∗∗
(-3.044) (-3.210) (-3.230) (-3.220) (-2.841) (-3.080) (-3.087) (-3.061)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 118099 118099 118099 118099 118099 118099 118099 118099
R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
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Table A6: Carve-outs - six covenants
This table reports the results of regressions for a binary variable denoting any occurrences of
carve-outs in a given calendar quarter and a relative measure of the asset value divested in those
occurrences, as a share of total assets, in that calendar quarter. Violation of most frequent covenants,
t−1 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1, when a violation of one of the six most frequent
covenants in the sample occurred in the last quarter before the initial calendar date. The six covenant
variables are tangible net worth, net worth, debt-to-EBITDA, interest coverage, leverage and current
ratio. t-2 denotes lagging to the second before the disinvestment period. t-3 denotes the lagging of
the violation binary variable to the third last quarter before the disinvestment period. Industry and
quarter fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All other control
variables are as described in Table 1.
Carve-outs - binary t Carve-outs / Total Assets t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Violation of six most frequent covenants t−1 0.005 0.003
(0.101) (0.076)
Violation of six most frequent covenants t−2 0.002 -0.001
(0.045) (-0.028)
Violation of six most frequent covenants t−3 0.009 0.006
(0.180) (0.178)
Log (Book value of assets) 0.086∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(4.650) (4.688) (4.639) (4.643) (4.744) (4.797) (4.737) (4.739)
Leverage ratio 0.200 0.197 0.198 0.195 0.150 0.149 0.151 0.148
(1.403) (1.318) (1.311) (1.311) (1.643) (1.534) (1.532) (1.535)
Tobin’s q -0.031∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.018∗∗
(-2.341) (-2.339) (-2.331) (-2.337) (-2.041) (-2.034) (-2.022) (-2.032)
Cash-to-assets ratio t−1 0.539 0.539 0.539 0.540 0.319 0.319 0.319 0.319
(1.267) (1.267) (1.267) (1.267) (1.428) (1.429) (1.428) (1.428)
EBIT-to-assets ratio -0.844∗ -0.835∗ -0.841∗ -0.836∗ -0.571∗ -0.566 -0.573∗ -0.566∗
(-1.850) (-1.734) (-1.817) (-1.825) (-1.770) (-1.643) (-1.737) (-1.739)
PPE growth t−1 -0.054 -0.053 -0.054 -0.052 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.015
(-0.526) (-0.505) (-0.513) (-0.496) (-0.226) (-0.214) (-0.225) (-0.203)
Sales growth t−1 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
(-0.316) (-0.318) (-0.315) (-0.323) (-0.218) (-0.220) (-0.214) (-0.226)
PPE-to-assets ratio t−1 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.141 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.110
(0.988) (0.991) (0.991) (0.994) (1.111) (1.115) (1.115) (1.119)
Industry diversification t−1 0.148∗ 0.148∗ 0.148∗ 0.148∗ 0.118∗ 0.118∗ 0.118∗ 0.118∗
(1.646) (1.647) (1.647) (1.647) (1.731) (1.733) (1.733) (1.732)
Constant -0.570∗∗∗ -0.572∗∗∗ -0.571∗∗∗ -0.573∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗ -0.377∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗ -0.378∗∗∗
(-3.352) (-3.407) (-3.379) (-3.379) (-3.616) (-3.701) (-3.664) (-3.658)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 118099 118099 118099 118099 118099 118099 118099 118099
R-squared 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
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Table A7: Spin-offs - firm FE
This table reports the results of regressions for a binary variable denoting any occurrences of
spin-offs in a given calendar quarter and a relative measure of the asset value divested in those
occurrences, as a share of total assets, in that calendar quarter. These models include firm and
quarter fixed effects. Violation of most frequent covenants is a binary variable that takes the value of
1, when a violation of one of the three most frequent covenants in the sample occurred in the last
quarter before the initial calendar date. The three covenant variables are tangible net worth, net
worth and debt-to-EBITDA. Violation of three main covenants, t−1 is a binary variable that takes
the value of 1, when a violation of one of the three most frequent covenants in the sample occurred
in the last quarter before the initial calendar quarter. The three covenant variables are tangible net
worth, net worth and debt-to-EBITDA. t-2, t-3 denotes lagging to the second or third quarter before
the disinvestment period. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All other control variables
are as described in Table 1.
Spin-offs - binary t Spin-offs / Total Assets t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Violation of three main covenants t−1 0.084 0.066
(0.727) (0.776)
Violation of three main covenants t−2 0.089 0.072
(0.823) (0.875)
Violation of three main covenants t−3 0.076 0.053
(0.689) (0.609)
Log (Book value of assets) 0.300∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(3.255) (3.322) (3.338) (3.334) (2.977) (3.055) (3.067) (3.049)
Leverage ratio t−1 -0.687∗∗∗ -0.734∗∗∗ -0.742∗∗∗ -0.729∗∗∗ -0.278 -0.315 -0.322 -0.307
(-2.633) (-2.659) (-2.643) (-2.601) (-1.474) (-1.604) (-1.596) (-1.510)
Tobin’s q t−1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008
(-0.012) (-0.008) (-0.018) (-0.012) (-0.277) (-0.273) (-0.283) (-0.277)
Cash-to-assets ratio t−1 -0.156 -0.151 -0.149 -0.151 0.159 0.163 0.165 0.163
(-0.309) (-0.300) (-0.297) (-0.300) (0.498) (0.510) (0.514) (0.508)
EBIT-to-assets ratio t−1 0.843 0.915 0.906 0.846 1.431∗ 1.488∗ 1.482∗ 1.433∗
(0.720) (0.779) (0.771) (0.722) (1.768) (1.846) (1.837) (1.771)
PPE growth t−1 -0.227 -0.221 -0.222 -0.219 -0.111 -0.107 -0.107 -0.106
(-1.397) (-1.355) (-1.357) (-1.331) (-0.845) (-0.807) (-0.808) (-0.792)
Sales growth t−1 -0.132∗ -0.135∗ -0.136∗ -0.135∗ -0.133∗∗ -0.135∗∗ -0.136∗∗ -0.135∗∗
(-1.849) (-1.872) (-1.878) (-1.870) (-2.458) (-2.483) (-2.492) (-2.479)
PPE-to-assets ratio t−1 0.396 0.401 0.403 0.403 0.063 0.066 0.068 0.067
(0.614) (0.623) (0.626) (0.625) (0.125) (0.132) (0.135) (0.133)
Industry diversification t−1 -0.081 -0.081 -0.081 -0.081 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024
(-0.507) (-0.507) (-0.508) (-0.509) (-0.173) (-0.173) (-0.173) (-0.174)
Constant -1.638∗∗ -1.692∗∗ -1.699∗∗ -1.693∗∗ -1.254∗∗ -1.296∗∗ -1.302∗∗ -1.292∗∗
(-2.377) (-2.473) (-2.488) (-2.480) (-2.234) (-2.320) (-2.328) (-2.307)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 109610 109610 109610 109610 109610 109610 109610 109610
R-squared 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079
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Table A8: Carve-outs - firm FE
This table reports the results of regressions for a binary variable denoting any occurrences of
carve-outs in a given calendar quarter and a relative measure of the asset value divested in those
occurrences, as a share of total assets, in that calendar quarter. These models include firm and
quarter fixed effects. Violation of most frequent covenants is a binary variable that takes the value of
1, when a violation of one of the three most frequent covenants in the sample occurred in the last
quarter before the initial calendar date. The three covenant variables are tangible net worth, net
worth and debt-to-EBITDA. Violation of three main covenants, t−1 is a binary variable that takes
the value of 1, when a violation of one of the three most frequent covenants in the sample occurred
in the last quarter before the initial calendar quarter. The three covenant variables are tangible net
worth, net worth and debt-to-EBITDA. t-2, t-3 denotes lagging to the second or third quarter before
the disinvestment period. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All other control variables
are as described in Table 1.
Carve-outs - binary t Carve-outs / Total Assets t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Violation of three main covenants t−1 0.071 0.047
(1.319) (1.176)
Violation of three main covenants t−2 0.081∗ 0.053
(1.665) (1.529)
Violation of three main covenants t−3 0.088∗ 0.065∗
(1.822) (1.888)
Log (Book value of assets) 0.027 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.014 0.018 0.019 0.020
(0.678) (0.830) (0.861) (0.898) (0.487) (0.623) (0.653) (0.714)
Leverage ratio t−1 0.353∗∗ 0.314∗∗ 0.304∗∗ 0.305∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗ 0.249∗∗ 0.246∗∗
(2.443) (2.071) (2.001) (2.076) (2.586) (2.226) (2.182) (2.247)
Tobin’s q t−1 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.325) (0.333) (0.312) (0.325) (0.322) (0.330) (0.311) (0.322)
Cash-to-assets ratio t−1 0.303 0.307 0.309 0.309 0.142 0.145 0.146 0.147
(0.728) (0.738) (0.742) (0.742) (0.650) (0.663) (0.668) (0.670)
EBIT-to-assets ratio t−1 0.109 0.170 0.166 0.112 0.149 0.189 0.186 0.151
(0.193) (0.300) (0.292) (0.199) (0.352) (0.445) (0.436) (0.358)
PPE growth t−1 -0.223∗∗ -0.218∗∗ -0.218∗∗ -0.213∗ -0.139∗ -0.136∗ -0.136∗ -0.133∗
(-2.030) (-1.971) (-1.980) (-1.934) (-1.884) (-1.824) (-1.835) (-1.783)
Sales growth t−1 -0.044 -0.046 -0.047 -0.047 -0.031 -0.032 -0.033 -0.033
(-1.043) (-1.089) (-1.101) (-1.094) (-1.004) (-1.048) (-1.058) (-1.057)
PPE-to-assets ratio t−1 0.434∗∗ 0.438∗∗ 0.440∗∗ 0.441∗∗ 0.288∗ 0.291∗∗ 0.292∗∗ 0.294∗∗
(2.035) (2.064) (2.071) (2.071) (1.959) (1.991) (1.999) (1.999)
Industry diversification t−1 0.207∗∗ 0.207∗∗ 0.207∗∗ 0.207∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.148∗∗
(2.210) (2.210) (2.209) (2.208) (2.147) (2.148) (2.147) (2.145)
Constant -0.366 -0.412 -0.421 -0.430 -0.226 -0.256 -0.262 -0.273
(-1.143) (-1.296) (-1.315) (-1.347) (-1.005) (-1.151) (-1.170) (-1.226)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 109610 109610 109610 109610 109610 109610 109610 109610
R-squared 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075
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Table A9: Regression discontinuity design: larger subsample (0.4 bandwidth)
This table reports the results of regression discontinuity design models. These models are applied to measures
of three different types of disinvestment: asset sales, spin-offs and carve-outs. For each type of disinvestment, I include
both a binary variable (label “-binary”) that denotes the occurrence of event and a relative measure of divested assets
in that type of events (label “/Total assets”), as a ratio of total firm assets. Covenant violation is the coefficient for
a regression discontinuity in a distance-to-threshold running variable. The distance-to-threshold running variable is a
measure of the minimum distance to threshold across three possible covenant variables in a given quarter, for a given
firm. Those three covenant variables correspond to the three most frequent covenant types included in tables 3, 4 and
5. (Tangible Net Worth, Net Worth, Debt-to-EBITDA). I consider the last quarter before the disinvestment event year.
Panel A shows the discontinuity estimates. Panel B shows the second degree polynomial estimates for negative binding
distances. Panel C shows the second degree polynomial estimates for positive binding distances. Models employ an
Epanechnikov non-parametrical kernel function of the Epanechnikov type. A total fraction of 16.6% of observations
is included in the RDD sample. The size of the subsample bandwidth is 0.4, measured in the running variable, as a
fraction of the threshold. Fixed effects are included at the firm and quarter levels. Standard errors are clustered by firm













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 13.315∗∗∗ 6.401∗∗∗ 3.017∗∗∗ 2.654∗∗∗ 0.411 0.223
(4.106) (3.129) (3.469) (4.311) (1.030) (0.919)
Proportional effects (at violation subsample mean) 0.461 0.480 0.823 0.951 0.770 0.904
Marginal effects (standard deviations) 0.375 0.617 0.223 1.216 1.167 1.209
Second-order polynomial
Binding distance (negative, × 100) 0.823∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.006
(8.936) (7.216) (3.440) (2.294) (3.451) (0.620)
Squared binding distance (negative, × 100) 2.184∗∗∗ 1.163∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.022
(9.321) (7.773) (3.708) (2.547) (3.577) (0.880)
Constant (negative) -3.234 1.250 7.705∗∗∗ 3.149∗∗∗ 7.717∗∗∗ 1.443∗∗∗
(-0.911) (0.551) (11.176) (6.760) (9.640) (3.848)
Squared binding distance (positive, × 100) -2.543∗∗∗ -1.057∗∗∗ -0.047 -0.029 -0.063 -0.065∗∗
(-8.911) (-5.802) (-0.843) (-0.763) (-0.971) (-2.153)
Binding distance (positive, × 100) 1.295∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.012 0.012 0.030 0.036∗∗∗
(12.400) (8.869) (0.613) (0.891) (1.285) (3.279)
Firm-level controls
Log (Book value of assets) t−1 6.137∗∗∗ 2.642∗∗∗ -0.351∗∗ 0.118 -0.270 0.055
(6.797) (4.583) (-1.994) (0.993) (-1.324) (0.575)
Tobin’s q -1.077∗∗ -0.547∗ -0.020 -0.128∗∗ -0.014 -0.035
(-2.230) (-1.774) (-0.213) (-2.013) (-0.132) (-0.688)
Cash-to-assets ratio t−1 -3.975 -7.498∗∗ -0.824 -0.444 -1.215 -0.640
(-0.857) (-2.531) (-0.896) (-0.717) (-1.139) (-1.286)
EBIT-to-assets ratio t−1 -26.276∗ -0.275 5.657∗ 3.449∗ 5.971∗ 2.273
(-1.766) (-0.029) (1.952) (1.766) (1.776) (1.448)
Sales growth t−1 -1.138 -1.247 -0.359 -0.324∗ -0.300 -0.103
(-0.852) (-1.462) (-1.382) (-1.850) (-0.995) (-0.735)
PPE-to-assets ratio t−1 1.108 0.901 1.251 0.370
(1.264) (1.524) (1.230) (0.778)
Industry diversification t−1 -0.535∗∗ -0.218 -0.231 0.035
(-2.485) (-1.502) (-0.923) (0.302)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11533 11533 11533 11533 11533 11533
R-squared 0.640 0.633 0.273 0.265 0.240 0.310
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Table A10: Baseline regressions with three lags included - asset sales and
spin-offs
This table reports the results of regressions for a binary and relative value measures for two
types of disinvestment: asset sales and spin-offs - in a given calendar quarter. Violation of most
frequent covenants is a binary variable that takes the value of 1, when a violation of one of the three
most frequent covenants in the sample occurred in the last quarter before the initial calendar date.
The three covenant variables are tangible net worth, net worth and debt-to-EBITDA. Violation of
three main covenants, t−1 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1, when a violation of one of the
three most frequent covenants in the sample occurred in the last quarter before the initial calendar
quarter. The three covenant variables are tangible net worth, net worth and debt-to-EBITDA. t-2
and t-3 denote lagging to the second or the third quarter before the disinvestment period. Fixed
effects and standard errors are as described in Tables 3 and 4. All other control variables are as









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Violation of three main covenants t−1 1.038∗ 0.713∗∗ 0.074 0.095
(1.756) (1.964) (0.757) (1.148)
Violation of three main covenants t−2 0.677 0.126 0.056 0.062
(1.583) (0.454) (0.838) (1.152)
Violation of three main covenants t−3 0.027 -0.233 0.073 0.053
(0.046) (-0.652) (0.755) (0.624)
Log (Book value of assets) 4.990∗∗∗ 1.375∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(22.530) (11.841) (6.372) (5.841)
Leverage ratio t−1 5.221∗∗∗ 4.125∗∗∗ -0.473∗∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗
(3.724) (4.964) (-3.563) (-2.943)
Tobin’s q t−1 -0.943∗∗∗ -0.507∗∗∗ -0.023 -0.007
(-4.772) (-4.291) (-0.906) (-0.356)
Cash-to-assets ratio t−1 -4.759∗∗ -1.930 -0.078 0.043
(-2.157) (-1.503) (-0.263) (0.221)
EBIT-to-assets ratio t−1 -62.679∗∗∗ -18.902∗∗∗ -1.189 -0.011
(-8.211) (-3.920) (-1.276) (-0.020)
PPE growth t−1 -4.995∗∗∗ -1.674∗∗ -0.199 -0.088
(-3.823) (-1.986) (-1.359) (-0.769)
Sales growth t−1 -0.916∗∗ -1.123∗∗∗ -0.113∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(-1.975) (-3.708) (-1.738) (-2.607)
PPE-to-assets ratio t−1 -0.255 -0.236
(-0.989) (-1.200)
Industry diversification t−1 -0.009 0.044
(-0.088) (0.502)
Constant -16.074∗∗∗ -1.694∗∗ -0.687∗∗∗ -0.509∗∗∗
(-10.794) (-2.054) (-3.252) (-3.111)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
sic3 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 109770 109770 109770 109770
R-squared 0.116 0.060 0.013 0.013
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Table A11: Disinvestment and other firm policies - asset sales
Tables A11 and A12 report the results of regressions for two types of disinvestment, where
the effect of other firm policies is estimated under covenant violation states. This table presents
models for asset sales. Two outcome variables are considered: a binary variable denoting any
occurrences of that particular event in a given calendar quarter and a relative measure of the asset
value divested in those occurrences, as a share of total assets, in that calendar quarter. Investment
reduction (p.p) is the negative absolute variation of annual capital expenditures in the previous fiscal
year, scaled in percentage points. Leverage reduction (d.p.) is the negative absolute variation of the
book debt-to-assets ratio (as defined in Table 3), scaled in decimal percentage points. Violation of
most frequent covenants is a binary variable that takes the value of 1, when a violation of one of the
three most frequent covenants in the sample occurred in the last quarter before the initial calendar
date. Those three covenant variables correspond to the three most frequent covenant types included in
tables 3, 4 and 5. t-4, t-5 denotes the lagging of the violation binary variable to the fourth or fifth-last
quarters before the disinvestment period. These are the two most recent quarters prior to the period
of measurement of investment and leverage policies. Interactions of the non-lagged violation dummy
(Violations of most frequent covenants) with 1) Investment Reduction and 2) Leverage Reduction are
included in some of the equations, with the label Interaction – violation. Industry and quarter fixed
effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All other control variables are as
described in Table 1.
Asset sales - binary t Asset sales / Total Assets t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interaction - ∆ investment, policy 0.037 0.019
(1.013) (0.960)
Investment reduction (p.p.) 0.007∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(2.181) (2.506)
Interaction - ∆ leverage, policy 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(2.215) (5.255)
Leverage reduction (d.p.) -0.000∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(-1.711) (-4.028)
Violation of three main covenants t−4, t−5 1.849∗∗∗ 1.787∗∗ 0.818∗∗ 0.929∗∗
(2.662) (2.451) (2.027) (2.218)
Constant -16.011∗∗∗ -17.067∗∗∗ -1.191 -1.812∗
(-9.790) (-9.731) (-1.305) (-1.878)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 87134 79032 87134 79032
R-squared 0.124 0.124 0.069 0.070
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Table A12: Disinvestment and other firm policies - spin-offs
Tables A11 and A12 report the results of regressions for two types of disinvestment, where
the effect of other firm policies is estimated under covenant violation states. This table presents
models for spin-offs. Two outcome variables are considered: a binary variable denoting any occurrences
of that particular event in a given calendar quarter and a relative measure of the asset value divested
in those occurrences, as a share of total assets, in that calendar quarter. All variables represented are
defined in table A11. Industry and quarter fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interaction - ∆ investment, policy 0.000 0.001
(0.039) (0.290)
Investment reduction (p.p.) 0.000 0.000
(0.642) (0.880)
Interaction - ∆ leverage, policy 0.000 0.000
(0.977) (1.086)
Leverage reduction (d.p.) 0.000 -0.000
(0.110) (-0.005)
Violation of three main covenants t−2, t−3 0.086 0.105 0.128 0.133
(0.872) (0.996) (1.576) (1.509)
Constant -0.752∗∗∗ -0.726∗∗∗ -0.553∗∗∗ -0.546∗∗
(-2.939) (-2.647) (-2.799) (-2.564)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 85845 77552 85845 77552
R-squared 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
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Table A13: Simultaneous policies in firms selling assets
This table reports regression models for two variable differences, measuring implemented firm
policies: Investment reduction (p.p) and Leverage reduction (d.p), for the subsample of firms having
sold assets in the most recent calendar quarter (Asset sales = 1). Investment reduction (p.p) is
the negative absolute variation of annual capital expenditures in the previous fiscal year, scaled
in percentage points. Leverage reduction (d.p.) is the negative absolute variation of the book
debt-to-assets ratio, scaled in decimal percentage points. The covenant violation dummy variable
(Violation of three main covenants, t−2, t−3) respects to the two most recent quarters prior to the
period of measurement of disinvestment. Industry and quarter fixed effects are included. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. All other control variables are lagged four additional quarters,






Violation of three main covenants t−2, t−3 0.275∗∗∗ -1.482
(2.898) (-1.146)
Log (Book value of assets) t−1 0.165∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗
(2.738) (3.209)
Debt-to-assets ratio (book) t−5 -0.043 8.052∗∗∗
(-0.093) (3.737)
Tobin’s q t−1 0.073 -0.608
(1.039) (-0.932)
Cash-to-assets ratio t−1 -0.668 -10.619
(-0.514) (-1.636)
EBIT-to-assets ratio t−1 -0.432 4.002
(-0.118) (0.297)




Industry FE Yes Yes
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Table A14: Simultaneous policies in firms selling assets
This table reports regression models for Investment and Leverage: the two stock variables differentiated
in table A14, for the subsample of firms having sold assets in the most recent calendar quarter (Asset
sales = 1). Both these variables are defined as in Table 1. The covenant violation dummy variable
(Violation of three main covenants - t−2, t−3) respects to the two most recent quarters prior to the
disinvestment period. Firm and quarter fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level. All other control variables are as described in Table 1.
Investment Leverage
(1) (2)
Violation of three main covenants t−2, t−3 -0.344∗∗∗ 6.630∗∗∗
(-2.581) (5.442)
Log (Book value of assets) t−1 -0.206 0.005
(-1.264) (0.005)
Tobin’s q t−1 0.317∗∗∗ 1.179
(4.603) (1.013)
Cash-to-assets ratio t−1 -1.161∗∗ -18.775∗∗∗
(-2.421) (-4.996)




Quarter FE Yes Yes
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Table A15: Regression discontinuity design - robustness to bandwidth
selection: asset sales, binary
This table reports the regression discontinuity estimates for RDD models identical to the first
column of table A9. The outcome variable is the binary variable denoting the occurrence of assets
sales in a given quarter. A single parameter is changed - the bandwidth of the kernel function, taking
a different value in each specification.""
Asset sales - binary t
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Bandwidth (h) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Regr. discontinuity estimate 9.943∗∗ 13.842∗∗∗ 13.335∗∗∗ 13.143∗∗∗
(2.039) (4.115) (4.889) (5.551)
Second order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 4684 9478 14275 18799
83
Appendix of Chapter 1
Table A16: Regression discontinuity design - robustness to bandwidth
selection: spinoffs, binary
This table reports the regression discontinuity estimates for RDD models identical to the
second column of table A9. The outcome variable is the binary variable denoting the occurrence of
spin-offs in a given quarter. A single parameter is changed - the bandwidth of the kernel function,
taking a different value in each specification.""
Spin-offs - binary
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Bandwidth (h) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Regr. discontinuity estimate 4.312∗∗ 3.167∗∗∗ 2.600∗∗∗ 2.256∗∗∗
(2.554) (3.345) (3.711) (3.893)
Second order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 4684 9478 14275 18799
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Table A17: Regression discontinuity design: placebo tests, assets sold
This table reports the regression discontinuity estimates for RDD models identical to the first
column of table A9. The outcome variable is the ratio between the value of assets sold and total assets
in a given quarter. A single parameter is changed - the thresold binding distance, which is the cutoff
for the RDD running varaible. This thresold takes a different placebo value in each specification.""
Placebo threshold - binding distance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
- 0.20 - 0.10 - 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.20
Regr. discontinuity estimate -1.718 1.259 -3.969 -2.313 -0.047 -3.656
(-1.148) (0.920) (-1.214) (-0.895) (-0.018) (-1.221)
Second order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 11819 10119 10797 8764 8162 6980
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Table A18: Regression discontinuity design: placebo tests, spun-off assets
This table reports the regression discontinuity estimates for RDD models identical to the
fourth column of table A9. The outcome variable is the ratio between the value of spun-off assets
and total assets, in a given quarter. A single parameter is changed - the thresold binding distance,
which is the cutoff for the RDD running varaible. This thresold takes a different placebo value in each
specification.""
Placebo threshold - binding distance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
- 0.20 - 0.10 - 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.20
Regr. discontinuity estimate 0.093 -0.284∗ 0.120 -0.217 0.372 0.349
(1.458) (-1.817) (0.913) (-0.854) (1.429) (0.645)
Second order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 11819 10119 10797 8764 8162 6980
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Figures - wider bandwidth (0.4)
Figure A1: Scatter plots and fitted polynomials: asset sales The following six
figures comprise four charts each, referring to each of the six dependent variables of
this paper. These are as defined in Table 1. The first chart in each figure is a scatter
plot that illustrates the distribution of the outcome variable across different values of
binding distance to threshold, computed for the three main covenants considered in
table A10 (Net Worth, Tangible Net Worth, Debt-to-EBITDA). A linear polynomial
if the binding distance is fit to the scatter, for each of two branches of the function
domain: negative binding distances (not violation any covenant) and positive binding
distances (in violation). The second chart reproduces the same scatter plot as in the
first. Differently, a quadratic polynomial of the binding distance is fitted to the data.
The third chart illustrates the distribution of the residual of a regression discontinuity
model, using as covariates the same control variables and fixed effects as in table A10.
The equations estimated are identical to those in table A6, with a bandwidth of 0.4 for
the kernel function. This distribution is computed within bins of 5 percentage points of
binding distance, measured as a percentage of its threshold. A quadratic polynomial of
the binding distance is fit into the bin-level average points for each sign of the binding
distance. The fourth chart illustrates the residuals of the same model than the third
chart, distributed across the same bins. It differs in that fourth-degree polynomials are
fitted to bin-level averages, for either negative or positive binding distances. This figure
reports results for the binary variable denoting the occurrence of asset sales in a given
quarter.
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Figure A2: Scatter plots and fitted polynomials: spin-offs This figure presents
an identical set of charts to those in figure 1, for the binary variable denoting the
occurrence of spin-offs in a given quarter.
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Figure A3: Scatter plots and fitted polynomials: carve-outs This figure presents
an identical set of charts to those in figure 1, for the binary variable denoting the
occurrence of carve-outs in a given quarter.
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Figure A4: Scatter plots and fitted polynomials: asset sales This figure presents
an identical set of charts to those in figure 1, for the binary variable denoting the
occurrence of asset sales in a given quarter.
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Figure A5: Scatter plots and fitted polynomials: spin-offs This figure presents
an identical set of charts to those in figure 1, for the ratio of the value of spin-offs to
total assets in a given quarter.
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Figure A6: Scatter plots and fitted polynomials: carve-outs This figure presents
an identical set of charts to those in figure 1, for the ratio between carved-out assets
and total assets in a given quarter.
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Financial divisions in diversified firms
2.1 Introduction
Although corporate diversification is one of the most extensively studied topics in
finance, most papers exclude conglomerates with financial divisions, claiming that such
segments are inherently different and that including them in the analyses would poten-
tially obfuscate results. Notwithstanding these issues of comparability, many conglom-
erates do have financial divisions and thus it seems natural to study their role, and this
is the broad objective of our paper. We start by documenting that most financial divi-
sions of US conglomerates fall under the classification of SIC 67 “Holdings and funds”.
While a division such as a holding company has potentially many functions, we believe
it is plausible that operating internal capital markets be at the core of what they do.2
2When holding divisions exist in a conglomerate, they are responsible for centralizing management
functions such as sales, marketing, and human resources management. More importantly for our paper,
they are also responsible for strategy and finance, which are the key functional areas of an internal
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Specifically, we envision a holding company employing a team of business specialists
with a high level of financial expertise, who would be able to produce accurate es-
timates for each (non-financial) division’s investment opportunities and thus guide the
process of capital allocation. Based on this idea, we develop a simple model of internal
capital markets and financial divisions, which predicts that such divisions would be
more prevalent in firms that are larger, more diverse, and have more segments. These
predictions are borne out by data, as is the hypothesis that internal capital markets
are more efficient when conglomerates have a financial division. Finally, we also show
that conglomerates with financial divisions have a valuation premium, as compared to
otherwise similar firms.
We propose a simple model of internal capital markets and financial divisions that
is closely related to existing literature on the topic (Gertner et al., 1994; Stein, 1997;
Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Rajan et al., 2000). The economy comprises business
units that can be organized as standalone firms or diversified conglomerates. Each of
these business units is endowed with a certain level of productivity and, ideally, more
productive units would invest more capital. However, raising capital is costly, especially
for large amounts, and this can compromise the unit’s ability to operate at the ideal
capacity. Such a friction is plausible and it follows the spirit of seminal literature on
financial constraints (Froot et al., 1993).
In our model, division-level costs of raising capital are convex, and thus a collection
of business units can raise funds more efficiently by having all units raise the same
amount. Once these funds are pooled together, they can potentially be allocated to
the units (or divisions) that are more productive. Alongside this potential advantage of




In particular, we assume that diversified firms bear a cost that is proportional to the
heterogeneity of capital allocations across divisions, which implies that conglomerates
will tend to display a socialist capital allocation (a term we borrow from Scharfstein and
Stein, 2000). The mechanism we have in mind is that if headquarters has a reputation of
implementing highly heterogeneous allocations, then this directs significant managerial
effort to rent-seeking activities, which is in the spirit of Scharfstein and Stein (2000).
In the model, having a dedicated financial division comes with a fixed cost, but
such a division minimizes the costs of implementing heterogeneous allocations. The
presence of such a division, with a team of experts who carefully analyze the prospects
presented by each division to headquarters, would limit the incentive of managers to
direct effort in pretending to have better opportunities than they really do. By reducing
costs associated with heterogeneity, the dedicated financial division would then allow
more capital to flow to high-productivity segments. The contribution of such a division
will be higher for larger firms (given the presence of a fixed cost), for firms with more
diverse divisions in terms of productivity (otherwise there is no advantage in having
heterogeneous allocations to begin with), and also for firms with more segments (holding
diversity and total size constant). The latter effect is the least obvious and more novel,
and it follows from our assumption that divisions benchmark their allocation to that of
the top division. With more segments, the top segment is more of an outlier in terms
of productivity even after accounting for “first-order diversity”, which means the firm
has more to gain in relaxing the costs associated with allocation heterogeneity.
We now turn to our empirical results. Using a sample of conglomerates from the
United States, we find that 9% of conglomerates have a financial division, representing
12% in assets value. Moreover, despite the general downward trend in corporate di-
versification, the proportion of conglomerates that have a financial segment has mostly
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increased over time, decreasing only after the 2007/2008 financial crisis (see Figure 2.4).
As mentioned before, “Holdings and funds” are the most frequent financial segment in
conglomerates with financial divisions, and are present in more than 50% of these con-
glomerates. The second most common financial divisions are “credit agencies”, which
are present in 26% of these firms. The role of these credit agencies is usually to provide
finance to the conglomerate’s customers (Bodnaruk et al., 2016). “Banks”, “insurance”,
and “market dealers” are fairly uncommon divisions. Given the much larger frequency
of holdings, we focus most of our analysis on them. As explained above, we conjecture
that holding divisions help to more formally operationalize the internal capital market
of the conglomerate.
As predicted by the model, we find that conglomerates with financial divisions are
larger, have more business segments, and have more diverse investment opportunities.
In fact, in univariate results we show that conglomerates with financial divisions are
more than double the size of conglomerates without a financial division as measured
by sales or assets. We also run probit and linear probability model regressions to
understand which conglomerates chose to have a holding division, which confirm the
univariate results.
To test our key assumption that financial divisions improve the operation of internal
capital markets, we look at efficiency measures from previous literature: absolute value
added by allocation (AVA) and value added by cross-divisional transfers (VAT). These
measures, proposed by Rajan et al. (2000), aim to capture the extent to which the
conglomerate efficiently allocates capital across its divisions, by transferring resources
from divisions with relatively low resource-weighted growth opportunities to the ones
with high resource-weighted growth opportunities. We find that financial conglomerates
have a significantly more efficient capital allocation when compared to other conglom-
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erates, and that these results are mostly driven by holding divisions. When observing
the behavior of financial conglomerates during the crisis, we show that they do not
seem as affected by external credit market tightness: they increase their leverage and
invest in tangible assets during this period relatively more than other conglomerates.
If indeed financial divisions operate internal capital markets more efficiently, we
also expect conglomerates with such divisions to perform better when external capital
market conditions are tighter (Matvos and Seru, 2014; Matvos et al., 2016; Kuppuswamy
and Villalonga, 2015). We test whether this is the case using the VIX (Chicago Board
Options Exchange Volatility Index) as a measure of external market frictions. We find
that conglomerates with holding divisions and at least two other non-financial segments
perform better in terms of internal capital allocation than other conglomerates otherwise
similar when external market conditions are tighter.
In addition to analyzing the determinants of when a conglomerate has a holding
division and how such a holding impacts the internal capital market, we also study
the association between holding divisions and firm value. We start by comparing the
valuation of conglomerates with and without a financial segment. We find that financial
conglomerates are valued at a premium when compared to otherwise similar conglom-
erates. We estimate this premium to be between 5.7% and 9.3% of firm value, and we
find that this can be mostly attributed to holding divisions as opposed to other types of
financial segments. Although we do not have a clean identification for assessing value
effects, we interpret these results as suggesting that financial divisions add to firm value
in a quantitatively meaningful way.
Lastly we run what we view as a placebo test of the internal-capital-markets hy-
pothesis. Here we focus on diversified firms that combine a financial division with a
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non-financial division, and check whether they perform better in terms of internal cap-
ital market allocation. For these firms we conjecture the financial division acts just as
a placebo: there is really no internal capital market to operate, since there is only a
non-financial division. We find no significant correlation between AVA and the presence
of a financial division in such conglomerates.
Diversified firms represent a large fraction of the world economy and have been ex-
tensively studied by economists. Coase (1937) was the first to discuss firm boundaries.
Since then, mixed evidence has emerged with respect to the value of being diversified
and operating an internal capital market. Two main views have been offered with
respect to the efficiency of capital allocation within these firms. One view is that con-
glomerates operate an efficient internal capital market, allocating resources optimally
across divisions and offering an advantage with respect to standalone firms when ex-
ternal capital markets experience or temporarily face turmoil. The case for the bright
side of conglomerates, as proposed by Stein (1997) among others, is supported by evid-
ence that conglomerates perform better than standalone firms during times when capital
markets are impaired (Matvos and Seru, 2014; Matvos et al., 2016; Kuppuswamy and
Villalonga, 2015) or in economies where external financial markets are less developed
(Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Fauver et al., 2004). The alternative view is that internal
capital markets work inefficiently by subsidizing poorly performing divisions, which
would not happen if these divisions were standalone firms subject to external market
discipline (Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). Our paper shows that reality
is more nuanced, and that whether and how internal capital markets operate depends
on the existence of dedicated financial divisions.
We also contribute to the recent literature showing that conglomerates are more
valuable when external markets conditions are tighter because they benefit from their
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own internal capital market (Matvos and Seru, 2014; Matvos et al., 2016; Kuppuswamy
and Villalonga, 2015). We offer new insights on how internal capital markets work, and
we show that financial divisions, namely, holding divisions, play a role in internal capital
allocation. We also document a set of new empirical facts about conglomerates with a
financial division that have not been covered by the previous studies. The literature on
financial subsidiaries has mostly focused on captive finance and on the advantages of
providing credit to your customers. We show that there is a value premium associated
with financial divisions that is not restricted to credit agencies but is mostly linked to
holding divisions. We propose a new mechanism for this association and argue that
holdings are relevant divisions for operationalizing internal capital markets.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 develops our theoretical framework.
Section 3.3 summarizes the data referring to US conglomerates that have financial
segments. Section 2.4 contains our empirical tests. Section 3.6 concludes.
2.2 A model of internal capital markets and financial
divisions
A1.1 Single-division benchmark
First let us introduce a model for a benchmark single-segment firm. Its value,
denoted by Vb, is given by the following expression:






where k is the amount the firm chooses to invest and w is the level of funds raised by the
firm. For simplicity we assume the firm has no internal funds, and thus the constraint
k ≤ w needs to be verified. As for the other parameters,
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• A captures the profitability/productivity of the firm;
• γ captures decreasing returns to scale; and
• φ scales the cost of accessing external financing, which increases quadratically
with the amount raised. These costs represent, for example: the shadow value
of collateral that may need to be pledged, fees of lawyers and other specialists
involved in accessing external finance, the opportunity cost of managerial time
devoted to outside-financing activities (e.g., roadshows, meetings).
Determining the optimal level of k is a simple optimization problem and thus the





which is economically intuitive. We will use this benchmark value when computing the
value added by corporate diversification and, more importantly, the value added by
financial divisions.
A1.2 Two-segment conglomerate
In this section, a diversified firm comprises two divisions, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}. Ab-


























ki ≥ 0 (2.5)
The above model of corporate diversification captures two relevant features of internal
capital markets (ICMs): (i) diversified firms are allowed to pool raised funds together
and allocate these funds to investment in a way that maximizes value; (ii) it is hard for
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the firm to implement highly heterogeneous policies across divisions, and this socialism
friction is captured by parameter η;3 To illustrate the mechanisms we have in mind
for how corporate socialism affects value, consider for instance the fact that managers
decide to spend more time doing “politics” inside the firm whenever they have lower
allocations; the extra time spent in politics could have been used for other valuable
managerial activities and thus represents an opportunity cost. Alternatively, and in
a more behavioral vein, managers might perceive a lower allocation as being unfair
(e.g., due to overconfidence about their own investment opportunities) and become less
productive.
After some tedious but simple algebra, it is possible to show that the value of the













As with the single-segment benchmark, decreasing returns to scale and external-financing
costs reduce firm value. Corporate diversification adds value, relative to the standalone
benchmark, by minimizing the convex costs of external funds (it is optimal to set
wi = w), while potentially allocating more capital to the more productive segments.
However, corporate socialism (the η parameter) can limit these gains, and this cost
shows up in the second fraction of (2.6). Intuitively, the η parameter only matters if
the divisions are diverse (i.e., have significantly different Ai); although of course without
diversity there would be no benefits at all to diversification in this simple model of ICMs.
Turning now to the dedicated financial division, suppose the firm can set up such
a segment with some fixed cost F .4 Further, consider that the benefit of this division
is to reduce the cost of socialism, e.g., by limiting the ability of divisional managers to
3Here we closely follow the ideas in Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan et al. (2000).
4This fixed cost could capture both the setup and running costs of the financial division.
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manipulate the perception of investment opportunities by headquarters. For simplicity,
we consider that with a dedicated financial division, corporate socialism vanishes, i.e.,
η → 0. This is an admittedly extreme assumption, but if facilitates the exposition of
our argument, which is qualitative in nature. Under these assumptions, the value added
by the financial division excluding the fixed cost F , denoted by ∆fin, is simply
∆fin = V
∗




If we re-write A1 and A2 as follows,
A1 = S(1 + σ) (2.8)
A2 = S(1− σ), (2.9)
where S captures the scale or level of the division’s opportunities and σ captures cross-





According to expression (2.10), we should expect diversified firms to adopt a financial
division whenever they are larger (an admittedly trivial implication of our model),
but also when the segments are more diverse. Moreover, the value effects and the
contribution of the financial division to the functioning of ICMs should also increase in
size and diversity.
In our model, the role that financial divisions play when divisions are very diverse can
be particularly important. What we mean by this is that for high enough socialism cost
η, corporate diversification can only add value if there exists a financial division. Thus,
financial divisions sometimes are enablers of conglomeration (and not just “improvers”).




This section generalizes the two-division setup to N segments. A key aspect of
this more general setup is that is not obvious how to model corporate socialism. In
particular, does each division compare itself to every other division? Or, alternatively,
to the mean? We chose a specification that nests the two-division instance from before
and is also formally simple: divisions compare their allocation to that of the division
that obtains the most capital.
A second important modeling choice is how to measure diversity across segments,
since we want to understand the effect of the number of segments by itself. We chose an
approach where segments are ordered according to their productivity Ai, with Ai+1 ≥
Ai, and where we assume
Ai = S
[








The key implications of the above definition are contained in lemma 1 (proof is provided
in the appendix).
Lemma 1. Using equation (2.11) to define segment-level productivity in an N-segment
conglomerate, the following is true:
1. The average Ai equals S.
2. For even N , the average absolute deviation of Ai equals Sσ.5
3. The difference between the maximal and minimal Ai is given by






The last point in the proposition is important, since it implies that, controlling
5This result does not hold if N is odd. However it holds approximately and, as N grows, the
absolute deviation for odd-N conglomerates does converge to Sσ. Given this argument we do not
exclude odd N in our numerical examples. Please see the proof of the lemma for details.
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for first-order dispersion σ, higher-order diversity increases in the number of segments.
Given our assumption that the biggest division (in principle the one with productivity
AN) is the reference point for all others when computing allocation inequality, then this
will imply a higher cost of implementing unequal allocations (and, hence, a higher cost
of corporate socialism).

























ki ≥ 0 (2.15)
ki+1 ≥ ki (2.16)
Relative to the two-division case there are two differences. First, the objective function
refers to division N as the reference point and there is a cost of inequality borne by
every other division. Second, we introduced the constraint (2.16). We believe this is
reasonable, since the firm could also face organizational problems from allocating less
capital to a more profitable division. Importantly, this assumption implies that using
division N as the reference point makes sense, since it will indeed be the division with
the highest capital allocation.6 These arguments notwithstanding, we focus on cases
with interior solutions, i.e., where constraint (2.16) is not binding. The solution to
the above optimization problem is outlined in proposition 1 (proof presented in the
appendix).
Proposition 1. An interior solution to the optimization program described by (2.13)-
6Without constraint (2.16), it becomes optimal in some numerical instances to set, for example,
kN < kN−1. This tends to occur with high N , since by lowering kN you are saving corporate-socialism
costs in many other divisions (division N is, in a sense, “sacrificed” for the common good of the firm).
But this then raises the question of why division N is the reference point. We also note that having an
endogenous reference point (the division with maximal ki) would make the model much less tractable.
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(γ + η)(γ +Nη)
(2.19)
As in the two-segment case, it is optimal for all divisions to raise the same amount,
since this minimizes the (convex) costs of external funds. The allocation for the most
productive division (kN), given by (2.18), increases in the difference between this divi-
sion’s productivity (AN) and the average productivity (S). kN decreases in the product
of η and N ; since corporate socialism is now affecting all other divisions. Therefore, the
higher the number of segments, the stronger the distortion to kN . The capital allocation
for all other divisions (ki) also captures the corporate-socialism effect. Specifically, the
last fraction in (2.19) states that, everything else equal, division i should invest more
when the highest productivity AN increases, as long as η > 0. This follows from the
fact that a higher AN implies a higher kN , and thus at the margin it becomes optimal
to have a higher ki (to minimize corporate-socialism costs).
As before, we assume that introducing a financial division eliminates corporate
socialism costs (i.e., η → 0). Figure 2.2 provides an example of how such a financial
division would impact allocations in conglomerates with a different number of segments.
As expected, the distortion to kN is stronger when the number of segments N is high,
which suggests that the financial division will have a stronger contribution in firms
with more segments. Figure 2.3 shows that this is the case, at least for our choice of
parameters. Specifically, even after scaling the contribution of the financial division by
total conglomerate size, adding the financial division has more impact in firms with




Firms in the US have to report segment-specific accounts if these segments meet
certain conditions: if 10% or more of their total revenue comes from sales to external
customers; if 10% or more of total assets are allocated to that segment; or if their net
income represents 10% or more of the total net income. We build a firm-segment-year
panel using Compustat segment files and Compustat annual firm data from 1976 to
2014 that is collapsed to a firm-year panel for part of our analysis. We apply the most
standard filters in the literature to these data: (1) we eliminate duplicates in segment
data resulting from updating of accounting data; (2) we eliminate segments with iden-
tifier = 99 and segments with SIC codes for primary sector, families/individuals, public
sector, membership organizations, and unclassified; (3) firms with negative total assets
or sales; and (4) firms with a sum of segment sales differing by more than 5% from
firm-level data. We treat firms solely composed of financial segments (e.g., banks, in-
surance companies, and other financials) as standalone firms. The main ratios and log
variables are winsorized at 1%.
Our yearly firm panel has a total of 172,663 firm-year observations and 20,015 firms,
with 1.53 segments per firm, on average. We split our data into three subsamples: (1)
standalones, (2) conglomerates (firms with more than one segment, and none which
are financial), and (3) conglomerates with financial segments. The latter is our group
of interest. We define financial divisions as any segment with an SIC code between
6000 and 6999. These include depositary institutions/banks (SIC 60); non-depositary
institutions/credit agencies (SIC 61); market brokers, dealers (SIC 62); insurance (SIC
63); insurance agency, brokerage (SIC 64); real estate (SIC 65); and holdings, funds
(SIC 67). Conglomerates with financial divisions represent 9% of the total number




Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics for these three groups. Conglomerates with
financial divisions are on average much larger than other conglomerates, being more
than double their size as measured by assets. They also have more segments (3.5 vs.
2.9), even though they have similar diversity and concentration as measured by the
Herfindahl index. As for performance, these conglomerates show higher Tobin’s q (1.7
vs. 1.6) and a higher market-to-sales ratio (4.1 vs. 2.9); and also show more efficient
internal capital markets as measured by the absolute value added by allocation (AVA)
measure (1.6 vs. 0.2) and the value added by cross-divisional transfers (VAT) measure
(0.02 vs. 0.001). Leverage is higher for financial conglomerates (0.35 vs. 0.29), and
cash holdings show no significant difference.
These univariate results are in line with the notion that conglomerates with finan-
cial divisions are different from conglomerates without financial divisions. They show
superior performance by standard metrics, in addition to having more efficient capital
markets. The fact that measures of efficiency of capital allocation are significantly lar-
ger suggests that financial divisions play an active role in internal capital markets. We
further test this hypothesis in the next section.
Finally, even though the number of non-financial conglomerates with financial seg-
ments has decreased over time, following the same trend as conglomerates in general
(Anjos and Fracassi, 2017), their weight among conglomerates has increased over the
last decades; only to fall after the recent financial crisis in 2009 (see Figure 2.4).
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A1.1 Conglomerates with financial segments
We use segment-level data to characterize conglomerates with financial divisions.
Table 2.2 shows the industry characterization of these conglomerates. Holdings and
funds are the most frequent segments (1,416 observations, which represent almost 50%
of these conglomerates). Holdings and funds divisions represent 16% of the total number
of financial segments for conglomerates with a financial division. Credit agencies are
the second most frequent financial segment, with 11% of these segments (table 2.2) and
a presence in more than 30% of these conglomerates (table 2.3). All the other financial
divisions represent less than 5% of these segments. When looking at assets weights of
these segments in their specific conglomerate, the rank is quite different. Banks, credit
agencies, and insurance divisions all represent on average more than 30% of the assets
of the conglomerate, with holdings and funds having a weight of less than 20%.
Table 2.3 shows summary statistics at the segment level and firm level by financial
divisions of conglomerates. Panel A shows statistics at the segment level. Banks, credit
agencies, and insurance divisions are the largest divisions. Interestingly, holdings and
funds, being the most frequent division in these conglomerates, are also the second
smallest by assets and by sales. This is consistent with holdings being important to
operationalize internal capital markets. Nevertheless, in order to perform that function,
they do not need to represent, at year end, a substantial part of the business/assets of
the conglomerate.
Panel B shows statistics at the firm level. Depository institutions, credit agencies,
and insurance divisions are part of the largest conglomerates. Conglomerates with these
financial divisions are much larger than the average conglomerate, being more than three
times the size of the average non-financial conglomerate. Holdings and funds, insurance




Conglomerates with holdings divisions are of particular interest because these are
the divisions that most likely can play an active role in internal capital allocation. We
find that conglomerates with a holding division exhibit striking differences in overall
firm performance and metrics of internal capital markets efficiency. The average Tobin’s
q of conglomerates with holdings divisions is 2.04, in contrast to an average Tobin’s q
of conglomerates of 1.6. The difference in the market-to-sales ratio is even more pro-
nounced: 6.2 for conglomerates with holdings versus 2.9 for the average conglomerate.
When looking at internal capital markets measures, the difference is again striking.
Conglomerates with holdings divisions have an AVA of 3.5, whereas other conglomer-
ates with financial divisions have an average value of 0.5. If we compare holdings with
other conglomerates that do not have financial divisions, the difference is even larger at
3.3. The results are similar when we look at value added by division transfers. Holdings
perform much better in this metric than any of the other conglomerates, including the
ones with other financial divisions. Interestingly, these conglomerates also have much
larger capex-to-sales ratios: 15% vs. 10% for all the other conglomerates.
The univariate analysis seems to suggest that conglomerates with financial divisions,
in particular the ones with holdings and funds segments, enjoy better performance than
other conglomerates. We conjecture that holdings divisions play an active role in in-
ternal capital allocation by setting goals by area, making investment decisions, and
operationalizing the portfolio strategy of the conglomerate. Overall, they should also
ensure that cash flows from each division are collected as part of the cash pooling pro-
cess and then redistributed in an efficient way. Causality cannot be inferred from this
analysis. We cannot say if these conglomerates perform better because they have a
holding division, or if they have these divisions because they have better-functioning
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internal capital markets. It might also be that other covariates explain these correla-
tions. Even without being able to establish a causal effect, however, these results clearly
show that firms with financial holdings have more efficient internal capital markets.
The most comprehensive presence in this set of non-financial industries is by “hold-
ings/funds” and “real estate” divisions. These most frequent non-financial industries
are typically associated to larger companies in most cases, encompassing industrial and
construction businesses, as well utilities and regulated sectors (not shown).
Although the industry of holdings/funds mostly presents low shares in the total
assets of each subclass, this is notoriously not the case for firms with (building) con-
struction and communication divisions. We infer that a large allocation of resources
should not be rare in this type of segments.
2.4 Empirical results
A1.1 Determinants of financial divisions
Table 2.4 shows the results of linear probability and probit models on the determ-
inants to have a holding division. The dependent variable on these regressions is a
dummy variable equal to one if the conglomerate has a holding division (SIC 67) and
has at least two non-financial divisions. In columns (1) and (3) we find that having a
holding division is positively related to the size of the company: the larger the company
is, the more likely it is to have a holding division. Based on specifications (1)-(3), a
10 billion USD change in total assets (the standard deviation in total assets is about
9 billion USD for conglomerates) corresponds to a 1 percentage point increase in the
probability of having a holding division.
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We also find that firms with more current and future investment opportunities,
as measured by Tobin’s q and CAPX are more likely to have a holding division. A
one-standard-deviation (2) increase in Tobin’s q is associated with an increase of 0.4
percentage points in the probability of having a holding division (from specification 1).
An increase of one standard deviation in CAPX is associated with an increase of 0.1
percentage points in the probability of having such division.
Our model suggests precisely that larger firms, with more investment opportunities,
will find it optimal to have a holding division. The model suggests as well that firms
with a more diverse set of investment opportunities, for which the potential of corporate
socialism is higher, also benefit from the presence of a holding division. Taking spe-
cification (2) as a base case, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in diversity
is associated with an increase of 2 percentage points in the probability of a having a
holding division. This effect is economically large, especially when we compare to the
effect of other firm characteristics. Lastly we look at the number of segments. We
find that one more business segment is associated with an increase in the probability
of having a holding division by 2 percentage points as well.
The results with probit specifications are very much consistent with the linear prob-
ability model.
A1.2 Financial divisions and internal capital markets
A1.2.1 Methodology
Next we use absolute value added by allocation (AVA) (Rajan et al., 2000) to test
whether conglomerates with financial divisions do indeed have more efficient internal
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where BAj is the book value of assets, and Ij the capital expenditure, of segment
j. BAsaj is the book value of assets, and Isaj the average capital expenditure, of the
corresponding standalone firms.
A1.2.2 Results
Table 2.5 shows the results of regressions of AVA on the main variable of interest,
which is the holding division dummy. We find that firms with a holding division show
significantly higher AVA. The presence of a holding division is associated with between
0.02 and 0.03 more AVA, which represents 10% more AVA evaluated at the mean for
conglomerates with no financial divisions. The result is robust across specifications,
also including firm fixed effects, which suggests that not only cross-sectional variation,
but also within-firm variation, contribute to this association. In the firm-fixed-effects
regressions the identification is coming from firms that either introduce or remove the
holding division.
In specifications (4) and (8) we interact diversity with the holding dummy and find
a positive and significant coefficient. This result suggests that holding companies are
particularly important for high-diversity firms, which is consistent with our theoretical
framework.
Overall, these results are consistent with the notion that holding divisions are im-
portant for the efficiency of internal capital markets.
The bright side of corporate diversification is typically associated with an efficient
and well-functioning internal capital market that takes advantage of resource realloca-
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tion and pooling of cash flows when firms face difficulties in accessing external markets.
Recent evidence indeed suggests that conglomerates are more valuable when external
market conditions are tighter (Matvos and Seru, 2014; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga,
2015).
Our previous results are consistent with a positive effect of holding divisions on the
way internal capital markets are run. We search for additional evidence that these divi-
sions are associated with more efficient internal capital markets by exploring variation
in external market conditions in the spirit of Matvos et al. (2016) and Kuppuswamy
and Villalonga (2015). Specifically, we test if conglomerates with holding divisions have
more efficient capital allocation when compared to other conglomerates in times when
external market conditions are tighter. We use VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange
Volatility Index) as a measure of external market frictions. Table 2.6 shows the results.
Our dependent variable in all specifications is AVA. We find that holding divisions
are associated with higher AVAs, especially in times of high frictions as measured by
VIX. We find that the interaction term between VIX and the holding dummy is positive
and significant when we explore cross-sectional variation, but also time-series variation
within the firm. For instance, focusing on specification (6), which includes firms fixed
effects, we find that for a one-standard-deviation change in VIX, firms with holding
divisions experience an increase in AVA of 0.03, which corresponds to an increase of
15% evaluated at the mean AVA for conglomerates with no such division.
These results are consistent with our theoretical framework, and conjecture that
holding divisions improve the operation of internal capital markets, especially when




A1.3 Financial divisions and firm value
A1.3.1 Methodology
The methodology typically used to study the value of diversified firms against stan-
dalones is based upon replicating portfolios, which comprise industry averages or me-
dians of Tobin’s q or market-to-sales ratios, weighted by segments’ assets or sales. The
use of this approach to non-financial conglomerates with financial segments raises con-
cerns because these metrics are not comparable across financial and non-financial firms,
mostly due to financial regulation and different accounting practices. In fact, market-
to-sales ratios are likely biased upward for financial firms because volumes of total assets
tend to have much larger magnitudes than the main flow variables. Conversely, Tobin’s
q of financial firms is most likely biased toward 1, due to widespread implementation
of mark-to-market practices for financial assets.
Hence, this study uses a different method for assessing the valuation discount or
premium in conglomerates with financial segments. The purpose is to be as neutral
as possible about ex-ante distinctive features of the group of interest. Our method
is based on saturated models of firm market value where there is a set of industry
marginal contributions according to the weights of each firm segment. Each industry’s
weight in firms’ total assets is used as a variable, while it is also interacted with a
diversification dummy. The interaction term tells us, on average, the marginal value
of being diversified in a given industry. This is particularly relevant for understanding
whether financial segments are valuable divisions in diversified firms.
We test different specifications, including pooled OLS and firm fixed effects, but
all of them stem from our main approach, built upon sector marginal contributions
and interactions of industry variables with the diversification dummy. We also include
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year fixed effects in some specifications. When using the pooled OLS specification, we
explore cross-sectional differences among conglomerates. With this methodology, we
can compare conglomerates with and without a financial segment, and otherwise similar
industry exposures. When using firm fixed effects, we exploit within-firm variation, and
therefore our identification comes only from firms that change their exposure to a given
industry: in the case of our conglomerates of interest, to the financial industry.
In our baseline specification, we pool the contribution of all financial segments into
one variable (FinSegDummy) comprising the marginal component in the market value
of the firms of interest. Industries are otherwise defined and classified according to
67 two-digit SIC codes, 7 of which correspond to financial industries. The following
equation summarizes our main specification with firm and year fixed effects:






βjwjitDivDummyit + βdDivDummyit +
βfFinSegDummyit + γControlsit + δi + δt + εit, (2.21)
where MVA is the market value of assets of firm i at time t, BV A is the book value of
assets, w is the weight of assets for segment s of firm i at time t, and DivDummy is a
dummy variable that is set to one if the firm reports more than one business segment at
time t and zero otherwise. FinSegDummy is a dummy variable that is set to one if the
firm reports a segment in a financial industry. Our basic set of control variables includes
the logarithm of a firm’s book value of assets adjusted for goodwill, capex-to-sales, and
EBIT-to-assets ratios. Additional controls include leverage and cash ratios.
A1.3.2 Results
There is mixed evidence in the literature with respect to the existence of an average
diversification discount or premium.7 However, the previous literature does seem to
7Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) stated the existence of a diversification dis-
count, based upon an excess value measure, with replicating portfolios as benchmarks of Tobin’s q’s,
115
Chapter 2
agree that most benefits of diversification are associated with an efficient and well-
functioning internal capital market.
Our univariate results are consistent with a positive effect of holding divisions, which
show higher Tobin’s q and Market-to-sales ratios. However, they do not control for other
factors that may affect valuation. We search for additional evidence that these divisions
are associated with an efficient internal capital management market by studying the
valuation of conglomerates with a holding division. Table 2.7 shows the results. We
first run a pooled OLS regression of market valuation of firms on a holding division
dummy (specification (1)). With this specification, we explore cross-sectional and also
time-series variation (we exclude year dummies) in the value of conglomerates with and
without a financial division. We also benchmark the value of both these conglomerates
with standalone firms and we control for the presence of other financial divisions that do
not correspond to a holding division. The holding division dummy coefficient is positive
and significant at 0.093, which suggests a value premium of 9.3% of market valuation
for having a such a division, when compared to an otherwise similar conglomerate.
In specification (2), we add year fixed effects to our previous specification. We find
a positive and significant premium of 5.8% for conglomerates with holding divisions.
This result suggests that part of the holding premium estimated in specification (1) is
associated with overall economic conditions captured by the year dummies.
So far, we have compared conglomerates with and without a holding division, and
found a market value premium between 6% and 9% for the first group. When exploring
within-firm variation by running firm-fixed-effects regressions, we also find a positive
and significant value premium for having a holding division. Columns (3) and (4)
among other relative measures of market value. Campa and Kedia (2002) pointed to the endogeneity
of diversification decisions and challenged previous estimations of the diversification discount with new
methods (Heckman model, IV). Villalonga (2004) and Custódio (2014) suggest that measurement has
important implications for the observed diversification discount.
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show the results. In these specifications, identification is coming from firms that add
or remove a financial segment. The value premium associated with adding a holding
division in a conglomerate is estimated to be between 6% and 7%.
These results show a value premium associated to the presence of a holding division
in conglomerates. Although we do not have an identification strategy that allows estab-
lishing a causal relation between having a holding division and firm value, we interpret
these results as consistent with the notion that holding divisions are relevant to run
efficient internal capital markets. Our theoretical framework helps to understand why
not all conglomerates have such divisions. For some firms the cost of implementing such
division might still be too high when compared to the benefits of enhancing internal
capital markets.
A1.4 Placebo test
So far we interpret our results as evidence that holding divisions have an important
role in managing internal capital markets. In this section we run what can be viewed
as a placebo test. Specifically, we test if the presence of any financial segment in
conglomerates with only one other non-financial division is also associated with better
measures of internal capital markets efficiency. For these conglomerates the financial
division cannot act as a facilitator of internal capital markets for the non-financial
divisions, since there is only one of such divisions, and thus we call it a placebo. We
show the results on table 2.8.
The dependent variable in all specifications is AVA. The independent variable of
interest is Placebo, which is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the conglom-
erate has only two divisions, one of which is a financial division. We run OLS regressions
and firm fixed effects, where we explore within-firm variation in the presence of such
117
Chapter 2
combination of divisions (one financial and one non-financial). In all specifications the
placebo dummy is not statistically significant. In specifications (5) and (6) we add the
holding dummy as previously defined and we obtain similar estimates as in the previous
tests. The holding dummy coefficient is positive and significant with a point estimate
of 0.03.
This test provides additional evidence consistent with the notion that the role of
holding divisions is indeed to facilitate internal capital markets.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper documents a new set of empirical facts about conglomerates with finan-
cial divisions, and proposes a model where such financial divisions enhance the efficiency
of internal capital markets. We confirm this hypothesis empirically, and we further show
that the characteristics of the average conglomerate that chooses to have a financial di-
vision are consistent with the model: these firms are larger, more diverse, and have
a higher number of segments. We also show that financial divisions are associated
with a value premium in conglomerates when compared to otherwise similar firms. We
contribute to the literature by analyzing an under-researched dimension of corporate
diversification, specifically in understanding the economic role and impact of dedicated
financial divisions such as holding companies.
118
Appendix of Chapter 2
Appendix – Proofs
Proof of lemma 1. Using expression (2.11), let us first establish the following inter-



























where we have used the result that the sum of the first M natural numbers is M(M +
1)/2. Turning to the first result in the lemma, we can set M = N and use expression
























which works because N is even (otherwise the absolute deviation would be smaller); and
where we used the fact that Ai < S for i ≤ N/2. Combining the above expression with
the result (A.1) (setting M = N/2), we can then write the average absolute deviation
119







(1− σ) = Sσ.
The third result is immediately obtained by setting i = 1 and i = N in equation (2.11).
This concludes the proof.
Proof of proposition 1. First note that wi does not interact with Ai; therefore, in
order to minimize the total convex costs of finance it must be the case that wi = w
































In an interior solution, the necessary and sufficient first-order conditions for ki, with
i < N , are
Ai − γki + 2η(kN − ki)− AN + γkN +
∑
l 6=i,N
η(kN − kl) = 0.
After a few steps of algebra, the above simplifies into
ki =
Ai − AN + kN [γ + η(N + 1)]− ηNw
γ + η
. (A.3)
Using (A.3) and combining with the budget constraint, we can write
N−1∑
i=1





















The above simplifies into expression (2.18) in the proposition, where in the simplification
we have used the fact that the average Ai is equal to S (or, equivalently, that the sum
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of Ai equals NS). The next step is to replace kN in (A.3) with the solution (2.18),
which after some manipulation yield (2.19) in the proposition. Finally, we can replace
kN and ki in (A.3) with (2.18) and (2.19), respectively. Differentiating with respect to
w and setting to zero then yields equation (2.17) in the proposition:
N−1∑
i=1
[Ai − γki − η(kN − ki)× 0] + AN − γkN −Nφw = 0⇔
N−1∑
i=1








 = Nφw ⇔ w = Sγ + φ,
which concludes the proof.





















Next let us consider the case with the financial division, i.e., setting η = 0. Then, for
division i, we have




where we used equation (2.19). Inserting this last expression into the objective function
(2.13), and after some lengthy but trivial algebra, we obtain



















































where we have made used of the definition of Ai from expression (2.11). Using Faul-
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N(N + 1)(2N + 1)
6
, (A.8)
equation (A.6) reduces, after some straightforward manipulations, to equation (A.7) in
the proposition; and this concludes the proof.
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Cross-division heterogeneity 













Cong. w/ fin. div.
Diversification becomes
economic, but only with
financial division
Figure 2.1: Organizational form, diversity, and value. The figure plots the value
of a standalone benchmark (dashed line), the value of a simple conglomerate (black
solid line), and the value of a conglomerate with a financial division (red line); as a
function of cross-division diversity σ. Parameter choice: S = 1, γ = 0.7, φ = 1.1,
η = 3, F = 0.1.
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Segment productivity A
i


























































Figure 2.2: Capital allocation across segments. The figure plots each segment’s
productivity Ai (horizontal axis) against its allocation ki (vertical axis). The left (right)
panel depicts a conglomerate with N = 3 (N = 6) segments. Parameter choice: S = 1,
γ = 0.5, φ = 1, η = 0.05, σ = 0.19.
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Number of segments N
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Figure 2.3: Number of segments and the contribution of a financial division.
The figure plots the contribution of a financial division (excluding the fixed cost F ),
defined as the difference between the value of a conglomerate with η = 0 and the value
of conglomerate with η > 0. The left panel depicts the contribution in terms of absolute
value ∆fin, the second scales the contribution by total size N × S. Parameter choice:
S = 1, γ = 0.5, φ = 1, η = 0.05, σ = 0.19.
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Figure 2.4: Conglomerates with financial divisions (1977-2014). The figure
shows the number of conglomerates with financial segments over our sample period,
and their proportion of all the conglomerates.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics. This table shows summary statistics of some financial measures
for three subsamples: conglomerates with financial divisions, conglomerates without financial divisions,
and standalone firms. Assets is the total stock of book assets of the firm. Sales is the firm’s sales
revenue. Tobin’s q is the ratio of market-to-book value of assets. Market/Sales is the ratio of the
market value of assets to sales. Ebit/Sales is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to sales.
Capex/Sales is the ratio of capital expenditures to sales. Leverage is the book ratio of total debt to
assets. Herfindahl index is the concentration measure computed from the Herfindahl index of each
segment’s market shares within the firm. Diversity is the ratio of the standard deviation and the mean
of each firm’s segment Tobin’s q’s, winsorized at 1%. AVA is the absolute value added by capital
allocation (x100), and VAT is the value added by cross-divisional transfers (x100), both computed
according to Rajan et al. (2000).
Mean Median St. dev. Minimum Maximum Obs
Panel A: Conglomerates with financial divisions
Assets 4,723.198 684.874 11,282.590 0.015 120,431.0 3,039
Sales 3,076.996 614.070 6,703.807 0.010 45,136.0 3,039
Tobin’s q 1.719 1.183 2.561 0.543 30.129 3,039
Market/Sales 4.122 1.620 15.659 0.246 195.901 3,039
Ebit/Sales -0.048 0.080 1.097 -19.824 0.706 3,039
Capex/Sales 0.113 0.041 0.279 0.000 2.667 3,039
Leverage 0.350 0.293 1.977 0.000 107.800 3,012
Cash/Assets 0.109 0.057 0.138 0.000 0.942 3,039
Goodwill/Assets 0.043 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.813 3,039
Number of segments 3.539 3.000 1.401 2.000 10.000 3,039
Herfindahl index 0.221 0.033 0.320 0.000 1.000 3,039
Diversity 0.867 0.902 0.167 0.000 0.996 3,039
AVA by allocation 1.580 0.000 12.344 -40.251 64.659 3,039
VA by cross-div. transfers 0.018 0.000 1.077 -3.057 3.027 3,039
Panel B: Non financial conglomerates
Assets 2,041.969 192.424 8,820.980 0.028 678,346.0 40,553
Sales 1,492.319 211.990 3,992.753 0.001 45,136.0 40,553
Tobin’s q 1.591 1.189 1.766 0.543 30.129 40,553
Market/Sales 2.921 1.171 11.480 0.246 195.901 40,553
Ebit/Sales -0.062 0.069 1.179 -19.824 0.706 40,553
Capex/Sales 0.099 0.042 0.232 0.000 2.667 40,553
Leverage 0.293 0.258 0.453 0.000 42.907 40,465
Cash/Assets 0.103 0.053 0.131 0.000 0.989 40,553
Goodwill/Assets 0.042 0.000 0.097 -0.007 0.958 40,553
Number of segments 2.957 3.000 1.163 2.000 10.000 40,553
Herfindahl index 0.234 0.092 0.285 0.000 1.000 40,553
Diversity 0.841 0.878 0.167 0.000 0.996 40,552
AVA by allocation 0.205 0.000 11.124 -40.251 64.659 40,553
VA by cross-div. transfers -0.001 0.000 1.134 -3.057 3.027 40,553
Panel C: Standalone firms
Assets 1,575.968 59.454 28,224.550 0.001 3,270,108.0 129,071
Sales 632.421 50.474 2,971.544 0.001 45,136.0 129,071
Tobin’s q 2.731 1.466 4.205 0.543 30.129 129,071
Market/Sales 11.293 2.003 33.400 0.246 195.901 129,071
Ebit/Sales -0.867 0.047 3.517 -19.824 0.706 129,071
Capex/Sales 0.173 0.037 0.450 0.000 2.667 129,071
Leverage 0.646 0.187 21.422 0.000 3,770.00 128,550
Cash/Assets 0.201 0.100 0.235 0.000 1.000 129,071
Goodwill/Assets 0.038 0.000 0.102 -0.042 1.0 129,071
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Table 2.2: Industry characterization of conglomerates with financial divisions.
This table shows the most prevalent two-digit SIC industries in the subsample of conglomerates
with financial divisions. Along with the number of segments (possibly more than one per firm),
we display their share in the total number of segments and the total market value of assets
within this subsample.






67 Holdings, funds 1416 15.7% 19.8%
61 Credit agencies 944 10.5% 30.2%
73 Business services 433 4.8% 33.6%
63 Insurance 409 4.5% 31.3%
35 Machinery, computers 339 3.8% 29.4%
49 Energy, gas, water utilities 298 3.3% 62.9%
65 Real estate 267 3.0% 22.9%
50 Wholesale, durable 265 2.9% 31.9%
13 Oil, gas 232 2.6% 47.4%
15 Construction, building 229 2.5% 56.5%
62 Market brokers, dealers 216 2.4% 24.4%
27 Printing, publishing 210 2.3% 43.1%
48 Communications 204 2.3% 35.9%
60 Banks, credit unions 181 2.0% 40.5%
64 Insurance agency, brokerage 181 2.0% 20.1%
37 Transportation 180 2.0% 38.4%
28 Chemicals 162 1.8% 39.5%
58 Eating, drinking 160 1.8% 44.7%
59 Retail, other 141 1.6% 44.5%
87 Architect., consult., account., research 139 1.5% 29.6%
20 Food 128 1.4% 45.5%
24 Lumber, wood 128 1.4% 26.7%
36 Electronic, electrical equipment 126 1.4% 37.2%
51 Wholesale, nondurable 121 1.3% 31.5%
47 Transportation services 97 1.1% 35.3%
70 Lodging 87 1.0% 31.3%
38 Precision instruments 84 0.9% 29.0%
34 Fabricated metal 83 0.9% 24.4%
Other 82 17.4% -
Total 9033 100%
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Appendix of Chapter 2
Table 2.4: Determinants of financial divisions. This table shows a linear probability
model (specifications (1)-(3)) and a probit model (specifications (4)-(6)), where the dependent variable
is a dummy taking the value of 1 whenever a conglomerate with at least two non-financial segments
has a financial division with code SIC 67 (Holdings, funds). Control variables are defined in table 2.1.
LPM Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Assets 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.003***
[11.337] [11.312] [5.424] [8.621] [8.679] [3.550]
Tobin’s q 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.029***
[4.840] [4.724] [6.009] [4.067] [3.910] [5.255]
Ebit/Sales 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.010 0.013
[1.047] [0.850] [0.976] [1.164] [0.983] [1.306]
Capex/Sales 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.188*** 0.179*** 0.227***
[4.302] [4.074] [5.159] [4.353] [4.095] [4.960]
Debt-to-assets -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.019 -0.019 -0.017
[-0.984] [-0.947] [-0.867] [-0.686] [-0.667] [-0.596]
Cash-to-assets 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.064*** 0.530*** 0.523*** 0.817***
[6.839] [6.681] [9.518] [6.421] [6.309] [9.430]
Number of segments 0.022*** 0.236*** 0.138***
[29.699] [7.885] [4.387]
Diversity 0.021*** 0.011*** 0.246***
[8.351] [4.333] [28.138]
[14.967] [0.804] [-17.189] -1.962*** -2.182*** -2.955***
Observations 0.021*** 0.002 -0.057*** [-101.049] [-63.396] [-63.244]
R-squared/ 0.005 0.007 0.027 0.0117 0.0163 0.0758
Pseudo R-squared
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Appendix of Chapter 2
Table 2.6: Internal capital markets (2/2). This table shows OLS models where the
dependent variable is the absolute value added by capital allocation (AVA). Holding division dummy
is one when a company has at least one segment classified as a holding (SIC code 67) and two non-
financial ones. All other control variables are as described in Table 2.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Holding division *VIX 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001**
[2.915] [2.943] [2.238] [2.233]
Holding dummy 0.011* 0.014** 0.019** 0.020***
[1.725] [2.095] [2.490] [2.608]
Ebit/Sales -0.001 -0.001 0.004** 0.004**
[-1.285] [-1.353] [2.077] [2.038]
Log(Assets) 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003
[0.514] [1.150] [0.797] [0.912]
Diversification dummy*VIX -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004
[-1.550] [-1.322] [-0.738] [-0.764]
VIX -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[-1.148] [-1.111] [-1.443] [-1.472]




Constant 0.005 0.006 -0.010 -0.009
[0.370] [0.457] [-0.476] [-0.434]
Firm fixed-effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 22,652 22,583 22,652 22,583
R-squared 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009
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Table 2.7: The value of financial divisions in conglomerates. This table shows the
main coefficients of four OLS models for the natural log of the market value of assets. Holding division
dummy is one when a company has at least one segment classified as a holding (SIC code 67) and
two non-financial ones. Diversification dummy is one when the number of segments of a firm is larger
than one and zero otherwise. We include interaction terms for all these weights variables with the
diversification dummy, except for the seven financial industries (SIC >6000, <6800). All specifications
include asset weights for each of the two-digit SIC industries, except for an omitted baseline group. We
allow for interactions of all these weights with the diversification dummy, except for financial industries
(SIC >6000, <6800). All other control variables are as described in Table 2.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Holding dummy 0.093*** 0.058* 0.070*** 0.057**
[2.888] [1.820] [2.618] [2.219]
Other financial segment dummy 0.055** 0.050** 0.042* 0.034
[2.426] [2.217] [1.844] [1.532]
Ebit/Sales -0.573*** -0.527*** -0.226*** -0.198***
[-54.532] [-48.323] [-17.856] [-15.886]
Capex/Sales 0.121*** 0.125*** 0.104*** 0.113***
[16.005] [16.600] [13.327] [14.517]
Log(Assets) 0.981*** 0.966*** 0.899*** 0.860***
[401.432] [366.316] [240.656] [181.474]
Year dummies No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 172,660 172,660 172,660 172,660
R-squared 0.923 0.926 0.712 0.728
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Table 2.8: Placebo test for the role of financial divisions. This table shows OLS
models where the dependent variable is the absolute value added by capital allocation (AVA). Holding
division dummy is one when a company has at least one segment classified as a holding (SIC code 67)
and two non-financial ones. Placebo is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the conglomerate
has only two divisions, one of which is a financial division. All other control variables are as described
in Table 2.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ebit/Sales -0.002** 0.003** -0.002** 0.003* -0.002** 0.003**
[-2.060] [1.981] [-2.091] [1.963] [-2.096] [2.012]
Log(Assets) -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003*
[-0.629] [1.472] [-0.197] [1.489] [0.102] [1.690]
Holding dummy 0.032*** 0.033***
[4.889] [4.726]
Placebo 0.019 0.010 0.018 0.007 0.018 0.016
[1.593] [0.833] [1.540] [0.714] [1.575] [1.381]
Number of segments -0.001 -0.000 -0.002** -0.001
[-1.299] [-0.391] [-2.547] [-1.320]
Diversity 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.398] [0.263] [0.305] [0.260]
Constant 0.002 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.005 -0.000
[0.952] [-0.033] [0.878] [-0.031] [1.360] [-0.038]
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 43,592 43,592 43,442 43,442 43,442 43,442






In private equity, compensation contracts and governance rules are established by an
agreement known as “fund terms”. Fund terms split cash flows between managers and
investors through complex, contingent provisions that include large bonus payments
(carried interest or carry). Most private equity funds reward their managers with
performance-based fees referring to all deals and portfolio firms under their manage-
ment. However, in other funds, compensation is derived from a string of individual
bonus payments per project, resembling a portfolio of call options. The resulting fee
is known as deal-by-deal carried interest. This deal-by-deal component aggregates a
I thank Miguel Ferreira and the Nova Finance Centre for their financial support and the Nova SBE
Research Office team (Sofia Vala, Ana Grifo and João Conduto) for their administrative support. I also
thank Juanita González-Uribe and the Financial Markets Group of the London School of Economics
for sharing their data.
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percentage of the total return of each deal (or portfolio firm) within the fund, paid only
when positive excess returns are realized. The benchmark for deal-level excess returns
is a constant equivalent annual rate (hurdle rate), typically around 8%.
This paper studies the effect of compensation on risk exposures in portfolio investments.
Under deal-by-deal rules, diversification in firm portfolios is associated to higher fee
payments and thus a lower net-of-fee performance. My findings are consistent with
the hypothesis that higher diversification in firm portfolios is optimal for managers
receiving deal-by-deal carried interest. For a given level of performance, performance-
based fees are maximized if the fund’s proceeds are concentrated in a smaller number
of extremely well performing deals, rather than split more uniformly across the fund’s
portfolio. Thus, under deal-by-deal rules, we expect managers to increase the chances
of generating high returns in particular deals. One way in which fund managers can
dissociate deal returns is through portfolio diversification.
My main finding is that the net performance of diversified deal-by-deal funds is lower
than than what is expected for their total returns. I estimate that diversification reduces
the net-of-fee internal rate of return (IRR) of deal-by-deal funds by between 1.5 and 3.5
percentage points, through the payment of higher fees. The mean net-of-fee IRR is at
7.7%. On average 3.25 percentage points of the total IRR are allocated to fees (median
2.73). So the effect of diversification amounts to 0.5 to 1.1 standard deviations of the
IRR margin paid to managers, under deal-by-deal rules.
I study the effect of deal-by-deal structures on performance, through investment strategies,
in the particular setting provided by private equity compensation. Private equity man-
agers (General Partners, or GPs) typically manage funds throughout their entire life
cycle under the same compensation terms (see Section 2 for details). Since investors
have almost no influence in management decisions, managers are fully responsible for
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their funds’ investment strategies. In the private equity industry, the potential to
identify a relationship between compensation and investment decisions comes from the
full accountability of managers and from the predictability of fee payments. GPs rely
on a certain relationship between compensation and fund performance. While taking
investment decisions, GPs can predict their future cash flows under different states of
the world, given future fund performance.
In the first part of my analysis, I assess how GP fee structures relate to key charac-
teristics of investment portfolios, such as industry diversification, location and stage
focus. I document a higher prevalence of deal-by-deal rules in more diversified funds
and GP vehicles. GPs could have an incentive to choose more diversified portfolios
in the presence of deal-by-deal compensation structures. More diversified funds have a
lower expected correlation between deal returns. Hence they are more likely to generate
extremely high return rates (in deal outliers) than more focused funds with the same
expected return. GPs also have a plausible incentive to propose and bargain deal-by-
deal rules for carried interest at fundraising when they expect to implement diversified
investment strategies.
Deal-by-deal models provide asymmetrical incentives for managers, across different
deals. GP’s are encouraged to assign more time and effort to the best-performing
deals and to those with the best prospects of early exits. Differential effort across deals
can be inefficient when maximizing the whole fund’s performance. The efficiency of
deal-by-deal schemes thus increases when effort in seeking early exits presents a larger
upside potential for overall performance. Deal-by-deal models may benefit performance
when riskier exit strategies are optimal, so that risk-taking is better rewarded at the
deal level.
Managers are expected to maximize the chances of strong early exits under deal-by-
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deal carry models, either when their optimal behaviour is efficient or when it is not.
In maximizing the chances of early exits, managers can get a positive contribution
from the choice of uncorrelated deals. Under this mechanism, GPs begin by forming a
more diversified firm portfolio. They implement diversifying strategies that are feasible
under the fund’s mandate and within the set of investment opportunities. In the post-
investment period, GPs search to mismatch exit timings and performance across deals
through their strategic choices. Notorious examples of these decisions include the fast
deleveraging of portfolio firms, the anticipation of public offerings and the abandonment
of further investment or M&A opportunities.
A particular set of investment opportunities should be highlighted: add-on acquisitions.
In seeking synergies, secondary M&A transactions concentrate firm portfolios, going
against intended strategies of deal diversification. By definition, they should increase
exposure to the risk factors of the primary deal. Most often, add-on firms belong to
the same industry and geography of the acquirer or, at least, to closely related ones.
When this loss of investment options occurs, we expect it to be harmful to the fund’s
investors (Limited Partners, or LPs). One of the main value creation drivers of private
equity is potentially foregone.1
In the second part of my analysis, I show that net-of-fee performance can be harmed
when deal diversification strategies are implemented, under deal-by-deal distribution
rules. My findings refer to funds performing above their minimum required return,
allowing for the (effective) payment of carried interest.2 In general, deal diversification
strategies do not significantly reduce the gross performance of deal-by-deal funds, ac-
1A common list of five pillars of value creation: leverage, performance improvements, add-on
acquisitions, multiples arbitrage and duration of investment-holding period.
2Carried interest can be recorded and taxed in deal-by-deal funds with realized returns below their
hurdle rates. However, managers do not freely dispose of earned carry before clawback provisions are
released. For more details, see Section 2.
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cording to my findings. Therefore, the main mechanism behind the reduction in their
net-of-fee performance is an increment in the payment of GP fees. I show that higher fee
payments in deal-by-deal funds are not predicted by gross performance measures. My
evidence is consistent with the existence of mechanical effects of investment strategies
on the present value of carried interest.
In the literature, carried interest models have so far been studied through the collec-
tion of detailed contract-level data for small fund samples.3 This paper broadens the
empirical analysis to a wider and more diversified population of funds. The scope of
my analysis is extended, since it is built on more comprehensive original databases,
containing key strategic and financial information. Diversification of portfolio firms is
measured across the fund’s portfolio and across any other investments managed by the
same GP vehicle.
Hüther et al. (2019) were the first to examine deal-by-deal distribution rules. They find
a positive effect on total performance for contracts with deal-by-deal carried interest,
seen as the most “GP friendly”. This improved performance is, however, not matched
by positive significant effects in net returns. The impact of deal-by-deal contracts in
performance is decomposed between two channels. The first channel is the recruitment
of better quality GPs, who better negotiate their contract terms. Secondly, deal-by-deal
rules induce increased effort and risk-taking. Earlier exits and better market timing are
two other important facts revealed for deal-by-deal funds in venture capital markets.
Earlier carried interest payments have a negative first-order effect on net-of-fee returns
for limited partners, by increasing the present value of fees. When the increase in fees
is not outweighed by indirect effects, through incentives, net performance is harmed.
3Hüther et al. (2019) have been the first to document differential impacts of carried interest models
on gross fund performance, through an analysis of the contract terms of 85 venture capital funds.
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My paper is related to several studies that documented PE as inconsistent with their
increased risk and illiquidity as compared to stock markets. This pattern has been well
documented for a long time period, at least since studies by Kaplan and Schoar (2005)
and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2008).
More recent papers, such as Harris et al. (2015), have shown that there are substantial
differences across time periods and private equity fund types. Public Market Equival-
ent measures are worse for venture capital and post-2000 (Harris et al. (2014)) funds.
Underperformance is not generalized, but prevails, in particular for funds raised in hot
market years (Robinson and Sensoy (2011)).
My work follows several studies that investigated the compensation terms of private
equity partnerships, in other dimensions. One of the first papers on this topic was
Gompers and Lerner (1999), who focus exclusively on VC funds and explore the cross-
sectional and time-series variation in fund terms.
Some other papers have analysed venture capital compensation structures. One of the
closest is Litvak (2009), who establishes the importance of carry timing in a sample of
contracts with no connected cash flow data. They address similar issues from a legal
perspective and extend the Gompers and Lerner (1999) analysis to consider several
additional terms from the partnership agreements.4 Metrick and Yasuda (2010) also
analyse contracts without direct access to the detailed cash flows.
Apart from Hüther et al. (2019), only the study by Robinson and Sensoy (2013) contains
contract terms and cash flow data. While their dataset is large and comprehensive, it
does not contain fee payments. Nor does it cover information on portfolio companies
that could support a discussion on motivated investment strategies. Phalippou (2015)
4Distribution rules are presented as a third fee component, their impact on the present value of
fees being compared to those of management fees and carried interest.
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analyses carried interest LP expenses, based on aggregate data from three US pension
funds. His study collects information on aggregate carry amounts and funds’ total
performances.
I contribute to the existing literature on private equity compensation by relating fee
payments and their models, to investment and performance outcomes. In particular,
I identify a portfolio management mechanism through which the adoption of deal-by-
deal rules can impact fees and fund returns. My sample size is larger than studies that
make use of hand-collected datasets of contracts, despite lacking their depth in covering
contract provisions5. It is also cross-sectionally richer, as it includes multiple smaller
fund types, GP firms and vehicles with widespread regional focuses and from several
locations. In particular, a relevant number of non-American funds is included in the
sample. Greater sample heterogeneity across the world private equity industry favours
the external validity of my findings. A comprehensive sample allows for a more precise
association of my findings with the experimental setting of the private equity business.
My sample avoids, therefore, associating the paper’s findings with any particular market
structure of private equity firms at the regional level.
Hüther et al. (2019) favour the hypothesis that deal-by-deal models create incentive-
related gains in venture capital. Deal-by-deal funds have an improved gross perform-
ance, but performance gains are mostly or fully captured by higher fees. Consistent with
Hüther et al. (2019), I find a positive effect on gross performance for venture capital
funds. My analysis deepens and broadens their results, by examining the whole private
equity industry and identifying a specific mechanism generating higher fees. Moreover,
I find that the sign of the total effect on performance is reversed for other fund types
5For this reason, some assumptions on underlying compensation rules are needed. The reason-
ing followed is in the spirit of a components’ analysis, based upon realized fee cash flows and their




This study applies a financial and strategic analysis of compensation rules to a lar-
ger and more comprehensive set of funds. The description of compensation models is
achieved for an extended sample, for which access to contract provisions is not required.
I undertake a thorough process of classification of fee and carried interest waterfalls from
observed payments. Although I do not include all the time series of my data in the
same analysis, multiple sections of this dataset provide a rich picture of industry trends
in GP fee payments and in investment strategies. An additional anonymous dataset
provides a descriptive picture of fund terms in deal-by-deal contracts, which is key in
the study’s design.
My contribution includes a refinement of empirical settings in which the links of com-
pensation and investment policies are studied. Several studies examine the efficiency
of performance-based compensation of CEOs and other firm managers (e.g. Yermack
(1995)). While a relationship between investment firm policies and CEO compensation
could be identified in other industries (Malmendier and Tate (2005)), none exhibits all
specific features of private equity partnerships. In my study, I benefit from the full in-
volvement of a GP management team throughout the entire investment cycle of private
equity funds. The scope of PE managers’ decisions essentially differs from investment
decisions taken over going concern projects by incoming CEOs. Therefore, studying the
PE industry can enrich our prior knowledge of managerial incentives, by testing them
under higher managerial discretion.
I also contribute to a broader literature on the performance of private equity funds and
on their attractiveness to outside investors. Several mechanisms have been suggested
as explanations for the low performance (Kaplan and Schoar (2005)) and the low at-
tractiveness of risk properties of private equity (Cochrane (2005)), compared to stock
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markets6. One of these mechanisms is mispricing Lerner et al. (2007), where the topics
of fee adequacy and LP-GP agency conflicts are comprised. I complement the angles of
investor literacy and skills, taken by other studies, by identifying a standard informa-
tion asymmetry in the negotiation of carry distribution rules. GPs benefit from private
information in opting for deal-by-deal rules, which is later revealed by their chosen
investment strategies. Diversified firm portfolios contribute to a lower net performance
of deal-by-deal funds.
The remainder of the paper will be organized as follows. Section 2 exposes some key
institutional details of the private equity industry. Section 3 describes the data and
my methodology. Section 4 presents the main empirical findings. Section 5 addresses
identification problems. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 The empirical setting - institutional details
Private equity funds are organized as limited partnerships, according to limited partner-
ship agreements (LPAs). Under these structures, private equity firms serve as general
partners (GPs) of the funds,7 with great independence in their management. LPAs
give GPs a broad mandate for selecting investments, choosing deal structures, business
and exit strategies. Large institutional or individual investors provide almost all cap-
ital as Limited Partners (LPs), yet have very limited influence over funds beyond the
agreement’s terms.
Contractual arrangements between general partners and their investors create a very
6Empirical support is still scarce for mechanisms that lower the performance in private equity
funds, well below their risk-adjusted cost of capital.
7GP firms are often split between several legal vehicles ("GP vehicles" henceforth), according to
differential focuses on industries, stages or geographies. GP vehicles would typically manage a pipeline
of successive funds, from several generations, raised at different years. Each generation could overlap
prior and following funds, since their expected life ranges between 7 and 12 years, approximately.
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precise setting, with contingent governance and compensation rules that are seldom
amended at later stages. Partnership agreements signed at funds’ inception clearly
define the expected payments to GPs, according to performance outcomes. It is thus
plausible that investment strategies should be influenced by managers’ expectations
over fees.
Fee payments consist of both fixed components (management fees) and variable ones
(carried interest / carry). In most cases, carried interest is either not due or withheld
until the fund as a whole attains a minimum realized rate of return, undiscounted. This
minimum hurdle rate is named as preferred return.
Historically, two main approaches have been followed in choosing a carried interest
basis. Deal-by-deal carry provisions entitle GPs to earn carried interest on each deal
with a strong exit. Whenever a positive excess return is reached (above the preferred
return rate), it is split between investors (distribution) and managers (carried interest).
The deal-by-deal model resembles the structure of a portfolio of call options.
In a strict version, nowadays uncommon, GPs receive carried interest as deals are
exited, regardless of losses of previous deals.8 More common versions follow a realized
loss model that does not entitle GPs to carried interest before the preferred return is
reached for all realized deals, making up for realized losses, while clawback provisions
leave carried interest withheld until the whole fund attains that return rate.
In contrast, whole fund carry provisions ensure that limited partners receive a certain
hurdle rate on performance of the fund as a whole, before GPs are entitled to receive any
carried interest. Its structure thus resembles that of a call option over the whole fund’s
portfolio. This paper studies differential incentives generated by this same dichotomy of
8In rare cases, strict versions could potentially allow current income, such as dividends, to be
subject to carry provisions.
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option-like compensation structures for GPs: between a portfolio of one call option per
each individual private equity deal invested and a call option over the entire portfolio
of private equity deals under their management.
Once the rate of preferred return is attained, most funds enter a period when returns
are entirely allocated to GP managers. Such clauses, known as catch-up provisions,
ensure that the total share of returns paid as compensation converges from zero to a
pre-specified formula, to be applied henceforth. In whole fund structures, the carried
interest rule is usually a linear split of total fund returns. In deal-by-deal models,
returns of previously divested deals (rather than the fund’s returns) are linearly split,
only once returns ensure that the preferred rate is delivered to investors. In this paper,
I test whether distinct split rules for deal-by-deal funds produce a better financial
outcomes for GPs following diversification investment strategies.
My research question stems from the fierce competition in pledging realized returns.
Outside investors (LPs) compete with fund managers (GPs), aiming at higher and
earlier cash distributions. I investigate whether a pre-defined compensation scheme
for GPs induces distinct investment decisions during the first years of their mandate
as fund managers, and whether induced investment decisions allow GPs to pledge a
higher share of the fund’s proceeds. It is common knowledge that all proceeds not
paid as carried interest (GP’s bonus compensation) will end up being distributed, since
private equity funds are self-liquidating. 9
Carry distribution rules can be illustrated with two simple examples. In the first case,
a fund with a preferred return of 8% manages two investments of the same size. One
is exited with an annual return of 12% and another one is divested with a -12% return
9Private Equity funds are legal entities with a time-limited mandate to invest and divest LP’s
capital, with each deal tranche being employed and divested only once. As such, the fund’s balance
sheet is progressively emptied; rare exceptions apply.
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rate. A second fund, with the same preferred return, manages two other investments
of the same size, but each one yields a 0% return rate.
In a strict deal-by-deal model, GPs would be entitled to receive carried interest from
the first fund, in any circumstance. However, non-strict models are nowadays adopted
by a vast majority of deal-by-deal funds.10 Under a non-strict deal-by-deal model,
carried interest would only be due on the strong exit if that deal were first exited, since
the realized return rate up to that date would be above the 8% hurdle in that case.
Clawback provisions would require carried interest to be withheld in an escrow account,
only to be reimbursed when the second deal is exited. Yet the first fund would have
its net performance harmed by the opportunity cost of the clawback deposit and by
tax implications of early carry payments (Schell (2019)). In contrast, whole fund carry
models would not require any carried interest payment. No carry would ever be paid
unless, at liquidation, the return rate for the fund ("as a whole") attained 8%. In this
example, it ends up amounting to 0%.
In a second example, two funds reach the preferred return rate of 8% in their seventh
year of life. The first fund has had two strong exits at return rates of 20%, while
the second fund has divested all its deals with annual returns between 8% and 12%.
Carried interest starts to be released after the fund reaches the preferred return rate.
Under a deal-by-deal model, catch-up provisions allow earned GP income to converge
to carried interest generated in divested deals with strong exits, up to that date. The
paid bonus converges to a fraction of realized excess returns in profitable deals. Those
excess returns are based on capital invested in deals with returns above the hurdle rate.
Under whole fund carry models, GP earned income converges to a fraction of excess
10As documented by Litvak (2009), some VC funds follow a rarer “Payback” distribution rule. With
this rule, early carry charges are paid to GPs as fund securities. GPs, in exchange, incur in a liability
equal to the capital contribution that would generate that profit (i.e. that value of carry).
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returns on the fund’s total invested capital.
For the first fund, carried interest withheld under deal-by-deal exceeds the correspond-
ing amount pledged in whole fund carry models, since it is based upon excess returns
for very strong exits. For the second fund, without any exit below preferred return,
both models yield identical fees, for the same carry and hurdle rates. On a deal-by-deal
basis, a portfolio of companies with either close to zero or very high returns yields
higher compensation than an otherwise equal return portfolio with all returns closer to
the hurdle rate.
There can be significant variations in the timing of carried interest, with much earlier
payments being driven by early exits of the best deals. Consequently, the proportion
of realized returns allocated to managers can be much higher than the final split rate
throughout most of the fund’s life. A graphical illustration of cash flow waterfalls is
provided in Figures C2 and C3.
General Partner firms tend to redistribute fees from concomitant deals, namely at the
GP vehicle level. During the investment period, fund managers often have pre-existing
assignments from active funds at later stages of their life cycles.
Any pre-existing assignments of fund managers to other funds could have a significant
influence in investment strategies of their latest fund. If fees from managers’ previous
accounts are not yet fully determined, managers ought to account for them as part of
their fee-generating portfolio. Even if managers do not directly intervene (anymore) in
other funds’ management decisions, it is expected that their access to carried interest
should be kept.
Overall, the industry presents unique experimental conditions. Fund managers are tied
by strict anti-turnover provisions ("key man clauses") since the fund-raising stage. For
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the entire fund lifecycle, GP turnover is reduced to "force majeure" events. Compensa-
tion terms are virtually impossible to amend, once agreed at fund-raising. Fund terms,
more generally, cannot be amended without the consent of GPs and a qualified majority
of investors.
Hence, private equity allows us to examine how "blue sky" investment strategies, built
from inception by a single management team, are implemented in the presence of highly
powered (and nearly irrevocable) incentives.
Welfare implications of private equity contracts are a current issue of concern for poli-
cymakers in all major economies. Private equity contracts have often been linked to
disputed industry practices, such as over-leverage, fund life extensions, advisory fees
and risky exit strategies. Concerns about the effectiveness of fund governance rules
have inspired the creation of sector-specific regulatory frameworks, in several countries.
Both in the regulatory and in the self-regulatory spheres, rules and guidelines have been
created, so as to increase disclosure and transparency.
3.3 Data and methodology
3.3.1 Data
3.3.1.1 Main financial database
From 2016 Preqin Fund Terms Advisor report, yearly compensation cash flows (GP
fees) were extracted for 1596 identified funds, for the period 2001-2015. Data on fund
transactions, cash distributions and (quarterly) book values were collected from the
Preqin dataset, for 2535 funds, in the period 1992-2013. 1100 identified funds were
matched between these two databases.
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The final panel is constrained, on its baseline version, to funds with 8 years of fee
payments reported (or a shorter, but complete time window) and with all fee cash flows
from the first year after vintage until 2013. All fund vintages from 2001 to 2008 are
comprised. Valid reporting of fee payments during the investment period is imposed,
in the estimation of an upper bound for management fees. Hence, the final panel is
composed of a total of 360 funds meeting all the sampling criteria.
All yearly cash flows available are used in my classification mechanism (2001-2015).
Gross performance of funds is estimated as of 2013, its measure being the Internal Rate
of Return given by total realized cash flows and the fund’s residual value in the last
period reported. Net performance of funds is estimated as of the same year, through an
Internal Rate of Return given by historical investor (LP) cash flows. Both performance
measures are thus based on a total value to paid in (TVPI) waterfall.
I assume that the fund’s residual value (from the ninth year onward) is fully distributed
to investors, unless the fund has been tagged by my classification algorithm as paying
carry. In carry-paying funds, residual values are assumed to include a provision for
carry for unrealized investments, amounting to 20% of that residual value.
In my baseline empirical specifications, I model the expected net-of-fee value for in-
vestors (LPs), using the fund’s expected gross performance as one of its determinants.
As explained in the previous section, share value foregone through fee payments to
GPs is largely determined by gross performance. From a contractual standpoint, fees
are a function of absolute performance metrics. No public market benchmarks are
involved. More comprehensive performance measures, such as the public market equi-
valent (PME), are not best suited to isolate unexpected reductions in net performance,
the focus of this paper.
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3.3.1.2 Descriptive data and stylized facts
My analysis is supported by a descriptive dataset, with detailed data on fund terms. It
is composed of anonymous contracts from the 2016 Preqin Fund Terms Advisor report.
It does not contain any financials. Funds are explicitly classified as deal-by-deal, whole
fund or other (including mixed versions of carried interest payments). In my descriptive
dataset, it is possible to associate fund characteristics to most of the key elements of
GP compensation. Anonymous information is available for 3372 funds.
In Tables A15 to A19, the univariate analysis of the fund terms reveals some interesting
stylized facts. Deal-by-deal funds are essentially based in North America, whereas whole
fund funds are more evenly distributed across the US, Europe and other geographies.
A clearly higher proportion of deal-by-deal funds comes from vintage years in the period
2000-2005. The reverse pattern is found in the period 2012-2016, while the years of 2006
and 2011 can be easily depicted as transition moments.
In Figure 4, a surge in the number of European funds is shown in the 2005 and 2006
vintages. These cohorts are almost entirely whole fund. In North America, for a much
larger universe of funds, a rebalancing effect is observed for carried interest models: the
proportion of deal-by-deal funds decreases from 47% to 22% between 2005 and 2006.
In Figure 3.5, for the year of 2011, a peak is shown in the proportion of North American
deal-by-deal funds. (49%). The 2011 surge is followed by a permanent reduction in the
number of deal-by-deal funds, to less than 20% in 2013. Both these trends will be
examined in section 5 of this paper. Details are shown in Table A20. Deal-by-deal
funds have higher carried interest rates, both in Europe and in North America. Fee
reduction schemes based on reduced rates charged on investment capital are much more
frequent in the deal-by-deal subsample. For deal-by-deal funds, average management
150
Chapter 3
fees are also higher, yet this is due to other fund types than buyout.
In Europe, the average share of transaction fees rebated is much lower for deal-by-
deal funds. Most deal-by-deal funds are either focused on buyout or direct lending
transactions, while a smaller number invests in venture capital and direct lending.
Growth and balanced funds have similar relative weights within both subpopulations.
Secondary and fund of funds classes are almost totally concentrated on the whole fund
subsample.
In the main dataset, some qualitative differences are crucial. One is the absence of
the "Direct Lending" class. A second one is that a great number of less common
or alternative fund classes are represented. Many of those comprise focused funds
(e.g. real estate, infrastructure), while some can be seen as subcategories of venture
capital and buyout types (e.g. seed, early stage, direct secondaries). Finally, geographic
areas outside North America are present in small numbers, making it difficult to draw
conclusions from the univariate distribution of carried interest models.
3.3.1.3 Sampling statistics
Qualitative data on private equity vehicles and funds were obtained from the Palico
platform. Palico is an industry-level marketplace where private equity firms self-report
managerial information. Matching between GP vehicles and funds was done carefully,
through hand collection, upon verification of background information. In some cases,
information was verified with use of Zephyr data on private equity deals.
Portfolio companies are identified and briefly described, along with their geographies
and timings of entry and exit. 50 managers per vehicle are identified, along with the
full historical list of funds (as self-reported) and the list of firm offices. Industry, region
and country-level investment propositions are also included in my qualitative database.
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My classification across industries was obtained through a text-mining algorithm. The
machine-learnt output was further revised in a manual process.
From a total of 992 funds matched, 340 of a total 360 in the final panel are included.
From those, 218 compose my main sample of funds, where my two diversification meas-
ures can be examined. I will refer to this fund panel as Main sample.
In Table 3.1, several statistics of the final panel are shown. In panel A, it can be seen
that no major distortions to the fund type structure of the sample are imposed by its
reduction - according to the availability of fee data.
My dataset is very diversified across fund types, adding to previous studies on more
homogeneous populations. Few material changes in the fund type composition are
observed through this sampling process. Some less frequent classes, such as mezzanine,
real estate and funds of funds are underweighted, while the buyout type is around 10%
more prevalent in the main sample.
Early stage funds, comprising all their sub-categories, amount for a fraction above 10%
of funds in both samples, expectedly adding to their diversity in compensation terms.
Real estate funds, usually known for the use of peculiar deal-by-deal structures, are the
only category to be most affected by the sub-sampling process.
Regarding fund size, both distributions are considerably skewed to the right, with a
significant overweight in the region of funds with sizes between 250 and 750 million
dollars. No striking differences are found when looking at the main sample. Net-of-fee
performance is similar in both groups overall; however, greater dispersion exists in the
main sample, mostly for funds below median performance. The regional mix of funds
is similar both in the sample and the main sample. Details are provided in Table C1.
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Performance results follow trends identified in Harris et al. (2014).11 Venture capital
internal rates of return are comparatively low in the sample period, comprising the 2000
"dot-com bubble", as well as vintages affected by the 2008 financial crisis. (table C2,
panel A). Main sample statistics present greater dispersion in the time series, but do
not differ from a qualitative standpoint (Table C2, panel B). In most recent vintages,
my performance data series is one year shorter - putting greater weight at these funds’
residual values.
3.3.2 Methodology
In my baseline specifications, I study the effect of deal-by-deal carry models and deal
diversification strategies on the net-of-fee performance of private equity funds. My
performance measure is the net internal rate of return (Net IRR). Performance effects
are conditional on gross performance, before fees, measured by the total internal rate
of return (Total IRR).
The same specifications are repeated for both versions of the counterfactual group ("not
classified deal-by-deal" and "whole fund"). A single adjustment in control variables dis-
tinguishes general diversification (HHI) and specific diversification (Exposure to Risk)
models, apart from the diversification measure.
The dependent variable is Net IRR. Fund IRR is a control variable. With this specific-
ation, I introduce a flexible structure to study the total impact of regressors over fees,
for the entire life of funds, by measuring the implied cost in net return terms. I avoid
imposing a structure on this relationship (such as a difference or a log ratio). Firstly,
lost returns are more meaningful to investors than discounted or undiscounted total fee
11I have excluded: (1) Funds with a DPI ratio above RVPI; (2) Funds with a net internal rate of




payments. Secondly, the correct shape of the net-gross performance relationship can
vary from one-to-one marginal functions.
The main regressor of interest is the interaction between the diversification measure and
the deal-by-deal binary variable. Both these variables are included separately. I control
for the effects of the economic cycle and the number of yearly fee payments through the
use of vintage fixed effects. Additionally, funds from different vintages have a varying
weight of unrealized value in performance measures and different likelihood of being
liquidated.
Specifications adding 1) fund type fixed effects and 2) fund type and manager fixed
effects (for GP vehicles) are included. Fund type fixed effects aim at controlling for
much narrower diversification options in fund classes with a focused mandate. At the
manager level, fixed effects intend to capture self-selection patterns in the choice of fee
structures. Standard errors are clustered by fund type and region focus.
The first diversification measure (HHI) is continuous, while the second one (Exposure
to Risk) is binary. In the case of binary diversification, the "deal-by-deal" coefficient
should be interpreted as a constant differential vs. whole fund observations. The general
diversification measure assumes an exponential functional form: -exp(HHI). The sign
of the HHI index is switched, so that it can be interpreted as a measure of dispersion.
The empirical model is specified as follows:
yi = ρri + βx(di × exp(−fi)) + +βddi + βf exp−fi + γi + θi + δi (A.1)
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The dependent net internal Rate of Return (yi) is estimated as a function of the total,
pre-fee IRR (ri). di is a binary variable denoting whether a fund is classified as deal-
by-deal. fi is the HHI index for the share of portfolio investments in each industry. γi
is a set of fund-level control variables. θi are fixed effects at the vintage, fund type and
manager levels.
For the specific diversification measure, I estimate a similar empirical model. The coef-
ficient of interest measures the effect of deal-by-deal structures for funds with balanced
exposures to at least one of a set of specific risk factors. fi now denotes the "Exposure
to risk" binary variable:
yi = ρri + βx(di × fi) + βddi + βffi + γi + θi + δi (A.2)
3.3.2.1 Diversification measures
My chosen set of diversification variables aims at testing the hypothesis that deal di-
versification affects net performance. The focus of this test is not the heterogeneity in
the distribution of realized deal returns, ex post. Differently, I examine the causes and
implications of uncorrelatedness in a fund’s expected deal returns. For best capturing
the unrelatedness of portfolio deals, I measure diversification dimensions linked to firms’
time-invariant characteristics.
The least varying firm characteristics are the ones expected to shape their risk profile for
a horizon of several years, during which they will be included in the fund’s portfolio. In
adjusting portfolio diversification, invariant characteristics are the best fund manager’s
knowledge, at the time of entry.
Not all stable characteristics of private portfolio firms are observable by outsiders.
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However, my data give access to their business descriptions and locations. From this
information, two main dimensions can be analysed: industry and geography.
I construct two main diversification measures. The first measure is taken from previ-
ous studies of finance and strategy. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index, introduced as a
measure of market concentration by Herfindahl (1950), has been used in prior corporate
diversification studies, namely by Demsetz and Strahan (1997), who applied it to the
banking industry. An equally weighted HHI index of diversification, based upon the
number of deals in each industry, is built for each GP vehicle in our sample.
The second diversification attempts to capture exposures to specific risk factors. An
extension of my main hypothesis is that GPs may have beneficial investment strategies
derived from specific patterns of diversification. The purpose of GPs is to diversify
the occurrence of early strong exits, across deals, in different states of the world. Their
optimal strategies do not generally imply larger levels of diversification across all dimen-
sions affecting performance. Instead, managers are expected to target specific drivers
of performance risk, such that deals can be assigned to each of these factors in a nearly
binary way. Expected GP fees should increase if the upside potential of individual deals
depends upon opposite realizations of the same risk factor.
My definition of diversification as Exposure to risk captures the existence of any large
exposure to a number of risk factors, in any direction. These factors are either indus-
trial or industrial and geographical, by definition. A large exposure is defined by the
existence of a number of deals below 25% or above 75% of the number of deals of the
whole portfolio.
The existence of this mechanism is supported by the market’s views of diversifiable
risk. In private equity and investment management industries, survey data often refer
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to uncertain political events, technological changes and asymmetrical shocks of the
business cycle as major concerns at each point in time.12 In private firm investments,
entry and exit timings can be seen as under greater dependence of “deal waves” and
industry-specific trends.
A second motive to measure diversification as Exposure to risk, in addition to the HHI, is
that specific risk factors can produce comparable effects across distinct industries, while
distinct effects may occur within the same industry. Hence a measure of diversification
based on specific risk is (at least) partially orthogonal to the HHI index. For instance,
industry splits by geography can capture significant risk components that are not at all
intrinsic to each industry’s activity, instead resulting from local market structures or
from other local frictions or shocks.
3.3.3 Measurement
3.3.3.1 Upper bounds for management fees
My data on compensation consists on total fee payments recorded every year. For an
analysis of carried interest payments to be possible, it is necessary to estimate how
these payments are split between performance and management fees.
In the simplest version of fee models, management fees, applied to committed capital,
should correspond to the whole amount of fee payments during the investment period.
It would then be easy to depict the management fee rate and to subtract it to total fee
payments, post-investment period, so as to estimate carried interest.
In practice, however, models are much more complex. In my descriptive dataset, 59% of
funds charge management fees on invested capital, post-investment period. 39% charge
12Individual events and shocks are realizations of specific risk factors, for which exposures can be
optimized. Those factors add to the systematic components of expected returns in private equity.
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reduced rates, either on invested or on committed capital, in the same period. Carried
interest payments can occasionally be seen in later years of investment period, under
deal-by-deal models. Fund formation fees are charged at the fund’s onset. Other small
components can plausibly be included.
Smaller fee components fixed in distributed-to-paid-in (DPI) returns, such as trans-
action fees, are earned by GPs from portfolio companies in the majority of funds, as
documented by Metrick and Yasuda (2010). As it is shown by Phalippou et al. (2018)
and validated by my descriptive dataset, transaction fees are almost always rebated
to management fees at rates above 50%. Rebates should be taken into account when
attempting to estimate management fee rates, which would be applied in their full
amount in periods without rebates. I do so by assigning an expected rebate to each
fund type, both in investment and post-investment periods.
Given all sources of variation in investment period fees, I establish a procedure for
binding management fee rates. The first step is to exclude either very low or very high
fee records during investment period, beyond thresholds that would not be feasible as
management fee rates. Minimum and maximum thresholds are listed, for each fund
type, in Table C4.1.
An adjustment in minimum thresholds is included for fee reductions. Fee reductions
are likely to occur at every period, due to rebates of transaction fees paid by portfolio
companies. An expected rebate is then assumed, by fund type, both during investment
and post-investment period.
Thresholds are particularly low for alternative classes of funds, requiring the allocation
of less resources in their routine management. A key distinction between lower and
larger size venture funds was considered when specifying a stricter threshold for those
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below 500 million dollars in commitments.13
I then proceed to the calculation of an upper bound for management fees. This upper
bound allows for a conservative estimate of carried interest, which could be seen as a
lower bound. Thereby, a more conservative classification of funds as deal-by-deal should
be achieved.
The upper bound is based on the lowest yearly fee payment during the investment
period, as a percentage of assets under management, within both thresholds. That
minimum fee payment is added to the fund’s presumed fee rebate. The first year is
excluded, as it is heavily affected by fund formation fees.
A second upper bound is separately computed for post-investment period, wherever a
reduced rate can be identified. In post-investment period, the upper bound is estimated
as a rate charged on invested capital. When no reduced rate fits the interval between fee
thresholds, the process is repeated for cashflows expressed as a fraction of committed
capital. In case of doubt, should both rates be available, the highest rate is chosen as
the upper bound.
Upper bound stats are shown in Tables A4.2 and A4.3. A key concern of this method
is to fit the distribution of management fee rates to that of the anonymous dataset,
wherever possible, with some over-estimation. There is significant variation by fund
type. As expected, venture capital funds and alternative fund classes are found on the
opposite end of the distribution, with most private debt funds also being found towards
the lower end.
The residual component of annual fees is classified as variable fee, if positive. The
estimated variable fee is a lower bound for carry, which will be used for classifying funds
13This distinction is based on information from the Preqin Fund Terms report.
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according to the likelihood of adopting a deal-by-deal carried interest basis. Likewise,
negative residual components are classified as fee reductions. Post-investment period,
reduced rates are employed when available.
By first expressing thresholds as a fraction of invested capital, I take a conservative
approach, yielding higher upper bounds than otherwise. Expressing upper bounds as
a proportion of invested capital does not affect the value estimate of carry estimates
other than by fee thresholds. As I will expose next, classification rules only depend on
committed and distributed capital.
Investment period upper bounds are calculated at the fund type level. Management fee
rates are overstated by the final estimates (table C5.2).14 Highest values are found for
venture debt and venture capital fund types. The accuracy of my estimates partially
ensured by the choice of thresholds for yearly fees (Table C5.1). Non-primary and
focused fund types yield the lowest rates.
Post-investment period reduced rates for primary equity fund types are, in average, close
to 10% below the main upper bounds, with slight variations across fund type means
(Table C5.3). For debt and secondary funds, dispersion is the highest. Progressive
fee reductions are often applied along the post-investment period. So the estimated
reduced rate is largely expected to be an upper bound.
3.3.3.2 Classification method
A specific set of identification criteria allows for the classification of funds in three
subsamples: deal-by-deal, whole fund and unclassified. These criteria are based on the
pace at which proceeds are shared between General Partners and investors (LPs).
14In Table C15, descriptive statistics from anonymous PE contracts (fund terms) can be used as




Three main patterns are searched in the recognition of deal-by-deal fee waterfalls. The
first of these is "catch up" regions. One simple way in which distinct catch up regions
can be conceived for deal-by-deal contracts is that larger consecutive carry payments
are recorded at the "full fund back" stage, compared to whole fund models. Large
consecutive payments would happen when withheld carry from early strong exits is
released to GPs.
We expect the catch-up carry amount to be higher than the amount used to converge for
a proportional split, under whole fund models. However, it is possible that payments are
recorded at prior dates. So a threshold is set, as a return rate over committed capital,
for carry payments between consecutive distributions, at any point of the fund’s life
before contributed capital is repaid. Payments are considered when recorded at the end
of an equal or greater calendar year, prior to the calendar year of the next distribution.
The threshold value is the carried interest amount that would result from a 20% carry
rate and a 9% hurdle rate or from an 8% hurdle rate and a 31% hurdle rate, applied
to a rate of return15 of 10% of contributed capital. In practice, the majority maximum
carry payment sequences are clustered between DPI ratios of 0.85 and 1. Adjustments
to the definition of repaid capital, for clawback purposes, could explain this pattern.
For funds having repaid capital, a share of proceeds of the last distribution is deducted,
so as to filter regular distributions under a whole fund model. Most of the remaining
distributions can then be found in positive return regions, where, in practice, a higher
"catch-up" amount could be paid.
A second criterion is the existence of carry payments in investment period years. A
margin of safety is added to the management fee estimate. By depicting early carry pay-
15Total return rates discussed henceforth are raw returns per annum.
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ments, I identify purer deal-by-deal contracts that generate and possibly release carry
at the time of the first strong exits. Carry payments originated by partial divestures
or dividend distributions are also targeted. The margin of safety for venture capital
funds is increased, since management fees have greater dispersion and non-recurring
payments are likelier.
A third criterion is the cumulative ratio of performance fees to cash distributions. This
cumulative ratio is measured for funds having achieved a minimum total return rate,
such that GPs should be paid carry at a proportional rate in whole fund models.16 It
only applies to funds with realized profits, yet it allows to capture funds with significant
amounts of fractioned carry payments before capital is repaid. The threshold for the
"carry-to-distributed" ratio is the value expected for a fund with a hurdle rate of 8% (or
less) and a carried interest rate of 25%. A higher hurdle rate would decrease the ratio.
In Table C6, descriptive statistics are presented for threshold measures. Robustness
checks are performed to these criteria, in sections ahead.
The subsample aggregating unclassified and whole fund funds is the most comprehens-
ive counterfactual for deal-by-deal funds. It is believed that funds not achieving carried
interest regions progressively lose all incentives linked to their carry model. Most im-
portantly, the impact of any investment strategies over performance fees is potentially
null.
Classification as whole fund serves is a refinement of the baseline group. When none
of the deal-by-deal classification criteria is verified, it is required that the fund has
distributed enough capital for having revealed its carry model. Revelation of the carry
model is assumed when funds have reached a total annual return of at least 8%. Venture
16Consecutive carry payments are adjusted for distributions exceeding 10 per cent of called capital




capital funds often implement 0% hurdle rates.
Funds raised in 2005 and later have been affected by the 2008 financial crisis. Not just
has this affected their performance, but also the shape of their cash flow waterfalls,
through their entry and exit timings. Classification according to positive return rates
creates a distorting effect in more recent years, by narrowing the whole fund subsample
and constraining it to the best-performing funds. On the contrary, during crisis years
incentives have presumably been adjusted in many funds, so that manager’s options
could not be totally out-of-the-money.
For funds raised between 2005 and 2008, requirements are adjusted when information
on fees for 2014 can be used. In the 2005-2008 vintages, the total return threshold
is adjusted to 0%. Funds differing from the total return threshold by less than 10%
of paid-in capital are classified as whole fund if their ratio of residual value to paid-
in capital (RVPI) is 3x larger than the original fund gap. I reclassify funds that are
expected to reach profitability within the fee sample period (before 2014). Robustness
tests are performed excluding post-2005 vintages.
In Table 3.3, the classification is illustrated for my main sample.17 69% of funds are
classified. 36% of those (25% of total) are identified as deal-by-deal. The proportion of
buyout funds classified as deal-by-deal is slightly below this average (28%), but above
that of all venture capital funds (21%). Generalist venture capital ones are dominantly
whole fund (88% of classified), in contrast with the early stage VC class. Smaller classes
of funds have higher prevalence of funds identified as deal-by-deal. Infrastructure funds
are a remarkable exception, with 50% of funds classified as deal-by-deal in a total of 10
observations.
17In total 246 sampled funds are classified (68%), from a total of 360.
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When decomposed by vintage (Table C2), both within the sample and the main sample,
the prevalence of deal-by-deal is greater in years before 2005 is significantly higher. In
the years of 2005 and 2006, a sizeable increase in the prevalence of whole fund models
coexists with growth in the total number of funds and in the number of unclassified
ones.
Generally, the proportion of deal-by-deal contracts is moderate and plausible when
compared to the descriptive dataset, even though my main dataset is a much smaller
sample.
3.3.4 Summary statistics
In Table 3.4, some descriptive statistics are provided for the general diversification
variable. Funds classified as deal-by-deal are more diversified in this dimension, yet the
unconditional difference is not very large, particularly compared to classified whole fund
funds. General partner vehicles where sampled funds are affiliated have very diverse
features, namely concerning the number of portfolio firms. HHI is unconditionally very
similar across subsamples.
However, within fund types where both whole fund and deal-by-deal are widely present,
deal-by-deal funds belong to more diverse GPs. Their deal-by-deal funds are concen-
trated in the most common fund classes, which tend to invest in more diversified assets.
Other cross-sectional differences exist, namely across vintages, with an important in-
fluence in the paper’s results.
Specific risk factors are considered in my second definition of diversification. Exposures
to each of those factors are defined as extreme when in above 25% or below 75% of
deals by the associated GP vehicle. The measure is a binary variable, defining any
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non-extreme exposure to one of the specific risk factors. ("exposure to risk")
The industrial component of factors is made of seven categories, which group EVCA
industries.18 Energy, life sciences, utilities ("energy and environment") and financial
sector correspond each to a single asset class. Three other factors aggregate two indus-
tries: housing ("construction" + "real estate"), consumption ("consumption products"
+ "consumer goods") and energy shock ("utilities" + "transportation"). The most com-
prehensive factor is regulation risk, adding five industries ("utilities", "transportation",
"communications", "construction" and "financial sector").
Each factor intersects the industrial component with the location of portfolio firms’
headquarters (in Europe or the United States), except for the finance and energy factors.
Two factors per industry combination are defined in all the remaining cases. For analysis
purposes, the set of investment countries is divided into seven areas (North America,
Europe, Asia Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Middle East, CIS).
Around 2.7% of funds in the main sample belong to GP vehicles declaring at least one
investment in a different geographical area than their main one, while 35% of funds
belong to PE firms with multi-regional investment in their reported mandates. Europe
and North America are the dominant combination of areas.
Two general measures of geographical diversification are defined: (1) the existence of any
firm investment in a different geography than the main one and (2) the mean distance
between capital cities of portfolio firms. Specific risk factors do not have a very high
prevalence in any of the subsamples, with the exception of "Regulation America" - the
factor comprising a larger number of industries. As they occur without much overlap,
more than half of funds are classified as exposed to "any specific risk factor". (Table





In Table 3.5, performance variables are presented for six subsamples, in the interaction
of the 3 classification categories (deal-by-deal, whole fund, other) and the binary "ex-
posure to risk" measure. Large cross-sectional differences exist between deal-by-deal
funds and the remaining sub-samples, both in terms of gross and net performance. Per-
formance effects are of particular size and interest in the comparison between diversified
deal-by-deal funds (panel D) and the two remaining diversified categories (panel B and
F).
Differences in the mix of fund types, sizes and vintages contribute to amplify the results.
In particular, focused fund categories with lower performance numbers have a larger
weight in the deal-by-deal sample. In section 4, I show that divergences are not so large
when we condition them on standard control variables.
Funds classified as whole fund are in average more profitable than the larger group
of funds nor classified as deal-by-deal. The profitability gap reflects the whole fund
classification, which is a refinement of the counterfactual group, implying that funds
must have returned invested capital and, during that period, revealed their carried
interest model. The main results of the paper use both versions of the counterfactual.
Gross performance, before fees, is similar between funds in panels C and E (no diver-
sification, deal-by-deal vs. other funds), in contrast with the corresponding panels for
diversified funds.
My baseline empirical setting is one where qualitative data are organized at the in-
stitutional level of GP vehicles. While investments cannot be exclusively assigned to
all funds in the sample, other holdings of GP vehicles are potentially under the man-
agement of common team members. Managers could be assessed for deals at different
166
Chapter 3
stages of their lifecycles. For example, General Partners could manage deals invested
by funds released after the first exits of the previous fund generation, but before its
liquidation.
In a setting of multiple assignments, some level of co-determination between diversi-
fication variables and carry models is plausible. My empirical analysis provides some
insights on these relationships. For this purpose, deal-by-deal funds are split according
to the classification criteria each one satisfies:
1) "pure deal-by-deal" cases, which are classified through high fee payments in invest-
ment period years (among other criteria);
2) mitigated "realized loss" funds,19 which are classified according to consecutive and/or
cumulative carry payments, but not by investment period fees.
Both versions of the counterfactual group are used in my analysis. For prediction
of the two main diversification measures (HHI and Any factor), a linear OLS model
is estimated with a "pure deal-by-deal" binary variable as main regressor of interest.
A positive relationship is found, for both measures and counterfactual versions, for
different combinations of covariates and vintage fixed effects. Association is stronger
for the "exposure to risk" variable.
In the opposite direction, a Probit prediction model was estimated for a "deal by deal"
binary variable (Table C9) with extended use of other predictor variables – including
geographical diversification, along with the two main diversification measures.
The "Pure deal by deal" variable has the strongest predictive power for all specifications
19In naming of this class, I resort to a simplification, not implying that all realized loss funds




in the main sample. A weaker positive relationship is revealed by sub-selecting funds
"Pure deal by deal" funds that meet one of the remaining two criteria. This analysis
is replicated in a panel including funds excluded from the main sample by lack of net
performance data (60 observations: 1998-2000).
However, in the case of HHI, an adjustment for the number of industries is crucial in
improving predictions. It is plausible that deal-by-deal funds diversify by having a more
balanced number of deals across the industries where their firms are present, rather than
by expanding to additional sectors. Controlling for the number of industries precludes
the potential bias of an ex ante determinant of industry diversification.
Diversification appears to be linked to heterogeneity within deal-by-deal carry models.
It shows no predictive power in identifying deal-by-deal funds from the "realized loss"
group, while its informativeness is high as the analysis is constrained to funds with
purer deal-by-deal structures.
3.4 Empirical findings
3.4.1 Fee costs of diversification in deal by deal funds
In Tables 3.6 and 3.7, I compare funds classified as deal-by-deal with all the remaining
ones from the main sample, whether classified or not.
Industry diversification of GP deal portfolios decreases the net performance of deal-
by-deal funds. This relationship has an exponential shape, in which the impact of
dispersion is increasing in the concentration index.
Intuitively, the largest marginal effect of HHI occurs when a fund invests in just one
industry (HHI =1); as fund portfolios become more diversified, the impact of further
168
Chapter 3
dispersion (across a 14-industry scale) is modest. As more industries are added, gains
decrease in relation to the benefits of diversifying in other dimensions: such as stage,
region or deal size.
A 0.25 increase in dispersion (1-HHI) from HHI = 1 leads to a decrease of the net IRR
by between 2.52 and 2.85 percentage points, due to fee payments. A 0.5 increase in
dispersion (1-HHI) leads to a similar decrease of the net IRR by between 3.25 and 3.65
percentage points.
Specific risk factors are examined in Table 7. GP diversification against any of the
defined risk factors decreases funds’ net performance in a linear manner. My classi-
fication regarding specific risk leads to a decrease of the net IRR between 1.62 and
1.91 percentage points, due to fee payments. A negative effect of adopting deal-by-deal
models is not found for non-diversifying funds under this measure.
Both general and specific forms of diversification do not affect performance, other than
by their effect on deal-by-deal funds.
3.4.2 Differential effects vs. whole fund models
In this section, I compare funds classified as deal-by-deal with funds classified as whole
fund and exclude unclassified funds from my analysis. Under this refinement of my
sample, net performance is also reduced by dispersion of deals across industries (HHI
index), due to fee payments. In Table 3.8, I show that this relation is also exponential20.
Effects are smaller in magnitude, but consistent in sign and significant.
20The linear relationship between HHI dispersion and the fee component of net performance is
also positive, but less significant. The order of magnitude of the coefficient is smaller, implying that
a decrease in HHI from HHI = 1 to HHI = 0.5 would have an expected impact between 1 and 1.5
percentage points in net performance.
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A 0.25 increase in dispersion (1-HHI) from HHI = 1 leads to a decrease of the net IRR
by between 1.70 and 2.21 percentage points, due to fee payments. A 0.5 increase in
dispersion (1-HHI) leads to a similar decrease of the net IRR by between 2.19 and 2.24
percentage points.
In subsamples just including smaller funds, the effect of HHI dispersion on net perform-
ance is still found. In particular, the effect is stronger in magnitude and significance
for small funds sizes below 1000 million dollars (Table A10). This finding points out
to a potential concentration effect on smaller funds, for identical levels of industry
diversification.
Larger funds must invest in a large number of deals, to the extent that average deal
sizes cannot be increased proportionally. A larger number of portfolio firms implies
that diversification against some forms of firm-specific risk is increased, ceteris paribus.
This could mitigate effects of industry concentration.
In Table 3.9, I show that specific risk factors have a similar effect on net performance.
According to the specific risk measure, diversification leads to a decrease of the net
IRR between 1.62 and 1.91 percentage points, due to fee payments. This effect fails to
achieve 10% significance when manager fixed effects are included.
An overall effect of deal-by-deal structures over performance is again found under the
general diversification measure (HHI). Diversification measures do not impact perform-
ance through the whole fund subsample. The only exception is found in column (2) of
Table 3.9. The effect of specific diversification is positive and significant – for within-
vintage, within-type variation. Nevertheless, its magnitude is small when compared to




I carry out a large set of robustness tests to validate my main results. In one of these I
remove all the GP vehicles where portfolio investments cannot be clearly split between
two (or more) sample funds (table B1). A smaller sample of 182 funds is defined as a
result. In this panel, the number of portftolio investments per funds ranges from 10 to
75.
All portfolio firms included in this analysis have been acquired in an investment period
year of their funds. It is imposed that no other fund within the same GP vehicle may
be issued before the acquisition, unless that fund’s mandate is incompatible with the
portfolio firm. Funds with a conflicting geographic focus or a conflicting constraint
to certain industries or assets (e.g. real estate) are allowed to have a conflicting time
window.
I examine the sensitivity of the fund classification method to the minimum return
required for the "whole fund" category (tables B2 to B5). This threshold is changed
from 8%, the typical hurdle rate for private equity funds, to 0% for all fund types other
than venture capital. With this calibration, I minimize the impact of any measurement
error in the timing of funds’ cash flows, where it may not coincide with the timing of
LP’s accounts. In particular, fund managers are known to use short-term fund leverage
around acquisition dates, so as to delay capital calls.21 Moreover, distinctions between
fund types are removed, with regard to benchmark hurdle rates.
Standard errors are clustered by GP vehicle, at the qualitative data unit-level. Al-
ternative time periods are tested, including data from the vintage year 2000. This
21For measurement purposes, investment is only realized when capital is called from LPs, possibly
later than the actual investment date. Shorter holding periods increase deal and fund gross IRR
statistics. Yet this effect may be seen as a distortion, as GPs incur financial costs that could be passed
through to limited partners as portfolio company fees.
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additional vintage has a significant impact in the dynamics of the economic cycle, since
it comprises funds raised just before the dot-com crisis. For this purpose, I replace gross
and net performance measures by equivalent internal return rates, computed from the
second year of funds’ lives onward.22 This is done for the panel years 2000-2008 (Table
D8) and, significantly, to years 2000-2005 (Table D9). In the latter case, I impose that
no funds with negative realized returns are classified as whole fund.
Finally, I examine the impact of deal by deal models in performance statistics, both
gross and net-of-fee. As predicted by Hüther et al. (2019), venture capital funds with
deal by deal rules perform better, this effect being stronger before fees (Table D10).
Nevertheless, other fund types (Table D11) do not follow this trend. If any effects in
performance exist, these are negative.
3.5 Identification
3.5.1 Threats to identification
In Section 4, I present evidence of a positive effect of deal diversification on fee pay-
ments, for deal-by-deal funds. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that deal
diversification can be an optimal strategy for GPs paid under deal-by-deal rules.
However, my baseline results do not clarify whether invariant PE firm policies are
among the mechanisms behind “deal-by-deal diversification”. Managing teams that
best combine skills for managing a diversified deal portfolio are likely to be assigned
to deal-by-deal funds. Other firm characteristics could influence the feasibility and the
optimality of these actions.
22General partner fee data are only available for the 2001-2015 period.
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Hüther et al. (2019) point out to a potential self-selection effect on the negotiation of
deal-by-deal contracts, with the assumption that these are preferred by general partners
and avoided by LPs (according to common wisdom). In this setting, best-performing
PE managers are the likeliest to extract this rent from limited partners. It cannot be
ruled out that best-performing managers react differently to early exit or diversification
incentives.23
Under those conditions, firms would be more likely to bargain deal-by-deal funds in
a frequent basis. In particular, this would be done when market conditions might be
more favourable, and the assignment of staff might be best suited for this purpose.
Such mechanisms could lead to the self-selection of GP managers with the right profile
to pursue diversification strategies and to be rewarded on a deal-by-deal basis.
Manager fixed effects contribute to the absorption of some firm characteristics, when
managers are involved in different GP vehicles; and to the absorption of pure skill or
status effects, when managers have been engaged in more than one firm. Yet this is not
the ideal setting for a within-manager effect to be found.
For a better identification of my results, I study two particular time periods in which
equilibrium conditions in manager-investor negotiations were strongly determined by
external events. These time periods are defined around two exogenous shocks to the
industry, determined by regulatory events. Temporary and unexpected changes in the
market structure create an opportunity to randomize the assignment of distribution
rules over managers and funds raised in these periods.
23It should also be noted that, regardless of diversification, overall effects of deal-by-deal models




3.5.2 IFRS and institutional investors - a supply shock
The first period of focus will be the year of 2006. This was a year that culminated the
sudden development of the European Private Equity market (2005-06) and, coincident-
ally, a period when many institutional investors, in particular European, entered the
US market for the first time as LPs.
This transition was well documented by Cumming and Johan (2007), in a contempor-
aneous survey with Dutch institutional investors. In large numbers, investors revealed
intentions to add the PE asset classes and evoked the main motives: IFRS fair value
accounting rules, the treatment of PE investments by Basel II standards and generally
improved investor protection and disclosure practices.24
The authors propose two main channels, by which regulatory harmonization could
reshape the Private Equity industry. A first channel is harmonization of accounting
standards across industries, which made compliance by GP firms more feasible towards
different classes of institutional investors. A second is harmonization across countries,
which made LP investments from different jurisdictions more compatible.
The main event to prompt regulatory changes was the adoption of the International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by the European Union (and other jurisdic-
tions), for listed firms, in 2005.25 Following this movement, fair value accounting was
implemented in the United State26 in 2006 by the SFAS 157. Illiquidity and opacity of
PE investments was an historical barrier for the participation of institutional investors
as LPs. A legally accepted framework became available to handle this problem.
24The decision stated that no information on portfolio companies may be regarded as a trade secret,
with regard to disclosure to investors (Jan 2006).
25Beyond legal compliance, many institutions engaged in voluntary reporting under the IFRS rules.
Their principles were progressively transposed to default accounting standards of EU member-states.




Coincidentally, other regulatory changes contributed to the external shock. In 2006,
Basel II rules were under implementation in the US and in Europe, two years after
their approval. The new banking regulation framework introduced a more favourable
risk weighting of PE investments.
In the United States, two court settlements have enhanced the protection of LP rights
and forced GPs to improve disclosure standards. A first one was a case won by CalP-
ERS, the largest public pension pension fund in the country. The disclosure of rates
of return and management fees paid was imposed, on a detailed fund basis. As a con-
sequence, trustees could make pension fund managers liable to request this information
from private equity funds, as a prior condition to committing capital.27 A second case
opposed Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation to all PE firms (General Partners) on
its portfolio, over disclosure practices.
Figure 3.4 illustrates market trends in distribution rules, with data from by descriptive
dataset. A dramatic growth in the number of European PE funds is shown, in vintages
of 2005 and 2006. This market became dominated by whole fund distribution rules,
adopted by more than 85% of documented funds in every vintage.
A milder effect of atypical market conditions was felt in the US, where improved LP
protection mechanisms coincided with a discontinuous increase in the share of whole
fund fundraisings. The proportion of deal-by-deal funds dropped from 47% to 22% from
the 2005 to 2006 vintage. A slight rebound on that share is observed after the shock,
yet far from prior levels.
27The CalPERS decision led to efforts by the Association for Investment Management and Research
(AIMR) and the British and European Venture Capital Associations to reach greater agreement on
disclosure standards in reporting the results of private-equity investments. The case details one set of




All in all, evidence suggests that an extra supply of funds was driven by concessions in
GP bargaining power, which allowed funds to abide by the standards of potential new
investors. The adjustment movement has produced a sizeable number of unexpected
whole fund funds in the European and North American markets in the year of 2006.
This can be qualified as a regulatory shock.
I do not rule out a possible feedback effect, where a shortening of excess demand for
LP funds could increase GP bargaining power. However, evidence is in favour of a
first-order impact in the opposite direction. In exploring this off-equilibrium period,
I employ two binary diversification measures. The first one is binary variable set as
1 when the HHI industry concentration index is greater than 0.6 and 0 otherwise.
The second measure is the previously used “exposure to risk” dummy – a measure of
diversification against specific risk factors.
I study the effect of diversification variables on net performance, through fees, for deal-
by-deal funds in the year of 2006 (Post-IFRS) and in neighbouring years 2003-2005
(Pre-IFRS). Fund type and region focus fixed effects are included. Standard errors are
clustered by fund type, region focus and pre/post-IFRS vintage.
In Table 3.10, I investigate the incremental effects of diversification in deal-by-deal funds
during the year of 2006, using a triple-difference framework for the general diversification
measure. The first two differences were explored in Section 4: distribution rule (deal-
by-deal vs. whole fund) and diversification measure. The third one is a time difference,





The net internal Rate of Return (yi) is again estimated as a function of the total, pre-fee
IRR (ri). di is a binary variable denoting whether a fund is classified as deal-by-deal
and fi is one of the portfolio diversification measures: functions of the HHI index and
Exposure to Risk. si is a binary variable, denoting whether a fund was raised during
the post-IFRS period (2006). γi is a set of fund-level control variables. θi are fixed
effects at the vintage, fund type and region focus levels.
General diversification has a greater negative effect over performance, for post-IFRS
deal-by-deal funds. The differential effect of the HHI measure funds has a large mag-
nitude, around 3 percentage points, in all specifications. The total effect of distribution
rules and diversification (vs. whole fund funds) is close to two percentage points, while,
for the remaining years, this effect is not significantly positive.
In a triple difference setting (Table C11). both this measure and the specific diversific-
ation variable have significant negative effects on net performance for post-IFRS funds.
When the period 2003-2005 is included, performance effects remain, while they are not
matched by a pre-IFRS effect of deal-by-deal diversification.
3.5.3 PE supervision under the Dodd-Frank act - a
regulatory rush
In this section, I will test the hypothesis that the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act, by
enacting SEC supervision over all private equity vehicles, should have discouraged the
raising of deal-by-deal funds to be filed under the new regulatory framework (scheduled
for 21/07/2011, delayed until 21/03/2012).
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act makes
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numerous changes to the registration, reporting and recordkeeping requirements of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Among these changes is the requirement that advisers
to most private funds (hedge funds and private equity funds) register with the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC).
Historically, many fund advisers had been exempt from registration under the so-called
“private adviser” exemption. The Dodd-Frank Act replaces this exemption with several
narrower exemptions for advisers that advise exclusively venture capital funds and
advisers solely to private funds with less than $150 million in assets under management
in the United States.
The Commission is given the authority to collect data from registered investment ad-
visers about their private funds for the purposes of the assessment of systemic risk
by the Financial Stability Oversight Council. The SEC has discretion in setting up
disclosure requirements, both in the act of fund registration and at subsequent times.
To fulfil its data collection obligations under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC Division
of Investment Management adopted a new form, Form PF.14. It requires private fund
advisers to disclose a long list of strategic and financial indicators, including a list
of products, performance and risk metrics, financing information, counterparties and
credit exposure.
SEC’s data collection process was oriented towards targeted monitoring actions, direc-
ted to some of the most unlawful practices in the industry, as perceived by supervisors.28
Fund terms set up under the new regime were constrained. The Commission has listed
some of these priorities in its policy papers. Some notorious examples are deductions of
transaction fees paid by portfolio companies, fair value accounting and financial report-
28Administrative infraction proceedings, in large numbers, enforced these actions in the next years.
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ing, accelerated monitoring fees29 and side interests of fund GPs. Among those, one is
of particular interest to this analysis: lack of transparency in co-investment agreements.
In particular, much greater scrutiny was brought over funds launched with “deals in
prospect”. Such deals can be offered as a private benefit of co-investment, if a GP fund
manager wishes to attract a valuable investor. (Greenberger (2007)). If this practice
is not disclosed to other LPs at the time of commitment, it can be seen as a hidden
rent transfer between LPs. It can also be interpreted as an untruthful signal, by which
a reputable investor makes a large commitment supposedly based on standard fund
terms, while it is being endowed with a separate account.
Promised opportunities to co-invest are most effective when specific deals are set to be
invested early in fund’s life. Pre-screened investments have more likely upside potential
(entry arbitrage). As these deals are the first to be entered, they are also likelier to be
first exited. Likelihood of strong early exits increases, creating optimal conditions for
the adoption of deal-by-deal models. This is one of the most profitable ex ante settings
in which a deal-by-deal contract can be agreed upon.
SEC intervention on co-investment practices could be anticipated. LPs were also likely
to be empowered, in future rounds, by other regulatory constraints to be implemented.
Conditions were created for a regulatory rush in registering deal-by-deal funds under
the old legal framework.
In Figure 3.5, an abnormal surge in the share of deal-by-deal funds is seen at the 2011
US vintage (49%, +11%), in contrast with a then in-adjustment from the 2012 vintage
onward, where whole fund structures have started to be more pervasive (with lasting
29Monitoring fees are paid yearly, as a function of each portfolio firm’s EBITDA. Early exits reduce
firm holding periods before expectation. LPs are sometimes forced to pay amounts that could be due
if firms were not exited early.
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effects). By 2013, this share had declined to 19%.30
The suggested hypothesis is that pre-Dodd-Frank deal-by-deal funds were incentivized
to close earlier, giving rise to an abnormal peak in the use of deal-by-deal structures and
to a significant change in bargaining mechanisms associated to managers (and investors)
with deal-by-deal preferences.
In Table 3.11, I test all my main diversification variables, as for their impact in North
American funds raised in 2011, when an off-equilibrium market period occurred just
before the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act. My dependent variable is the undiscounted
total of fees paid in the first three years of fund’s lives.
In recent vintages, funds do not have a sufficiently long time series to be classified as for
carried interest models. However, it is possible to look at their investment strategies of
their GP vehicles, for which data is available until 2016. Instead of studying effects for
funds classified as deal-by-deal, I look here at funds belonging to private equity firms
that raised deal-by-deal funds in my sample (of 380 firms), for the years 1998-2008.
The share of classified deal-by-deal funds in sampled firms ranges between 55% and 70%
for the period 2004-2008. During a peak of deal-by-deal fundraising, this probability is
expected to be higher. In Table C13, I show that the proportion of deal-by-deal funds
in my main sample (2001-2008) is well below the share of deal-by-deal funds predicted
during this peak. If not all funds in “deal-by-deal firms” are deal-by-deal, they are at
least expected to have negotiated under this prospect, with the intention to capitalize
on specific conditions of this period. Namely, these firms were likelier to raise deal-by-
deal funds in the next year, according to a regular pipeline, and to be bound by this
anticipation effect.




My analysis of the 2011 shock does not measure specific effects of diversification over
fees, through carried interest. However, it sheds light on a complementary issue: on
whether deal-by-deal funds with diversification strategies practice generally worse fee
conditions, at times when GP firms are incentivized to raise them.
As in Section 5.2, I employ two binary diversification measures. The first one is a binary
variable, set as 1 when the HHI industry concentration index is greater than 0.6 and
0 otherwise. The second measure is the previously used “exposure to risk” dummy – a
measure of diversification against specific risk factors. In addition to this, I employ the
continuous measure of general diversification (1-HHI).
In this analysis, the sample is different from previous Tables, comprising funds raised
from 2008 to 2012 – for which the first three years of fees are observed. Details of the
time series can be seen in Table C13.
I specify a triple difference model. In a setting with a new dependent variable and a
small sample size, four changes were made. First, vintage fixed effects are not included
– as management fees are determined by the economic cycle; second, standard errors
are not clustered; third, I test for linear relations with the HHI index; fourth, I control
for raised post-shock, in 2012. The specification is otherwise similar to that employed
in Section 5.2:
zi = β(di×fi×si)+βx(di×fi)+βy(di×si)+βz(fi×si)+βddi+βffi+βssi+γi+θi+δi (A.4)
The outcome variable measures funds’ management fees paid for the first 3 years of life
(zi). di is a binary variable denoting whether the fund’s parent firm raised funds classi-
fied as deal-by-deal (2001-2008) and fi is one of the portfolio diversification measures:
functions of HHI and Exposure to Risk. si is a binary variable, denoting whether a
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fund was raised during the Dodd-Frank shock period (2010-11). γi is a set of control
variables, including a “Post-Dodd Frank” binary variable, for funds raised in 2012. θi
denotes fund type fixed effects.
In Table 3.11, all the three diversification variables have positive effects in funds belong-
ing to “deal-by-deal firms”. Stronger differential effects are identified for HHI variables,
the fee total increasing by more than 6 percentage points in the binary variable case.
Conversely, in the absence of diversification interactions, the deal-by-deal propense sub-
sample does not evidence any increase in fees paid by the 2011 fund vintage.
Evidence suggests that General Partners negotiate distinct fund terms in firms prone
to raise deal-by-deal funds. This is consistent with hypothesis that deal-by-deal di-
versification is implemented by GPs at times when their bargaining power is high in
fund closings. GP managers are expected to diversify industry exposures under deal-by
deal rules, according to evidence from the 2001-2008 fund vintages. I find no “a priori”
reason to exclude this hypothesis for subsequent funds, raised between 2009 and 2011.
As a robustness verification, the test on the first three years of fees is replicated in
the 2006 shock period, using the Main sample. Post-IFRS funds (Table C21) also pay
significantly higher fees for their first three years of life. Magnitudes of 2006 effects on
management fees are comparable to those found for the 2011 shock (Table 3.11).
3.6 Conclusion
Private equity partnerships are characterized by a strong empowerment of managers
(GPs), at the expense of investors (LPs). The governance of private equity vehicles re-
sembles the setting of public firms without controlling shareholders. However, PE funds
have a unique feature: compensation rules and levels are set with great contingency
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and detail before fund activity starts. Later amendments are exceptional.
Deal-by-deal carry rules entitle managers to earn a bonus (carried interest) whenever
a portfolio firm is sold or divested in a profitable manner. If the most profitable deals
of a fund are first divested, deal-by-deal rules have the potential to anticipate bonus
payments in several years, increasing their time value. Some funds might also increase
the nominal value of carried interest.
Diversification increases chances of having extremely good deals (alongside the chances
of having the lousiest ones). Thus, according to my findings, managers are expected
to diversify portfolio investments when they receive deal-by-deal bonus payments, both
across industries and specific risk factors.
For the same reason, private equity firms with a penchant for diversification should
prefer purer deal-by-deal models. Bargaining optimal fund terms at fundraising is key
for both parties. Yet managers are more informed about future investment plans and
about their own skills.
When diversification strategies are implemented, I find that net performance of deal-
by-deal funds is lower than what is predicted by their total levels of value creation. My
finding holds for general industry diversification, across the fund’s portfolio and other
investments managed by the GP vehicle. It also applies to non-extreme exposures to
specific risk factors, where PE fund managers best gamble in their opposite realizations,
such that any may generate strong exits.
High bargaining power seems to be associated with deal-by-deal diversification, notori-
ously at times when LPs’ position is strengthened. Plausibly, some of the best perform-
ing managers self-select themselves to pursue diversification strategies. To alleviate
self-selection concerns, I examine fund returns and fee payments in two off-equilibrium
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periods where the industry faced regulatory shocks (2006 and 2010-2011).
When market conditions are propense to funds with whole fund rules, I find that diver-
sified deal-by-deal funds still charge higher fees than predicted. Conversely, when an
incentive exists for deal-by-deal funds to be raised, diversified deal-by-deal funds charge
much higher management fees than focused funds or those with whole fund rules.
Diversifying strategies have a positive impact in fee payments even when managers
lose their ability to choose deal-by-deal distribution rules. However, deal-by-deal terms
make diversification most beneficial to managers, due to the implicit GP incentives to
pursue strong early exits carried interest payments.
I do not claim that diversification strategies followed under deal-by-deal models are
value-destroying or inefficient per se. Nonetheless, they are potentially pursued with
motivations alien to value-delivery to LPs.
They can potentially push funds to diversify investments and seek early firm exits at
any cost. This could mean skipping important investment options. A famous example
is “add on acquisitions” — typical private equity structures in which an additional firm
is acquired and combined with an existing portfolio firm of the same industry.
On the other hand, they can increase the fund’s set of investment opportunities, not
least since managers have more powered incentives to take risks at the deal-specific
level. They can also be optimal in building on the management team’s set of skills.
It is plausible that investors should benefit from giving managers some extra “skin in
the game”. However, authorities should be aware of unintended incentives investors
may be paying for. Deal-by-deal structures can induce risk-taking behaviour that is
beneficial for managers but can be undesired from the standpoint of investors.
184
Chapter 3
Authorities should examine welfare implications of deal-by-deal rules and impose ap-
propriate restrictions and disclosure requirements. In an industry where investment
positions are illiquid and their valuations are opaque, transparency of manager in in-
centives is a key endeavour.
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Figures
Figure 3.1: Sequential payments in whole fund and realized loss deal-by-deal
models. The figure plots a stereotypical example of cash flow waterfalls for GPs and
LPs, under different distribution rules.
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Figure 3.2: Sequential payments in whole fund and realized loss deal-by-deal
models. This figure plots cash flow waterfalls from the first example in the text, both
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Figure 3.3: Graphical illustration of realized loss deal-by-deal model vs. whole
fund. This figure plots cash flow waterfalls from the second example in the text, both
for GPs and LPs, under different distribution rules.
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Figure 3.4: Deal-by-deal classification – time series from anonymous database
- IFRS shock years The figure plots time trends in the choice distribution rules, for
funds raised in years close to the shock period (2006-2007). The first graph provides
a detailed illustration for all funds raised in raised the Europe. The second graph
comprises all funds raised the United States. The third graph isolates venture capital
funds raised in the United States.
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Figure 3.5: Deal-by-deal classification – time series from anonymous database
Period around Dodd-Frank Act adoption This figure plots time trends in the
choice distribution rules, for funds raised in years close to the shock period (2010-2011).
The first graph comprised all funds raised in the United States, in years 2008-2013. The
second graph and the third graphs provide a detailed illustration of American buyout
and direct lending funds, respectively.
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Figure 3.6: Sectorial classification, major grouping. This figure lists all first-level
industries of the classification proposed by Invest Europe, as a recommended framework
to be used in Private Equity investment.
EVCA 14-industry classification
1 Agriculture
2 Chemicals and materials
3 Business and Industrial Products
4 Business and Industrial Services
5 Construction
6 Transportation
7 Consumer goods and retail
8 Consumer services: other




13 Computers and consumer electronics
14 Life Sciences
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Tables
Table 3.1: Frequency of fund types. This table presents the number of funds and
its proportion for all fund types, as classified in the Preqin dataset. That decomposition is
replicated for the relevant subsamples, built in accordance with data exclusion criteria
Panel A: All merged data Panel B: Funds with data on performance, post 1998Sample Main sample Not in the main sample
Fund type Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Balanced 27 2.5% 10 2.8% 7 3.2% 3 2.1%
Buyout 384 34.9% 126 35.0% 82 37.6% 44 31.0%
Co-Investment 11 1.0% 4 1.1% 2 0.9% 2 1.4%
Direct Secondaries 3 0.3% 2 0.6% 2 0.9% 0 0.0%
Distressed Debt 52 4.7% 22 6.1% 10 4.6% 12 8.5%
Early Stage 87 7.9% 40 11.1% 26 11.9% 14 9.9%
Early Stage: Seed 9 0.8% 5 1.4% 4 1.8% 1 0.7%
Early Stage: Start-up 11 1.0% 4 1.1% 3 1.4% 1 0.7%
Expansion/Late Stage 27 2.5% 10 2.8% 3 1.4% 7 4.9%
Fund of Funds 55 5.0% 15 4.2% 5 2.3% 10 7.0%
Growth 51 4.6% 17 4.7% 13 6.0% 4 2.8%
Infrastructure 21 1.9% 5 1.4% 5 2.3% 0 0.0%
Mezzanine 22 2.0% 4 1.1% 2 0.9% 2 1.4%
Natural Resources 44 4.0% 10 2.8% 8 3.7% 2 1.4%
Real Estate 69 6.3% 5 1.4% 3 1.4% 2 1.4%
Real Estate Co-Investment 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Secondaries 26 2.4% 12 3.3% 6 2.8% 6 4.2%
Special Situations 9 0.8% 2 0.6% 2 0.9% 0 0.0%
Timber 2 0.2% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Turnaround 2 0.2% 1 0.3% 0 0.0% 1 0.7%
Venture Capital (All Stages) 182 16.5% 64 17.8% 34 15.6% 30 21.1%
Venture Debt 5 0.5% 2 0.6% 1 0.5% 1 0.7%
Total: 1100 360 218 142
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Table 3.3: Deal by Deal Classification - summary statistics by fund type.
This table summarizes the classification of funds according to carried interest models, with a
breakdown by fund types
Panel A: Deal by deal
classification overall
Panel B: Deal by Deal Classification
- Buyout and Balanced Funds
Carried Interest Basis # Funds % of Classified % of Total # Funds % of Classified % of Total
Deal by Deal 54 36 25 17 28 19
Whole Fund 97 64 44 44 72 49
Unclassified 67 . 31 28 . 31
Total 218 89
Panel C: Deal by Deal
Classification - Venture Capital
Panel D: Deal by deal
classification - all venture capital
Carried Interest Basis # Funds % of Classified % of Total # Funds % of Classified % of Total
Deal by Deal 4 7 12 6 21 14
Whole Fund 18 31 53 22 79 51
Unclassified 12 . 35 15 . 35
Total 34 43
Table 3.4: GP vehicle portfolios and general diversification variables Table
4 mentions GP vehicle portfolios and general diversification variables. The data for these
variables have been categorized further. Panel A is the Main Sample data containing Mean,
Standard Deviation, Minimum, Maximum values as well as the number of observations. Same
parameters are mentions in Panel B, C and D but Panel B contains data of Funds classified as
Deal by Deal whereas Panel C deals with Funds classified as whole fund and Panel D contains
the previously mentioned parameters for all such funds not classified as Deal by Deal. HHI is a
variable measuring a Herfindahl-Hirschman index: the commonly accepted measure of market
concentration. The HHI index is computed by industry for proportions of the total number
of portfolio firms in each fund: measuring concentration of portfolio investments across 14
industries
Panel A: Main Sample Panel B: Funds Classified asDeal by Deal
Variable Mean St. Dev Min Max Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max Obs
Number of Firms 60.70 56.87 1 200 218 53.44 53.21 1 200 54
Number of Industries 8.09 3.75 0 14 218 7.63 3.78 0 14 54
1 - HHI 0.448 0.191 0 0.687 218 0.446 0.193 0 0.686 54
1 - HHI, primary funds 0.460 0.183 0 0.687 207 0.476 0.170 0.04 0.686 47
1 - HHI, buyout + VC 0.492 0.167 0 0.687 145 0.528 0.146 0.12 0.686 26
Panel C: Funds classified as
whole fund
Panel D: All funds not classified as
deal by deal
Variable Mean St. Dev Min Max Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max Obs
Number of Firms 62.15 59.92 1 200 99 63.09 57.98 1 200 164
Number of Industries 8.24 3.65 1 14 99 8.24 3.74 1 14 164
1 - HHI 0.450 0.187 0 0.687 99 0.449 0.191 0 0.687 164
1 - HHI, primary funds 0.457 0.179 0.03 0.687 94 0.455 0.186 0 0.687 160
1 - HHI, buyout + VC 0.476 0.161 0 0.687 83 0.478 0.172 0 0.687 132
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Table 3.5: Fee Margins and Internal Rates of Return by Subsamples. Table 5
summarizes Fee Margins and Internal Rates of Return. Fee Margin is defined as the difference
between Fund IRR and Net IRR. Parameters of mean, standard deviation, minimum and
maximum values, as well as number of observations are reported for each variable. Data has
been categorized by subsamples, combining the two possible realizations of Exposure to risk
with the two carry distribution models: deal by deal and whole fund. Exposure to risk is a
binary variable, which takes the value of 1 when a fund takes a "non-extreme exposure" to
one of the defined "specific risk factors" - binary variables defined at the portfolio firm level.
A fund is classified as having a non-extreme exposure to a factor if at least 25% and no more
than 75% of its portfolio firms are exposed to the risk factor in each of its two categories
Panel A: Whole fund, no specific
diversification factor
Panel B: Whole fund, any specific
diversification factor
Mean St. Dev Min Max Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max Obs
Net IRR 11.45 13.12 -16.27 67.01 35 14.60 14.66 -22.31 77.07 62
Fund IRR 14.71 13.72 -12.24 76.32 35 18.08 15.06 -20.02 78.12 62
Fee margin 3.26 1.65 1.42 9.31 35 3.48 2.74 0.30 18.85 62
Panel C: Deal by deal, no specific
diversification factor
Panel D: Deal by deal, any specific
diversification factor
Mean St. Dev Min Max Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max Obs
Net IRR 6.48 7.64 -4.65 19.48 17 5.85 18.75 -62.31 60.75 37
Fund IRR 10.11 7.86 -1.57 24.15 17 10.81 18.41 -43.50 72.81 37
Fee margin 3.62 1.22 1.92 5.83 17 4.97 3.25 1.65 18.81 37
Panel E: Whole fund or unclassified,
no specific diversification factor
Panel F: Whole fund or unclassified,
any specific diversification factor
Mean St. Dev Min Max Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max Obs
Net IRR 6.49 15.31 -71.94 67.01 64 9.37 15.81 -65.67 77.07 100
Fund IRR 10.44 12.60 -21.63 76.32 64 12.70 16.07 -59.50 78.12 100
Fee margin 3.96 6.07 1.42 50.31 64 3.32 2.29 0.30 18.85 100
197
Appendix of Chapter 3
Table 3.6: Larger sample - unclassified firms - HHI
Table 6 reports the results of regression models estimating net
performance (Net IRR) as a function of internal rates of return
before fees (Fund IRR). HHI is used as regressor, measuring
diversification. Models are estimated for the larger sample,
including unclassified funds. The main variable of interest is
the interaction between the binary indicator of deal-by-deal
carry models (Deal by deal) and the diversification measure.
Fund Size (M) is the fund’s total committed capital at the
time of fundraising. Fixed effects are included at the vintage,
fund type and manager levels. Standard errors are clustered
by GP vehicle. All other variables are as defined in tables 2.1
and 4
(1) (2) (3)
Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR
Fund IRR 1.009*** 0.996*** 0.993***
(32.307) (31.074) (29.926)
Deal by deal x -exp(HHI) -1.969** -2.185** -2.218**
(-2.485) (-2.486) (-2.007)
Deal by deal -4.394*** -5.305*** -5.574***
(-3.025) (-3.597) (-3.101)
-exp(HHI) 0.391 0.200 0.174
(0.754) (0.472) (0.265)
No. of portfolio firms classified 0.005 0.015*** 0.020***
(1.549) (4.172) (2.935)
Fund Size (M) 0.218** 0.012 0.033
(2.216) (0.181) (0.336)
Constant -2.822* -2.806** -2.719
(-1.903) (-2.488) (-1.603)
Vintage fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Fund type fixed effects No Yes Yes
Manager fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 218 218 218
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.7: Larger sample - unclassified firms - Ex-
posure to risk Table 7 reports the results of regression
models estimating net performance (Net IRR) as a function of
internal rates of return before fees (Fund IRR). Exposure to risk
is used as regressor, measuring diversification. Models are es-
timated for the larger sample, including unclassified funds. The
main variable of interest is the interaction between the binary
indicator of deal-by-deal carry models (Deal by deal) and the di-
versification measure. Fixed effects are included at the vintage,
fund type and manager levels. Standard errors are clustered by
GP vehicle. All other variables are as defined in tables 2.1, 5
and 6.
(1) (2) (3)
Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR
Fund IRR 1.009*** 1.000*** 0.997***
(32.812) (31.393) (29.685)
Deal by deal x Exposure to risk -1.623*** -1.818*** -1.911*
(-3.454) (-3.294) (-1.942)
Deal by deal 0.124 -0.327 -0.308
(0.200) (-0.586) (-0.361)
Exposure to risk 0.545 0.387 0.606
(1.453) (1.036) (1.057)
Fund Size (M) 0.238** 0.104* 0.141*
(2.454) (1.808) (1.833)
Constant -3.532*** -2.249*** -2.073***
(-4.508) (-3.511) (-2.731)
Vintage fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Fund type fixed effects No Yes Yes
Manager fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 218 218 218
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.8: Main sample - HHI - general. Table 8 re-
ports the results of regression models estimating net perform-
ance (Net IRR) as a function of internal rates of return before
fees (Fund IRR). HHI is used as regressor, measuring diver-
sification. Models are estimated for the main sample. The
main variable of interest is the interaction between the bin-
ary indicator of deal-by-deal carry models (Deal by deal) and
the diversification measure. Fixed effects are included at the
vintage, fund type and manager levels. Standard errors are
clustered by GP vehicle. All other variables are as defined in
tables 2.1, 4 and 6
(1) (2) (3)
Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR
Fund IRR 0.978*** 0.967*** 0.961***
(30.729) (28.300) (25.449)
Deal by deal x -exp(HHI) -1.338** -1.359** -1.327**
(-2.076) (-2.070) (-2.089)
Deal by deal -3.645*** -3.806*** -4.153***
(-2.856) (-3.518) (-3.449)
-exp(HHI) 0.025 -0.123 0.290
(0.044) (-0.199) (0.374)
No. of portfolio firms classified 0.003 0.012*** 0.013***
(1.211) (3.042) (2.796)
Fund Size (M) 0.196* 0.005 0.037
(1.889) (0.065) (0.335)
Constant -2.903 -2.182 -0.426
(-1.415) (-0.854) (-0.127)
Vintage fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Fund type fixed effects No Yes Yes
Manager fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 151 151 151
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.9: Main sample - Exposure to risk. Table 9 re-
ports the results of regression models estimating net perform-
ance (Net IRR) as a function of internal rates of return before
fees (Fund IRR). Exposure to risk is used as regressor, measur-
ing diversification. Models are estimated for the main sample.
The main variable of interest is the interaction between the
binary indicator of deal-by-deal carry models (Deal by deal)
and the diversification measure. Fixed effects are included at
the vintage, fund type and manager levels. Standard errors
are clustered by GP vehicle. All other variables are as defined
in tables 2.1, 5 and 6
(1) (2) (3)
Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR
Fund IRR 0.977*** 0.968*** 0.965***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.036)
Deal by deal x Exposure to risk -1.145** -1.496*** -1.812
(0.538) (0.543) (1.149)
Deal by deal -0.542 -0.504 -0.369
(0.511) (0.703) (1.184)
Exposure to risk -0.145 -0.458** -0.295
(0.268) (0.185) (0.258)
Fund Size (M) 0.186* 0.027 0.047
(0.100) (0.056) (0.069)
Constant -2.604** -0.154 0.852
(1.113) (1.313) (1.699)
Vintage fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Fund type fixed effects No Yes Yes
Manager fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 151 151 151
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.10: 2006 shock - differential effect on HHI. Table 10 reports
triple difference regression models, which illustrate the differential effect of deal-by-
deal distribution rules (Deal by deal) and diversification (Diversification) in funds
raised in 2006, in the period identified as "IFRS shock" (Post IFRS ). These models
estimate net performance again as a function of internal rates of return before fees.
Data are from the last three years preceding the surge in the European Private
Equity market (2003-2005) and the year when the shock occurred (2006). HHI
< 0.6 is a binary variable taking the value of 1 when the HHI index of industry
concentration for portfolio firms is lower than 0.6 and 0 otherwise. Models contain
fund type and region focus fixed effects and a control binary variable for funds
raised in the pre-IFRS vintage (2005). Standard errors are clustered by fund type,
region focus and sample period. All other variables are as defined in tables 2.1, 4
and 6
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR
Fund IRR 0.945*** 0.945*** 0.948*** 0.948***
(25.646) (26.959) (25.771) (27.459)
Post IFRS x Deal by Deal x Diversification -3.138** -3.471** -2.779** -3.121**
(-2.299) (-2.323) (-2.082) (-2.127)
Post IFRS x Deal by Deal 3.731** 3.858** 3.493** 3.630**
(2.540) (2.497) (2.424) (2.417)
Post IFRS x Diversification 2.662** 2.488* 2.403* 2.236*
(1.999) (1.904) (1.838) (1.761)
Deal by Deal x HHI < 0.6 0.990 1.458 0.954 1.386
(0.587) (0.912) (0.582) (0.903)
Post IFRS -2.480** -2.467** -2.443** -2.426**
(-2.220) (-2.203) (-2.226) (-2.219)
HHI < 0.6 -1.267 -0.989 -1.307 -1.014
(-1.234) (-1.037) (-1.277) (-1.073)
Deal by Deal -2.791** -2.816** -2.577** -2.605**
(-2.317) (-2.278) (-2.229) (-2.230)
Fund Size (M) 0.139** 0.138**
(2.414) (2.144)
Constant 0.126 1.648 -0.601 0.949
(0.108) (1.016) (-0.482) (0.589)
Fund type fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region focus fixed effects Yes No Yes No
Observations 93 93 93 93
Number of type 28 28 28 28
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.11: 2010-11 shock - effects in first 3 years of fees (undiscounted) Table
11 reports triple difference regression models, which illustrate the differential effect of the past
adoption of diversification (Diversification) and the past adoption of deal-by-deal distribution
rules, at the firm level (Deal by deal firm) in funds raised in 2010 and 2011, in the period
identified as “Dodd Frank shock” (Post Dodd-Fr.). These models estimate the (undiscounted)
total amount of fees paid by funds in their first 3 years of life. HHI < 0.6 is a binary variable
taking the value of 1 when the HHI index of industry concentration for portfolio firms is lower
than 0.6 and 0 otherwise. Fixed effects are included at the fund type level. Robust standard
errors are estimated. All other variables are defined as in previous tables









Pre Dodd-Fr. x Deal by Deal x Diversification 6.756** 14.658** 6.041**
(2.667) (2.462) (2.048)
Deal by deal firm x Diversification -6.629*** -11.888** -1.541
(-3.946) (-2.663) (-0.579)
HHI < 0.6 0.178
(0.212)
1 - HHI 1.123
(0.543)
Exposure to risk 0.125
(0.171)
Deal by deal firm 5.707*** 6.185** 1.570 1.193
(4.045) (2.418) (1.315) (1.172)
Post Dodd-Fr. -1.041 -1.073 -1.050 -0.617
(-1.271) (-1.336) (-1.362) (-0.818)
Pre Dodd-Fr. x Deal by Deal firm -5.117** -6.531** -2.446* -0.385
(-2.388) (-2.087) (-1.886) (-0.297)
Pre Dodd-Fr. -0.808 -0.137 -1.029 -0.710
(-0.973) (-0.113) (-1.233) (-1.323)
Fund Size (M) -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(-2.259) (-2.758) (-4.138) (-3.256)
Constant 4.658*** 4.328*** 4.898*** 4.474***
(6.127) (4.016) (7.633) (10.265)
Fund type fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 57 57 57 76
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
203
Appendix of Chapter 3
Appendix – Statistics and tests
Table C1: Size, performance and location measures for sampled funds. This
table summarizes, in detail, the distributions of fund size (committed capital) and net-of-fee
fund performance and presents the breakdown of funds per geographic area of focus
Size (USD million) Panel A: Sample Panel B: Main Sample
1st Percentile 50 42.2
5th Percentile 127.5 125
10th Percentile 184.5 180
25th Percentile 303 339.4
50th Percentile 606 700
75th Percentile 1405.5 1597.4
90th Percentile 3193.5 3500
95th Percentile 4510.15 5754.1
99th Percentile 10000 10000
Mean 1292.4 1438.4
St. Dev 1888.3 2159.1
Observations 360 218
Net IRR Panel C: Sample Panel D: Main Sample
1st Percentile -28.8 -62.3
5th Percentile -12.8 -12.9
10th Percentile -8.2 -5.8
25th Percentile 0.1 2.6
50th Percentile 7.2 7.9
75th Percentile 13.4 13.6
90th Percentile 20.2 19.7
95th Percentile 26.4 32.5
99th Percentile 60.6 60.8
Mean 7.0 7.7
St. Dev 14.5 15.7
Observations 360 218
Region Focus (%) Panel E: Sample Panel F: Main Sample
North America 84.1 81.2
Europe 10 12.4
Asia 3.9 4.1




Middle East & Israel 0.3 0.5
Observations 360 218
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Table C2.1: Fund performance by fund types: Sample (2001-2008). This table
reports fund performance by fund types for the extended sample of 360 funds. Net IRR is
the performance measure given by the net-of-fee internal rate of return of all quarterly LP
cash flows, after management fees and carried interest are factored in. Fund IRR is the fund’s
total internal rate or return, before fees. Fee margin is the difference between the two and is
obtained by subtracting Fund IRR by Net IRR. This table contains the Mean, Median and
Standard Deviation values of all three performance parameters for different fund types
Net IRR Fund IRR Fee margin Net IRR Fund IRR Fee margin
Balanced Infrastructure
Mean 9.24 12.58 3.34 Mean 14.85 18.0 3.18
Median 10.50 13.40 2.64 Median 14.09 17.4 3.33
St. Dev 7.10 8.30 1.51 St. Dev 6.72 6.2 0.90
Obs 7 7 7 Obs 5 5 5
Buyout Mezzanine
Mean 10.90 14.4 0.78 Mean 11.00 14.3 3.33
Median 9.90 13.0 0.65 Median 6.80 9.4 2.84
St. Dev 11.38 12.2 0.51 St. Dev 7.46 9.1 1.69
Obs 93 93 93 Obs 3 3 3
Co-Investment Natural Resources
Mean 2.92 4.6 1.63 Mean 9.85 13.4 3.57
Median 2.49 4.2 1.56 Median 9.64 12.8 3.63
St. Dev 9.50 9.7 0.40 St. Dev 17.14 18.0 1.15
Obs 4 4 4 Obs 10 10 10
Direct Secondaries Real Estate
Mean 5.73 10.1 4.42 Mean 0.61 3.1 2.45
Median 5.73 10.1 4.42 Median 0.04 1.7 1.67
St. Dev 14.67 16.0 1.33 St. Dev 4.87 6.8 1.98
Obs 2 2 2 Obs 4 4 4
Distressed Debt Real Estate Co-Investment
Mean 12.88 15.0 2.07 Mean
Median 9.20 11.6 2.15 Median
St. Dev 18.20 17.7 0.86 St. Dev
Obs 21 21 21 Obs
Early Stage Secondaries
Mean 0.76 5.2 4.42 Mean 11.22 14.5 3.25
Median 2.99 5.9 3.65 Median 11.90 14.3 3.22
St. Dev 19.72 18.9 3.18 St. Dev 4.64 5.0 1.39
Obs 28 28 28 Obs 8 8 8
Early Stage: Seed Special Situations
Mean -6.56 -2.3 4.28 Mean 5.55 9.7 4.15
Median -6.56 -1.1 4.26 Median 5.55 9.7 4.15
St. Dev 5.79 5.9 1.43 St. Dev 0.22 0.9 1.12
Obs 4 4 4 Obs 2 2 2
Early Stage: Start-up Timber
Mean -7.39 -3.8 3.61 Mean
Median -5.41 -2.1 3.52 Median
St. Dev 8.07 7.8 0.39 St. Dev
Obs 3 3 3 Obs
Expansion/Late Stage Turnaround
Mean 16.29 19.6 3.28 Mean
Median 16.47 20.6 2.94 Median
St. Dev 7.02 7.7 1.74 St. Dev
Obs 5 5 5 Obs
Fund of Funds Venture Capital (All Stages)
Mean 5.64 7.8 2.16 Mean 2.65 8.1 5.46
Median 5.53 8.2 1.97 Median 3.92 7.8 3.82
St. Dev 3.07 3.1 0.63 St. Dev 21.33 19.1 7.31
Obs 11 11 11 Obs 43 43 43
Growth Venture Debt
Mean 8.37 12.2 3.83 Mean 3.93 7.3 3.40
Median 8.57 11.8 3.32 Median 3.93 7.3 3.40
St. Dev 11.37 11.2 2.10 St. Dev
Obs 16 16 16 Obs 1 1 1
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Table C2.2: Fund performance by fund types - Main sample. This table reports
fund performance by fund types for the main sample: the subsample grouping all funds classi-
fied according to carry distribution rules. All variables are as defined in table 2.1. This table
contains the Mean, Median and Standard Deviation values of all three performance parameters
for different fund types
Net IRR Fund IRR Fee margin Net IRR Fund IRR Fee margin
Balanced Infrastructure
Mean 9.24 12.58 3.34 Mean 14.85 18.0 3.18
Median 10.50 13.40 2.64 Median 14.09 17.4 3.33
St. Dev 7.10 8.30 1.51 St. Dev 6.72 6.2 0.90
Obs 7 7 7 Obs 5 5 5
Buyout Mezzanine
Mean 10.68 14.1 0.78 Mean 13.21 16.8 3.57
Median 10.02 13.0 0.66 Median 13.21 16.8 3.57
St. Dev 10.68 11.3 0.51 St. Dev 9.06 11.4 2.32
Obs 82 82 82 Obs 2 2 2
Co-Investment Natural Resources
Mean 10.17 12.1 1.91 Mean 5.71 8.9 3.18
Median 10.17 12.1 1.91 Median 8.67 11.6 3.04
St. Dev 6.10 5.7 0.39 St. Dev 16.28 16.8 0.89
Obs 2 2 2 Obs 8 8 8
Direct Secondaries Real Estate
Mean 5.73 10.1 4.42 Mean 1.33 4.2 2.89
Median 5.73 10.1 4.42 Median 1.61 3.7 2.11
St. Dev 14.67 16.0 1.33 St. Dev 5.70 7.8 2.17
Obs 2 2 2 Obs 3 3 3
Distressed Debt Real Estate Co-Investment
Mean 14.76 16.8 2.02 Mean
Median 11.91 14.1 1.90 Median
St. Dev 26.31 25.6 1.10 St. Dev
Obs 10 10 10 Obs
Early Stage Secondaries
Mean 0.90 5.4 4.51 Mean 11.56 15.0 3.43
Median 3.34 6.6 3.65 Median 11.46 14.2 3.66
St. Dev 20.46 19.6 3.28 St. Dev 5.27 6.3 1.32
Obs 26 26 26 Obs 5 5 5
Early Stage: Seed Special Situations
Mean -6.56 -2.3 4.28 Mean 5.55 9.7 4.15
Median -6.56 -1.1 4.26 Median 5.55 9.7 4.15
St. Dev 5.79 5.9 1.43 St. Dev 0.22 0.9 1.12
Obs 4 4 4 Obs 2 2 2
Early Stage: Start-up Timber
Mean -7.39 -3.8 3.61 Mean
Median -5.41 -2.1 3.52 Median
St. Dev 8.07 7.8 0.39 St. Dev
Obs 3 3 3 Obs
Expansion/Late Stage Turnaround
Mean 12.72 15.3 2.54 Mean
Median 15.23 16.8 1.95 Median
St. Dev 5.46 6.2 1.38 St. Dev
Obs 3 3 3 Obs
Fund of Funds Venture Capital (All Stages)
Mean 5.32 7.5 2.19 Mean 4.21 10.0 5.75
Median 5.33 8.4 1.87 Median 5.69 8.9 3.79
St. Dev 1.51 1.8 0.67 St. Dev 23.32 20.7 8.20
Obs 5 5 5 Obs 34 34 34
Growth Venture Debt
Mean 10.76 14.3 3.59 Mean 3.93 7.3 3.40
Median 8.97 12.2 3.25 Median 3.93 7.3 3.40
St. Dev 10.73 10.4 1.80 St. Dev
Obs 13 13 13 Obs 1 1 1
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Table C3: Carried interest basis by vintage. This table reports the yearly frequency
of funds raised under both carried interest models, according to their classification process.
Frequencies are provided both for the Sample and the Main Sample
Sample 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Whole fund 12 9 19 13 6 3 10 24 32 25 10
Deal by deal 2 2 12 9 9 3 11 10 15 6 6
Main Sample 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Whole fund 11 5 2 9 20 24 20 6
Deal by deal 7 8 2 8 7 12 4 5
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Table C4.1: Thresholds for management fees - by fundtype. This table reports
four key parameters of the classification process. Distinct values are assigned to each fund type
defined in the Preqin database. Those four variables are the mininum threshold for reported
fees (Minimum threshold), the investment period and post-investment period fees rebated from
portfolio firms (Rebates and Rebates: post-investment and the total minimum threshold for
management fees, including rebates (Implicit thresholds.)
Minimum theresholds
Fund types Rebates Rebates: post-investment Implicit thresholds Thresholds
Funds of funds 0.20% 0.10% 0.50% / 0.40% 0.30%
Secondaries 0.20% 0.10% 0.50% / 0.40% 0.30%
Co-investment 0.20% 0.10% 0.50% / 0.40% 0.30%
Natural resources 0.20% 0.10% 0.50% / 0.40% 0.30%
Distressed debt 0.50% 0.30% 1.25% / 1.05% 0.75%
Mezzanine 0.50% 0.30% 1.50% / 1.30% 1.00%
Real estate, infrastructure 0.50% 0.30% 1.50% / 1.30% 1.00%
Turnaround 0.50% 0.30% 1.50% / 1.30% 1.00%
Buyout, venture, growth capital 0.50% 0.30% 1.60% / 1.40% 1.10%
Venture, < 500 million USD 0.50% 0.30% 2.00% / 1.80% 1.50%
Maximum theresholds
Fund types Thresholds









Buyout, venture, growth capital 2.60%
Venture, < 500 million USD 2.85%
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Table C4.2: Management fee upper bounds - statistics by fund type. This
table summarizes upper bounds for management fees, from the classification process of carried
interest models. Statistics are presented by fund type, for all sample funds classified.
Fund Type Mean St. Dev Min Max Obs
Balanced 2.27 0.18 2.10 2.60 15
Buyout 2.30 0.21 1.51 2.60 198
Co-Investment 2.34 0.14 2.11 2.47 6
Direct Secondaries 1.30 0.00 1.30 1.30 2
Distressed Debt 1.78 0.27 1.35 2.60 36
Early Stage 2.47 0.15 2.10 2.60 56
Early Stage: Seed 2.71 0.15 2.51 2.85 7
Early Stage: Start-up 2.70 0.17 2.51 2.85 8
Expansion/Late Stage 2.59 0.26 2.11 2.85 14
Fund of Funds 0.88 0.24 0.50 1.30 29
Growth 2.34 0.21 1.62 2.60 36
Infrastructure 1.85 0.19 1.50 2.00 16
Mezzanine 2.16 0.27 1.58 2.54 10
Natural Resources 2.31 0.22 1.74 2.60 19
Real Estate 1.79 0.25 1.50 2.25 33
Secondaries 0.91 0.25 0.54 1.30 18
Special Situations 2.47 0.20 2.18 2.60 4
Turnaround 1.87 1.87 1.87 1
Venture Capital (All Stages) 2.57 0.23 1.73 2.85 100
Venture Debt 2.70 0.22 2.45 2.85 3
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Table C4.3: Reduced rates, management fees - statistics by fund type. This
table summarizes upper bounds for reduced management fee rates, from the classification
process of carried interest models. Statistics are presented by fund type, for all sample funds
classified.
Fund Type Mean St. Dev Min Max Obs
Balanced 2.04 0.15 1.90 2.38 15
Buyout 2.13 0.28 0.83 2.60 198
Co-Investment 2.18 0.14 1.91 2.29 6
Direct Secondaries 1.21 0.08 1.15 1.26 2
Distressed Debt 1.58 0.35 0.82 2.45 36
Early Stage 2.28 0.24 1.85 2.60 56
Early Stage: Seed 2.53 0.18 2.31 2.85 7
Early Stage: Start-up 2.43 0.27 2.01 2.81 8
Expansion/Late Stage 2.40 0.32 1.91 2.85 14
Fund of Funds 0.75 0.25 0.40 1.30 29
Growth 2.21 0.25 1.42 2.60 36
Infrastructure 1.70 0.27 1.30 2.00 16
Mezzanine 1.98 0.26 1.38 2.34 10
Natural Resources 2.14 0.26 1.54 2.60 19
Real Estate 1.65 0.28 1.30 2.25 33
Secondaries 0.68 0.21 0.41 1.05 18
Special Situations 2.17 0.54 1.41 2.60 4
Turnaround 1.67 1.67 1.67 1
Venture Capital (All Stages) 2.38 0.27 1.53 2.85 100
Venture Debt 2.30 0.30 2.04 2.62 3
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Table C5: Statistics for carried interest variables (lower bounds). This table
summarizes three variables of interest, related to estimated lower bounds for carried interest,
at the fund level, in the classification process of carried interest models. Cumulative carry is
the proportion of a fund’s commited capital paid as carried interest since the fund’s inception.
Cumulative distribution is the proportion of a fund’s invested capital paid as carried interest
since the last distribution. Cumulative carry ratio is the ratio of Cumulative carry and the
cumulative amount distributed to Limited Partners.
Panel A - Cumulative carried interest statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev Min Max Obs
Cumulative Carry (% committed) 14.03 12.37 2.50 84.75 95
Cumulative Distribution (/ invested) 1.86 0.73 0.99 6.11 95
Cumulative Carry Ratio 17.2% 4.0% 8.8% 30.7% 93
Panel B - Funds classified by maximum cumulative carry payments
Maximum Carry (% committed) 4.23 3.05 2.26 24.58 79
Total carry Ratio 7.9% 4.8% 2.2% 22.1% 74
Cumulative Carry Ratio 18.4% 4.2% 8.8% 23.8% 16
Panel C - Funds classified by maximum cumulative carry ratios
Maximum Cumulative Carry Ratio 30.7% 2.8% 26.7% 34.8% 11
Cumulative Carry 6.7% 3.2% 2.3% 12.1% 11
Cumulative Carry Ratio 19.5% 2.3% 14.6% 21.6% 11
Panel D - Funds classified as pure deal by deal
Early Fees 3.56 1.51 2.05 9.80 57
Management Fee (% committed) 1.85 0.51 0.41 2.60 57
Total Carry Ratio 7.3% 5.5% 0.1% 22.1% 51
Maximum Cumulative Carry Ratio 27.9% 4.1% 22.0% 34.8% 8
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Table C6: Robustness of classification criteria - sample sizes. This table reports
the frequency of carried interest models in the Sample, when funds are classified according to
three distinct algorithms: the adopted classification method and two alternative definitions:
1) funds with consecutive carry payments of at least 2% of committed capital; 2) funds with
consecutive carry payments of at least 2.25% of committed capital and with any yearly fee
payment exceeding the upper bound for management fees by 1% or more, during the investment
period.
Max consecutive carry payment
of 2% and early fees 1% above
upper bound
Max consecutive carry payment
(2.25%) between any cash distribution
(incl. low value)
Deal by Deal Alternative definition 1 Alternative definition 20 1 0 1
0 99 0 98 1
1 4 15 3 24
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Table C7: Specific risk factors - industry exposures.This table summarizes all the
specific risk factors underlying the Exposure to risk variable. For each binary factor, the
percent frequency of both realizations is summarized: whether a fund’s share of portfolio
deals exposed to the risk factor is between 25% and 75% or not. Statistics are presented for
the Main Sample (panel A) and by carried interest model (panels B and C)
Panel A: Main Sample Panel B: Funds Classified as Deal by Deal
Specific Risk Factors 25-75% Deals Extreme exposures 25-75% Deals Extreme exposures
Electronic America 8.8 91.2 7.5 92.5
Electronics Europe 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Life Sciences America 11.1 88.9 13.2 86.8
Life Sciences Europe 0.9 99.1 1.9 98.1
Housing America 0.9 99.1 0.0 100.0
Housing Europe 0.9 99.1 0.0 100.0
Consumption America 6.5 93.5 9.4 90.6
Consumption Europe 0.9 99.1 1.9 98.1
Regulation America 24.0 76.0 24.5 75.5
Finance Factor 6.5 93.5 9.4 90.6
Any Factor 62.8 37.2 69.8 30.2
Panel C: Funds classified as whole fund Panel D: Funds not classified as deal by deal
Electronic America 8.1 91.9 9.1 90.9
Electronics Europe 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Life Sciences America 10.1 89.9 10.4 89.6
Life Sciences Europe 0.0 100.0 0.6 99.4
Housing America 0.0 100.0 1.2 98.8
Housing Europe 0.0 100.0 1.2 98.8
Consumption America 7.1 92.9 5.5 94.5
Consumption Europe 0.0 100.0 0.6 99.4
Regulation America 27.3 72.7 23.8 76.2
Finance Factor 4.0 96.0 5.5 94.5
Any Factor 64.6 35.4 61.0 39.0
213
Appendix of Chapter 3
Table C8: Diversification variables and carried interest basis - OLS, Probit
models. This table reports OLS and Probit prediction models for diversification variables.
The first 3 equations predict a continuous measure of diversification (1-HHI ), by estimating
OLS models. The last 3 equations estimate Probit models for the binary measure of diversific-
ation. Any factor denotes the Exposure to risk binary variable. Pure Deal by Deal is a binary
variable, taking the value of 1 when a fund’s carried interest model is classified as deal-by-deal
due to a yearly fee payment during the investment period. First generation fund is binary
variable taking the value of 1 when a fund is raised in the first five years of activity of a GP
firm. Fixed effects are included at the vintage level. Standard errors are clustered by GP
vehicle. All other variables are as defined in previous tables.
Panel A - Main sample, including unclassified funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 - HHI 1 - HHI 1 - HHI Any factor Any factor Any factor
Pure Deal by Deal 0.053* 0.049* 0.050* 0.155** 0.160** 0.156**
(1.844) (1.733) (1.760) (2.044) (2.012) (1.995)
Fund size (M) 0.009* 0.008* 0.008 -0.001 -0.008 -0.006
(1.811) (1.705) (1.640) (-0.079) (-0.475) (-0.374)
First generation fund -0.042 -0.036 0.167** 0.195**
(-1.084) (-0.912) (2.117) (2.392)
Constant 0.432*** 0.449*** 0.457*** 0.574*** 0.666*** 0.621***
(25.978) (14.494) (13.780) (12.094) (6.578) (6.081)
Vintage fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 218
R-squared 0.030 0.050 0.055 0.033 0.043 0.064
Panel B - Main sample, only classified funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 1 - HHI 1 - HHI 1 - HHI Any factor Any factor Any factor
Pure Deal by Deal 0.067** 0.063** 0.065** 0.174** 0.187** 0.176**
(2.187) (1.988) (2.075) (2.203) (2.194) (2.088)
Fund size (M) 0.010* 0.011** 0.011* -0.030 -0.035* -0.032*
(1.826) (1.984) (1.879) (-1.582) (-1.897) (-1.715)
First generation fund -0.058 -0.049 0.203** 0.241***
(-1.305) (-1.057) (2.442) (2.646)
Constant 0.427*** 0.455*** 0.466*** 0.621*** 0.717*** 0.663***
(20.655) (13.386) (12.790) (10.834) (6.661) (5.999)
Vintage fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 151
R-squared 0.048 0.084 0.092 0.073 0.076 0.109
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Table C10: Main sample - HHI - detail. This table reports the results of regression
models estimating net performance (Net IRR) as a function of internal rates of return before fees
(Fund IRR). HHI is used as regressor, measuring diversification, in six additional variations of
models presented in table 6. Models are estimated for the larger sample, including unclassified
funds. The main variable of interest is the interaction between the binary indicator of deal-
bv-deal carry models (Deal by deal) and the diversification measures. No. of portfolio firms
classified is the number of portfolio firms in which the fund invests, during its life. In the first
and the second equations, I reduce my sample to funds with less than 1.000 million US dollars
in total commited capital. In the third and the fourth equations, I exclude funds with total
commited capital exceeding 3.000 million US dollars. Fixed effects are included at the vintage
and fund type levels. Standard errors are clustered by GP vehicle. All other variables are as
defined in previous tables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR
Fund IRR 0.996*** 0.991*** 0.972*** 0.962*** 0.978*** 0.969***
(0.018) (0.024) (0.033) (0.035) (31.215) (28.094)
Deal by deal x -exp(HHI) -1.907** -2.885** -1.449** -1.878**
(0.842) (1.350) (0.635) (0.743)
Deal by deal x 1 - HHI -2.448* -2.512
(-1.800) (-1.349)
Deal by deal -4.742*** -6.651*** -3.965*** -4.949*** -0.213 -0.395
(1.706) (2.012) (1.376) (1.192) (-0.276) (-0.320)
-exp(HHI) 0.192 -0.018 0.288 -0.065
(0.779) (0.780) (0.594) (0.610)
1 - HHI -1.249 -0.861
(-0.994) (-0.632)
No. of portfolio firms classified 0.001 0.010 0.004 0.014** 0.207** 0.087
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (2.084) (1.083)
Fund Size (M) 0.002* 0.002 0.001*** 0.000 0.235 0.622
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.239) (0.602)
Constant -4.079 -4.013 -2.788 -2.021 -2.905*** -1.494
(3.091) (3.565) (2.223) (2.840) (-3.073) (-1.323)
Vintage fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund type fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fund Size (M) < 1000 < 1000 < 3000 < 3000 All All
Observations 94 94 135 135 153 153
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table C11: 2006 shock - general estimation.This table reports triple differ-
ence regression models, measuring the differential effect of deal-by-deal distribution
rules (Deal by deal) and diversification (Diversification) in funds raised in 2006,
in the period identified as "IFRS shock" (Post IFRS ). These models estimate
net performance again as a function of internal rates of return before fees. Data
are from the last three years preceding the surge in the European Private Equity
market (2003-2005) and the year when the shock occurred (2006). HHI < 0.6 is a
binary variable taking the value of 1 when the HHI index of industry concentration
for portfolio firms is lower than 0.6 and 0 otherwise. Models contain fixed effects
only at the fund type level. A control binary variable is added for funds raised
in the pre-IFRS vintage (2005). In the second and fourth equations, I exclude all
deal-by-deal funds raised before 2006, narrowing the control group of funds prior
to the shock. Standard errors are clustered by fund type, region focus and sample
period. All other variables are as defined in previous tables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR
Fund IRR 0.948*** 0.946*** 0.949*** 0.945***
(21.079) (19.608) (21.142) (18.685)
Post IFRS x Deal by Deal x Diversification -2.779** -3.518** -1.934* -1.990**
(-1.963) (-2.322) (-1.946) (-1.977)
Pre IFRS x Deal by deal x Diversification 0.954 -2.092
(0.664) (-1.488)
Post IFRS x Deal by deal 0.915 1.472 0.100 0.113
(0.913) (1.346) (0.130) (0.150)
Post IFRS x Diversification 1.096 1.109 -0.013 0.117
(1.086) (1.100) (-0.025) (0.228)
Post IFRS -2.443** -2.580** -0.681 -0.882
(-2.222) (-2.258) (-1.219) (-1.463)
Pre IFRS x HHI < 0.6 -1.307** -1.508**
(-1.985) (-2.148)
Pre IFRS x Any factor -0.261 -0.355
(-0.548) (-0.651)
Pre IFRS x Deal by deal -2.577** -0.356
(-2.251) (-0.282)
Fund Size (M) 0.139** 0.126** 0.128*** 0.139***
(2.367) (2.354) (3.231) (2.942)
Constant -0.601 -0.967 -1.198 -2.221*
(-0.527) (-0.738) (-1.060) (-1.789)
Fund type fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-IFRS deal by deal funds included Yes No Yes No
Observations 110 93 110 93
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table C12: Carried interest basis by vintage - IFRS event. This table reports the
frequency of each carried interest model, for the period between 2003 and 2006
Event Sample 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Whole fund 8 12 28 33 81
Deal by deal 2 8 7 12 29
Total 10 20 35 45 110
Table C13: Carry basis: past record of fund’s parent firms - Dodd Frank
event. This table reports the frequency of both realizations of the Deal by deal firm binary
variable, across sampled funds: 1) belonging to a parent GP firm that has never raised any
deal-by-deal fund and 2) belonging to a parent firm with at least one deal-by-deal fund raised
in the past. Frequencies are for the period between 2008 and 2011
Event Sample 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
All whole fund 34 9 7 23 17 257
Deal by deal firm 18 3 6 8 4 133
Total 20 4 1 2 21 390
Vintage as % committed Whole fund Deal by deal
2003 3y fees 0.0 -N 1 0
2004 3y fees 3.0 3.1N 22 13
2005 3y fees 3.0 3.9N 24 17
2006 3y fees 3.6 4.2N 39 26
2007 3y fees 3.1 4.3N 41 20
2008 3y fees 3.6 4.4N 30 17
2009 3y fees 5.6 3.8N 8 3
2010 3y fees 3.4 3.9N 6 6
2011 3y fees 3.6 3.7N 17 7
2012 3y fees 3.7 2.5N 8 2
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Table C14: 2011 shock - effects in first 3 years of fees. This table
reports cross-sectional regression models using a triple difference, measuring the
differential effect of the past adoption of diversification (Diversification) and the
past adoption of deal-by-deal distribution rules, at the firm level (Deal by deal
firm) in funds raised in 2010 and 2011, in the period identified as “Dodd Frank
shock” (Post Dodd-Fr.). These models estimate the (undiscounted) total amount
of fees paid by funds in their first 3 years of life. HHI < 0.6 is a binary variable
taking the value of 1 when the HHI index of industry concentration for portfolio
firms is lower than 0.6 and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are estimated.
All other variables are defined as in previous tables
(1) (2)
Fees - First 3 years Fees - First 3 years
Post IFRS x Deal by Deal x Diversification 7.472** 7.511**
(3.186) (3.170)
Post IFRS x Deal by deal -3.343*** -3.387***
(0.735) (0.733)
Post IFRS x Diversification -0.626 -0.620
(0.853) (0.849)








Diversification variable HHI < 0.6 Exposure to risk
Observations 80 67
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table C15: Fee statistics - anonymous dataset with contract terms.This table
summarizes carried interest rates (Carried interest), hurdle rates (Preferred return) and man-
agement fee rates (Management fees) for all funds reporting this numbers in the anonymous
dataset. Statistics are split per carried interest model, across the two main categories: "Deal
by Deal" and "Whole fund"
Deal by deal Whole fund
Carried interest
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
393 19.75% 3.37% 2% 50% 1344 19.11% 3.96% 1% 50%
Preferred return
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
334 8.12% 1.05% 4% 15% 1110 8.18% 2.06% 3% 40%
Management fees
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
402 1.91% 0.48% 1% 6% 1370 1.90% 0.49% 0% 5%
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Table C16: Size statistics - anonymous dataset.This table reports the frequencies of
size classes in the anonymous dataset. Statistics are split per carried interest model, across
the two main categories: "Deal by Deal" and "Whole fund".
Deal by deal Whole fund
Size class Freq. Percent Cum. Size class Freq. Percent Cum.
< 50 26 6.33 6.33 < 50 205 14.57 14.64
50-100 35 8.52 14.84 50-100 194 13.79 28.43
100-250 98 23.84 38.69 100-250 428 30.42 58.85
250-500 78 18.98 57.66 250-500 269 19.12 77.97
500-1 bn 80 19.46 77.13 500-1 bn 175 12.44 90.41
1 -2 bn 42 10.22 87.35 1 -2 bn 78 5.54 95.95
>2bn 51 12.41 99.76 >2bn 57 4.05 100
Total 411 100 Total 1407 100
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Table C17: Time series of carry models - anonymous dataset.This table reports
the frequencies of carried interest models per year of vintage in the anonymous dataset. Carried
interest models are classified in two main categories: "Deal by Deal" and "Whole fund". Data
are for the period 2000-2016
Deal by deal Whole fund
Vintage Freq. Percent Cum. Vintage Freq. Percent Cum.
2000 17 4.08 4.08 2000 7 0.49 0.49
2001 8 1.92 6 2001 6 0.42 0.91
2002 2 0.48 6.47 2002 4 0.28 1.19
2003 9 2.16 8.63 2003 14 0.98 2.18
2004 15 3.6 12.23 2004 29 2.04 4.21
2005 32 7.67 19.9 2005 72 5.06 9.27
2006 26 6.24 26.14 2006 130 9.13 18.4
2007 44 10.55 36.69 2007 158 11.1 29.49
2008 37 8.87 45.56 2008 120 8.43 37.92
2009 27 6.47 52.04 2009 66 4.63 42.56
2010 46 11.03 63.07 2010 123 8.64 51.19
2011 43 10.31 73.38 2011 101 7.09 58.29
2012 27 6.47 79.86 2012 110 7.72 66.01
2013 22 5.28 85.13 2013 140 9.83 75.84
2014 25 6 91.13 2014 142 9.97 85.81
2015 20 4.8 95.92 2015 85 5.97 91.78
2016 17 4.08 100 2016 116 8.15 99.93
Total 417 100 Total 1424 100
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Table C18: Carried interest basis by fund type.This table reports the frequencies of
carried interest models per fund type in the anonymous dataset. Carried interest models are
classified in two main categories: "Deal by Deal" and "Whole fund". In this dataset, funds
are classified across nine fund types, which include "Direct lending", a category that is absent
from my sample
Deal by deal Whole fund
Fund type Freq. Percent Cum. Fund type Freq. Percent Cum.
Balanced 5 1.2 1.2 Balanced 17 1.19 1.19
Buyout 181 43.41 44.6 Buyout 340 23.88 25.07
Co-Investment 5 1.2 45.8 Co-Investment 11 0.77 25.84
Direct Lending 104 24.94 70.74 Direct Lending 452 31.74 57.58
Growth 45 10.79 81.53 Growth 144 10.11 67.7
Natural Resources 3 0.72 82.25 Natural Resources 11 0.77 68.47
Private Equity Fund of Funds 8 1.92 84.17 Private Equity Fund of Funds 74 5.2 73.67
Private Equity Secondaries 3 0.72 84.89 Private Equity Secondaries 22 1.54 75.21
Venture Capital 63 15.11 100 Venture Capital 353 24.79 100
Total 417 100 Total 1.424 100
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Table C19: Carried interest basis by GP location.This table reports the frequencies
of carried interest models per location of the General Partner firm in the anonymous dataset.
Deal by deal Whole fund
GP Location Freq. Percent Cum. GP Location Freq. Percent Cum.
Asia 39 9.35 9.35 Asia 137 9.62 9.62
Europe 35 8.39 17.75 Europe 471 33.08 42.7
North America 327 78.42 96.16 North America 694 48.74 91.43
Rest of World 16 3.84 100 Other 1 0.07 91.5
Rest of World 121 8.5 100
Total 417 100 Total 1.424 100
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Table C20: Carried interest basis by region focus. This table reports the frequencies
of carried interest models per region of focus in the anonymous dataset. Carried interest models
are classified in two main categories: "Deal by Deal" and "Whole fund". Three geographical
areas are defined: the European continent (Europe); United States of America and Canada
(North America); all the remaining countries (Rest of World)
Deal by deal Whole fund
Focus Freq. Percent Cum. Focus Freq. Percent Cum.
Europe 28 6.73 6.73 Europe 448 31.98 31.98
North America 316 75.96 82.69 North America 632 45.11 77.09
Rest of World 72 17.31 100 Rest of World 321 22.91 100
Total 416 100 Total 1.401 100
Table C21: Time series of carry models - anonymous dataset. This table reports
the frequencies of carried interest models per year of vintage for funds reporting their fee rates
in the anonymous dataset. Carried interest models are classified in three categories: "Deal
by Deal", "Whole fund" and "Other". The share of each category is reported, per year of
vintage. Data are for the period 2000-2016
Deal by deal Whole fund Other Total
Vintage Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Total
2000 17 73.91 6 26.09 3 11.54 26
2001 6 75.00 2 25.00 4 33.33 12
2002 2 40.00 3 60.00 0 0.00 5
2003 9 52.94 8 47.06 14 0.98 2.18
2004 14 43.75 18 56.25 29 2.04 4.21
2005 30 46.88 34 53.13 72 5.06 9.27
2006 20 22.47 68 77.27 1 1.12 89
2007 33 27.50 85 72.03 2 1.67 120
2008 28 31.11 61 68.54 1 1.11 90
2009 21 36.21 36 63.16 1 1.72 58
2010 36 37.89 55 60.44 4 4.21 95
2011 35 48.61 35 50.00 2 2.78 72
2012 22 31.43 46 67.65 2 2.86 70
2013 14 18.99 57 80.28 2 2.74 73
2014 17 19.32 71 80.68 0 0.00 88
2015 11 20.75 42 79.25 0 0.00 53
2016 12 15.19 67 84.81 0 0.00 79
Total 327 100 694 100 22 100 1043
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Appendix – Robustness
Table D1: GP vehicles split in funds - only clas-
sified funds.This table replicates table 6, but reduces
the Sample to GP Vehicles either with only one fund,
or whose funds have their investment periods fully mis-
matched.
(1) (2) (3)
Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR
Fund IRR 0.985*** 0.978*** 0.975***
(32.076) (33.003) (29.910)
Deal by deal x -exp(HHI) -1.136** -1.283*** -1.235**
(-2.312) (-2.885) (-2.514)
-exp(HHI) 0.107 0.409 0.564
(0.167) (0.586) (0.698)
Deal by deal -3.051*** -3.429*** -3.546***
(-2.804) (-3.474) (-3.472)
Fund Size (M) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.585) (0.482) (0.352)
Constant -1.414 -0.853 -0.559
(-0.832) (-0.475) (-0.276)
Vintage fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Fund type fixed effects No Yes Yes
Manager fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 182 182 182
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table D2: Whole fund classification for returns
above 0 (pre-2005) - all funds, HHI.This table
replicates table 6 for a Sample of funds whose year of
vintage was in the period 2000-2004.
(1) (2) (3)
Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR
Fund IRR 1.009*** 0.996*** 0.993***
(32.307) (31.074) (29.926)
Deal by deal x -exp(HHI) -1.969** -2.185** -2.218**
(-2.485) (-2.486) (-2.007)
-exp(HHI) 0.391 0.200 0.174
(0.754) (0.472) (0.265)
Deal by deal -4.394*** -5.305*** -5.574***
(-3.025) (-3.597) (-3.101)
Fund Size (M) 0.000** 0.000 0.000
(2.216) (0.181) (0.336)
Constant -2.822* -2.806** -2.719
(-1.903) (-2.488) (-1.603)
Vintage fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Fund type fixed effects No Yes Yes
Manager fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 218 218 218
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table D3: Whole fund classification for returns
above 0 (pre-2005) - all funds, any risk factor.This
table replicates table 7for a Sample of funds whose year of
vintage was in the period 2000-2004.
(1) (2) (3)
Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR
Fund IRR 1.009*** 1.000*** 0.997***
(32.829) (31.480) (29.881)
Deal by deal x Any risk factor -1.548*** -1.863*** -1.959*
(-3.219) (-3.362) (-1.929)
Any risk factor 0.443 0.448 0.712
(1.333) (1.104) (1.091)
Deal by deal 0.062 -0.306 -0.317
(0.114) (-0.556) (-0.369)
Fund Size (M) 0.000** 0.000* 0.000*
(2.371) (1.744) (1.766)
Constant -3.465*** -2.300*** -2.116***
(-4.557) (-3.562) (-2.776)
Vintage fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Fund type fixed effects No Yes Yes
Manager fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 218 218 218
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table D4: Whole fund classification for re-
turns above 0 (pre-2005) - only classified funds,
HHI.This table replicates table 8 for a Sample of funds
whose year of vintage was in the period 2000-2004. Net-
of-fee and gross performance measures are measured from
the second to the last year of life of funds
(1) (2) (3)
Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR
Fund IRR 0.976*** 0.967*** 0.961***
(31.917) (29.918) (26.037)
Deal by deal x -exp(HHI) -1.510** -1.356** -1.207*
(-2.381) (-2.000) (-1.699)
-exp(HHI) 0.191 -0.131 0.338
(0.363) (-0.234) (0.528)
Deal by deal -3.971*** -3.825*** -3.878***
(-3.212) (-3.551) (-3.084)
Fund Size (M) 0.000* 0.000 0.000
(1.907) (0.184) (0.341)
Constant -2.610 -2.172 -0.022
(-1.309) (-0.893) (-0.008)
Vintage fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Fund type fixed effects No Yes Yes
Manager fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 158 158 158
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table D5: Whole fund classification for returns
above 0 (pre-2005) - only classified funds, any
risk factor.This table replicates table 9 for a Sample of
funds whose year of vintage was in the period 2000-2004.
Net-of-fee and gross performance measures are measured
from the second to the last year of life of funds
(1) (2) (3)
Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR
Fund IRR 0.976*** 0.965*** 0.962***
(33.820) (34.241) (28.478)
Deal by deal x Any risk factor -1.182** -1.516*** -1.795
(-2.060) (-2.628) (-1.505)
Any risk factor -0.156 -0.439* -0.265
(-0.484) (-1.739) (-0.746)
Deal by deal -0.524 -0.514 -0.441
(-1.180) (-0.783) (-0.392)
Fund Size (M) 0.000* 0.000 0.000
(1.925) (0.501) (0.756)
Constant -2.576** -0.197 0.774
(-2.416) (-0.154) (0.476)
Vintage fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Fund type fixed effects No Yes Yes
Manager fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 158 158 158
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table D6: Clusters by GP firm - all funds.This
table replicates table 6, using clustered standard errors
at the GP firm level.
(1) (2) (3)
Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR
Fund IRR 1.008*** 0.994*** 0.991***
(28.469) (28.696) (26.391)
Deal by deal x -exp(HHI) 0.401 0.734*** 0.815***
(1.526) (3.171) (2.735)
-exp(HHI) -0.204 -0.403 -0.395
(-0.533) (-0.714) (-0.521)
Fund Size (M) 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
(3.136) (0.198) (0.264)
Constant -3.961*** -4.008** -3.983*
(-3.014) (-2.285) (-1.662)
Vintage fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Fund type fixed effects No Yes Yes
Manager fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 218 218 218
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table D7: Clusters by GP firm - all funds.This table
replicates table 7, using clustered standard errors at the GP
firm level.
(1) (2) (3)
Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR
Fund IRR 1.009*** 1.000*** 0.997***
(29.017) (27.436) (25.316)
Deal by deal x Any risk factor -1.500*** -2.132*** -2.207***
(-2.669) (-3.472) (-2.992)
Any risk factor 0.519 0.440 0.650
(0.900) (0.626) (0.769)
Fund Size (M) 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000**
(3.307) (2.167) (2.162)
Constant -3.508*** -2.297** -2.103*
(-3.624) (-2.147) (-1.710)
Vintage fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Fund type fixed effects No Yes Yes
Manager fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 218 218 218
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table D8: All sample, 2000-2008, performance
from year 2 to last available year.This table replic-
ates table 6 for a Sample of funds whose year of vintage
was in the period 2000-2008. Net-of-fee and gross per-
formance measures are measured from the second to the
last year of life of funds.
(1) (2) (3)
Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR
Fund IRR 1.009*** 0.997*** 0.993***
(33.298) (33.600) (30.988)
Deal by deal x -exp(HHI) -1.531*** -1.473*** -1.491**
(-2.932) (-3.527) (-2.455)
-exp(HHI) 0.364 0.584 0.450
(0.699) (1.203) (0.740)
Deal by deal -3.348*** -3.552*** -3.721***
(-3.349) (-4.575) (-3.359)
Fund Size (M) 0.000** 0.000 0.000
(2.243) (0.780) (0.822)
Constant -1.646 -0.932 -1.167
(-1.486) (-0.945) (-0.838)
Vintage fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Fund type fixed effects No Yes Yes
Manager fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 262 262 262
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table D9: All sample, 2000-2005, perform-
ance from year 2 to last available year. This
table replicates table 6 for a Sample of funds whose
year of vintage was in the period 2000-2005. Net-of-fee
and gross performance measures are measured from the
second to the last year of life of funds.
(1) (2) (3)
Net IRR Net IRR Net IRR
Fund IRR 1.026*** 1.004*** 0.999***
(24.533) (23.871) (22.375)
Deal by deal x -exp(HHI) -1.482 -1.590* -1.826*
(-1.610) (-1.741) (-1.655)
-exp(HHI) 0.385 0.710 0.308
(0.692) (1.009) (0.370)
Deal by deal -3.390** -3.970** -4.405**
(-1.997) (-2.386) (-2.236)
Fund Size (M) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.484) (0.593) (0.869)
Constant -2.161* -1.249 -2.041
(-1.883) (-0.951) (-1.033)
Vintage fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Fund type fixed effects No Yes Yes
Manager fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 159 159 159
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
236
Appendix of Chapter 3
Table D10: Gross and net performance - venture cap-
ital funds.This table reports models for the gross perform-
ance of venture capital funds, before fees (Fund IRR. The main
explanatory variable of interest is the (Deal by deal indicator.
Fixed effects are included at the Vintage level. Standard er-
rors are clustered by GP vehicle. All variables are as defined in
previous tables.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fund IRR Net IRR Fund IRR Net IRR
Deal by deal 6.550* 5.845* 6.826* 6.023*
(1.984) (1.779) (1.950) (1.768)
Fund Size (M) 7.564** 8.545** 7.588** 8.315**
(2.175) (2.376) (2.139) (2.371)
First generation -3.600 -3.633 -1.952 -1.710
(-1.000) (-0.971) (-0.457) (-0.385)
1 - HHI -4.329 -2.861
(-0.494) (-0.323)
Constant 0.547 -2.467 2.320 -0.984
(0.144) (-0.611) (0.399) (-0.167)
Vintage fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 93 93 79 79
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table D11: Gross and net performance - all other
fund types.This table reports models for the gross perform-
ance, before fees, of all sampled funds not belonging to venture
capital fund types (Fund IRR. The main explanatory variable
of interest is the (Deal by deal indicator. Fixed effects are in-
cluded at the Vintage level. Standard errors are clustered by
GP vehicle. All variables are as defined in previous tables.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fund IRR Net IRR Fund IRR Net IRR
Deal by deal -2.258 -2.982* -2.677 -3.339*
(-1.405) (-1.882) (-1.461) (-1.774)
Fund Size (M) -0.264 -0.126 -0.483* -0.332
(-1.058) (-0.498) (-1.862) (-1.256)
First generation 1.311 0.486 1.977 0.990
(0.491) (0.197) (0.662) (0.357)
1 - HHI 7.491* 8.272*
(1.764) (1.827)
Constant 9.230*** 8.084*** 5.569 3.905
(3.318) (2.770) (1.427) (0.959)
Vintage fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 224 224 187 187
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table D12: Diversification variables and carried interest basis.This table replic-
ates table A8, replacing the Deal by deal binary variable by the Pure Deal by deal indicator,
classifying carried interest models between strict deal-by-deal distribution rules and all the
remaining ones.
Main sample, including unclassified funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 - HHI 1 - HHI 1 - HHI Any factor Any factor Any factor
Pure Deal by Deal -0.154** -0.161** -0.164** 0.172* 0.184* 0.182*
(-2.234) (-2.397) (-2.477) (1.792) (1.909) (1.887)
Fund size (M) -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.028 -0.026 -0.026
(-0.433) (-0.416) (-0.381) (-1.436) (-1.188) (-1.174)
First generation fund 0.099 0.099 0.069 0.056
(1.111) (1.072) (0.691) (0.535)
Constant 2.803*** 2.688*** 2.647*** 0.555*** 0.816*** 0.793***
(67.676) (43.855) (36.318) (9.695) (7.311) (6.321)
Vintage fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 151
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